Title: **Geographies of Youth Identity, Memory and Belonging in the Palestinian Refugee Camps of Lebanon.**

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Thesis Abstract

Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon live in a protracted refugee situation. They remain under- researched by ethnographers and anthropologists. This thesis seeks to address this lacuna. Using qualitative research techniques, of semi-structured interviews and observation, the thesis examines issues surrounding identity, belonging, memory, attachment to place and homeland. These are viewed through the lens of the traditional pillars of Palestinianness. The subjects of this research are known colloquially as *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* (The generation after the war). Commencing the thesis, the research aims are enumerated and the scope and nature of the research is outlined. A review of the literature incorporating the theories surrounding identity follows and this relates those to the Palestinian situation. An exploration is undertaken of the importance of memory, tradition and the homeland as facets of identity through the prism of *al-Nakba* (events surrounding the 1948 expulsion of Palestinians). Attachment to place and homeland are investigated amongst this generation through their concept of *Haq al 'Awda* (right to return) and what form of return is envisaged. Attachment to place is explored further through the issue of *Tawteen* (naturalisation). An examination of emigration (*Hijra*) elicits the concepts which this generation hold and how they envisage the availing of this opportunity will affect their identity. This research has found evidence of intergenerational changes in how Palestinian identity is perceived by the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb.* Factors existing in the socio-economic and physical landscapes are offered as reasons for these changes. The findings also point to a heterogeneity amongst this generation of their concept of Palestinianness which seems to contradict the portrayal by previous researchers, of Palestinian identity as homogenous. A number of recommendations are suggested which may assist policy makers and NGOs to develop appropriate solutions to the Palestinian refugee situation in Lebanon.

Abbreviations Used throughout this Thesis

AUB	American University of Beirut
CSO	Camp Services Officer
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DPRA	Directorate of Political and Refugee Affairs
GOL	Government of Lebanon
LAF	Lebanese Armed Forces
LPDC	Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee
LRCS	League of Red Cross Societies
NGO	Non -Governmental Organisation
PA	Palestinian Authority
PC	Popular Committee
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PRC	Palestinian Refugee Camp
PRL	Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon
PRS	Palestinian Refugees from Syria
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGAR	United Nations General Assembly Resolution
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNRWA	United Nations Relief Works Agency for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East
UNSCR	United Nations Security Council Resolution

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Chapter 1

In 2016, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were 11.6 million refugees worldwide in a 'protracted' situation (Preamble to UNHCR:2009 defines a protracted situation as one in which refugees have been in exile for five or more years after their initial displacement); with 4.1 million, who were in a protracted refugee situation for in excess of twenty years (UNHCR 2016: 22). In addition to those figures, United Nations Relief Works Agency in the Near East (UNRWA) estimates that there are 5.7 million refugees registered globally with them, of which 1.6 million were registered in Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) throughout the Middle East (UNRWA, 2016)[1]. In the period leading up to and after the founding of the State of Israel, over 750,000 Palestinians fled or were driven out of the British Mandated State of Palestine. They were dispersed to neighbouring states including Lebanon, where an estimated 150,000 arrived (Khalidi, 1984: 37; Peteet, 2005 :6). When the UNHCR and UNRWA figures are taken together, there are an estimated 18 million refugees in a protracted situation.[2] In 2016, UNHCR estimated that there were in excess of 22 million refugees worldwide, of which 17 million were under its mandate, the balance being mainly Palestinian refugees UNHCR (2016: 2). According to the same report (UNHCR 2016: 3), Lebanon hosted the largest number of refugees relative to its population (I in 6, or 169 refugees per 1,000 Lebanese, excluding those under the UNRWA mandate). Chaaban et al (2016: 8) report that there are over 1.1 million Syrian refugees and 42,000 Palestinian Syrian Refugees (PRS) in Lebanon, in addition to the 495,985 registered Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon (PRLs)[3]. Not all Palestinian

[1] UNRWA published a caveat to these figures which stated that 'these figures are based on data supplied voluntarily to UNRWA by registered refugees and hence may not represent statistically valid demographic data.' Nonetheless they represent 'best estimates' and are probably as close to true numbers as it is possible to calculate.

[2] UNHCR defined a protracted situation for refugees as one in which refugees have been in exile 'for five or more years after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions.' (Preamble to UNHCR, 2009, UNHCR Ex Comm. 2009).

[3] Chaaban et al (2016: 44) note that whilst there are 495,985 PRLs registered with UNRWA, 'it is estimated that the actual number of PRLs residing in Lebanon is between 260,000 and 280,000,' due they say to continuous emigration from Lebanon. It should be

refugees are eligible to register with UNRWA[4]. Almost all of the Syrian refugees have been in Lebanon since 2011/2012 and so come under the definition of 'protracted refugees'. Urban (2017) has stated on her blog that over 65 million people worldwide have been forcibly displaced from their natal homes and that 60% of them are hosted by the world's most fragile states. Lebanon, a relatively modern state, still recovering from the effects of a prolonged civil war and occupation by both Israel and Syria and composed of deeply divided communities along confessional lines, is considered such a fragile state.[5]

The stark reality of the enormity of Lebanon's refugee population provides the backdrop for the research for this thesis. Given the protracted nature of the Palestinian refugee situation in Lebanon, an examination of issues around identity for the present generation of refugee youth was considered important, due to the probability of intergenerational change (Hoffman:1984; Trommsodorff: 2006; Trommsodorff and Nauck, 2006); the possible diffusion of Palestinian identity (Allan:2014); the break with the older generations political constructs (Erni: 2013) and the constant struggle to form their own definition of Palestinian refugee identity (Erni:

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noted that as frequently related to the author in 2015 and 2016, all figures are estimates only, as registration is voluntary and not all refugees are registered. Many PRLs, residing abroad, remain registered as a contingency in the event of failure in their new country; and also, as a means of claiming their right to return to Palestine, should a solution to the Israel-Palestine problem be implemented.

[4] UNRWA (2016) defines a Palestinian refugee as: 'persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict.' UNRWA services are available to all those living in its area of operations who meet this definition, who are registered with the Agency and who need assistance. The descendants of Palestine refugee males, including adopted children, are also eligible for registration. When the Agency began operations in 1950, it was responding to the needs of about 750,000 Palestine refugees. It should be borne in mind as Zureik (1996: 9-10) notes that there are Palestinian refugees who are unable to register with UNRWA, due to that organisations' definition of who constitutes as a Palestinian refugee. These include inter alia:

- Palestinian refugees from the 1948 war who settled outside UNRWA's area of operations.
- Residents of Gaza and the West Bank and their descendants who were displaced for the first time in the 1967 war.
- Palestinians who were outside British Mandatory Palestine when the 1948 and 1967 wars broke out and were prevented by the Israelis from returning.

[5] UNHCR (2016: 21) reports that Lebanon, which it rates a 'middle- income country' suffered a' notable burden on its economy' due to the increased influx of refugees since 2011.

2013). This research will provide a greater understanding of Palestinian refugee youth in the PRCs. This will allow decision-makers at the local, regional and international levels to devise policies with greater certainty and knowledge. It will also assist service providers and NGOs to shape and provide more suitable assistance and permit a more nuanced and focussed delivery, in the context of ever diminishing resources.[6]

This study explores the nuances of Palestinian refugee youth identity, amongst PRLs in the PRCs of Lebanon. There is a surprising paucity of research in this area given the possibility that new forms of identity are emerging amongst this generation, caused in part by a worsening of the socio-economic landscape; the desperation amongst this cadre caused by a lack of agency; and the effects of exposure to other cultures facilitated by increased access to the internet and mass media. This research is focussed on the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* (the generation after the war), with an age group between 18 and 35 years.[7] This study marks the first critical assessment of this generation. Extensive research has been published on Palestinian refugee identity, much of it centred on Lebanon (Sayigh: 1977, 1994, 2012; Masalha: 2009; Hanafi: 2003, 2010; Ramadan: 2009; Roberts: 2010).[8] These studies have investigated Palestinian identity, emphasising

[6] Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) were established in Lebanon during the exodus from Palestine, during the period 1947-1949 (Peteet, 2005: 6). Originally there were sixteen, but this number has been reduced to 12 over the years, due to violence associated with the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1989) and the War of the Camps (1985-1988) (Fisk, 1992: 358-381; 604-609). In addition to these 12 camps, administered by UNRWA, there are a number of unofficial 'gatherings', of small clusters, of Palestinian refugees, mainly in the urban centres throughout Lebanon. The camps are located from the North (near Tripoli) to the South (near Tyre), and from the West (around Beirut) to the East (in the Bekka). Appendix 'A' describes in greater detail the disposition of the PRCs in Lebanon today; the demographics of; and the living conditions of; the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon. Appendix 'B' provides a profile of Shatila PRC, which is typical of the camps in Lebanon.

[7] It has been noted by Swedenburg (2007: 1) that the period of 'youth' has been elongated amongst populations in the Middle East mainly because of economic pressures, which are exacerbated for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, due to the restrictions imposed upon them by the Government of Lebanon, in respect of opportunities for work and achieving agency, for themselves.

[8] Although Chatty and Hundt (2005, 2001) have carried out studies in this area, their research has focussed on a much younger age group, which is not the focus of this research. There is a paucity of research which specifically targets this generation.

nationalist and collective identity perspectives. It is argued here, that these studies have assumed that these are identity priorities for all Palestinians, regardless of age and generation. Personal or alternate concepts of individual identity have tended to be overlooked. The degree to which individual Palestinians ascribe loyalty to a nationalist dialogue or indeed a collective identity have been ignored or subsumed. Additionally, ethnographers and anthropologists have tended to assume that this nationalist identity is homogenous and static for all Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This thesis seeks to determine if this portrayal is accurate for the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* and whether or not a more appropriate designation of this identity is one which is heterogenous and dynamic in nature. This study also seeks to examine the factors which are influencing that heterogeneity, such as restrictions imposed by the physical, socio-economic and socio-political landscapes, in addition to some of the influences of globalisation, such as greater access to the internet and the uneven spread of development as noted by Massey (1994). It is imperative that policymakers, NGOs and the Lebanese government recognise any change in the identity of the Palestinian youth, in order that the existing framework of solutions is adjusted to take account of a more pragmatic visualisation of that identity. Policies formulated by governments, NGOs and regional bodies depend on accurate information. Any change to the basis for policy formulation requires a consequent alteration in policy structure. This study indicates that an assumption of a homogenous Palestinian identity which formed the basis for policies of dealing with the Palestinian refugees is no longer correct. The assumption that this identity is static, bounded and conforming to traditionally ascribed notions of Palestinianness is no longer valid. Ignoring the changes in this demographic has the possibility of encouraging radicalisation; increasing violence as membership of factions could become more attractive; or causing this generation to adopt more desperate measures to alleviate their dire economic prospects.

Analytical Frame

The conceptual framework for this thesis was developed by reference to the available published literature on the subject of identity, with emphasis on refugee youth identity. This analytical frame proposes that the nature of Palestinian refugee identity is in a process of evolutionary change. This theory proposes that inter-generational differences in this identity have been exacerbated by socio-economic factors, political stagnation, exposure to the effects of globalisation, and a growing sense of hopelessness. This theory focusses on four aspects of Palestinian identity*: al-Nakba; Hijra; Tawteen and Haq al 'awda*. It proposes that the relevance of the *Nakba* for this identity is losing its significance for the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb.* It suggests that *Hijra* has become an extremely important means of achieving agency for them. It posits the view that *Tawteen*, previously thought to be abhorrent for all Palestinians, is now becoming increasingly palatable for this generation. It advances the claim that *Haq al 'awda,* which is regarded by Palestinians as an inalienable right is now being interpreted by this generation in a different manner from their antecedents, and a myriad of solutions are being offered as to how it can be achieved. Finally, it proposes that there is indisputable evidence that these evolving concepts of Palestinian refugee identity can no longer be considered as homogenous.

Primary Research Aim

The primary and overarching aim of this research was to ascertain the degree to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Har*b subscribe to the traditional Palestinian refugee identity as depicted by previous researchers. This is bounded in a memorialisation of the *Nakba* (events surrounding 1948, known as the 'catastrophe'), an absolute rejection of *tawteen* (naturalisation*)* and total loyalty to a *haq al 'awda* (right of return) to the Palestine of the British Mandate (Sayigh:1977,1998,2001, 2012; Ramadan: 2009; Masalha:2009; Khalidi: 1997; Peteet:2005). This study also seeks to identify any intergenerational dissonance in the expression of that identity. This is important because it will add to the body of academic work around issues of identity, memory, belonging and place. It will, as outlined above,

assist in providing more focussed and appropriate strategies for NGOs and inform policymakers at the international, regional and national levels to formulate solutions to the refugee problem.

Primary Research Objectives:

- To assess the extent to which former political loyalties are still relevant to the younger Palestinian Refugee youth in Lebanon, through qualitative survey.
- To evaluate the socially constructed identities of the self at the individual and collective levels of this generation.
- To explore how this identity is expressed through interviews and landscape analysis.
- To identify the factors contributing to contemporary fluidity, which may be causing alterations to the traditional Palestinian refugee identity as described by previous researchers.

This Research Aim and associated objectives are important because as will be shown, in this thesis, identity is not moribund. On the contrary, it is dynamic and changes not just in the normal progression from childhood through adolescence to adulthood; but also, in response to changes in the physical, socio-economic and socio-political landscapes, surrounding a community such as the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* in Lebanon. The availability of the internet and through it the exposure to other cultures has to be considered as one of the influences which is imbricating Palestinian refugee identity. It would be remiss if ethnographers, policymakers and anthropologists were to ignore the potential for change in concepts of identity in this generation, and to discount the possibility of heterogeneity amongst them, even though this is the accepted norm for members of their peers in the West (Calhoun, 1995: 293; Whitebrook, 2001: 137). This possibility for change has consequences for the future development of Palestinian aspirations for return, for a nation state, for Middle Eastern politics in general, and a resolution of the Palestinian- Israeli dispute. While this thesis has a singular overarching aim, I have identified a series

of subsidiary aims, which form the basis of each of the core data chapters, or articles in this thesis.

Subsidiary Research Aim 1

This subsidiary research aim was to establish the relevance which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* ascribe to events surrounding the *Nakba* (catastrophe). *Al-Nakba* occurred in 1948 with the formation of the state of Israel and the flight of the Palestinian people, either through fear or force, from the British Mandated territory of Palestine. *Al-Nakba* forms the basis for exilic Palestinian history and has been described as the 'lynchpin of Palestinian identity' Allan (2014: 41-45) and a 'watershed in the development of Palestinian identity' (Peteet, 2005:3; Khalidi, 1997:22). Knowledge of the origins of the Palestinian refugee situation in Lebanon has been held to be one of the pillars of their identity (Knudsen: 2007; Sayigh: 1977). Any diminution in this knowledge would indicate a weakening of this pillar and could also indicate a weakening of the memories passed on by the antecedents of this generation. It could also indicate that forgetting, the negation of memory, is occurring either on a deliberate or subconscious basis (Battaglia:1992; Nietzsche: 1873, 1983).

Research Objectives

- To ascertain what knowledge this generation, possess of their historical origins and how this impinges on their identity.
- To ascertain, using qualitative survey what importance the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* attach to *al-Nakba*.
- To identify any factors which interfere with the intergenerational transmission of knowledge of the *Nakba*.

Subsidiary Research Aim 2

This research aim was to assess the relevance of the concept of *haq al 'awda* for the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* in Lebanon today. *Haq al 'awda* refers to the right of return, to pre-Israeli Palestine, and was the codified by

UNGAR 194 (UN Documents 1948). This has been a core aspiration of Palestinian refugees through the years. *Haq al 'awda* has been one of the central tenets of Palestinian national identity as iterated by academics through the years (Knudsen,2007; Khalidi, 1997; Suleiman, 1999; Sayigh, 2001; Abu-Sitta, 1999).

Research Objectives

- To determine by qualitative survey the amount of loyalty the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* possess to *haq al 'awda.*
- To investigate using qualitative survey the degree of attachment to place amongst this generation.
- To investigate any factors which may be altering that attachment to place.

Subsidiary Research Aim 3

This research aim was to evaluate whether or not this generation were willing to accept or reject *tawteen. Tawteen* is a problematic term variously translated as assimilation, settlement, naturalisation, and implantation. It is a highly emotive term, in a country where the divisions of the recent civil war remain unhealed. It is subject to political hijacking by politicians who want to use it to convey alarm for the Lebanese population. This thesis adopts the meaning of naturalisation, which is the most neutral and probably the least contentious definition. *Tawteen* is regarded as one of the pillars of Palestinian national identity (Knudsen: 2007), and has been regarded by some academics as abhorrent to all Palestinians (Sayigh,1977; Masalha,2009; Bianchi,2014). Within the concept, dimensions of attachment to place, collective identity, homeland and belonging are intertwined.

Research Objectives

- To evaluate, using qualitative survey, the extent to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* reject or accept *tawteen* and the level of awareness of what this might entail to their concepts of Palestinian identity and belonging.
- To assess, using qualitative survey, attachment to place, either in Palestine, Lebanon or elsewhere.
- To investigate what factors are altering the traditionally accepted view of attitudes to *tawteen*, amongst this generation.

Subsidiary Research Aim 4

This research aim was to establish how *hijra*, usually translated as emigration, impacted on the concept of identity and belonging for this generation. It has been estimated by Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) that 53.5% of Palestinian refugee households in Lebanon reported having immediate family abroad. The importance of *hijra* as a means of achieving agency for the Palestinian refugees given their precarious existence in the PRCs and how they achieve that agency is deserving of investigation. This research seeks to ascertain the destinations to which they aspire to travel and how they visualise these destinations will affect their Palestinianness.

Research Objectives

- To determine, using qualitative survey, the degree to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* desire to avail of *hijra*.
- To assess, using qualitative survey, the extent to which this generation realise how achievement of *hijra* will impact on their sense of identity and belonging.
- To identify what factors are causing this generation to seek *hijra,*
- To assess, using qualitative survey, the degree to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* are willing to forgo their traditional Palestinian identity in pursuit of *hijra*.

Methodology:

This research followed a qualitative research design and used a case study methodology. The rationale for a qualitative research methodology was determined by a review of the available published material for Palestinian refugee youth identity. This indicated a lack of quantitative and qualitative material on the subject. The choice of a qualitative research design allowed for a greater understanding of the world of the Palestinian refugee youth and provided a more complete reservoir of data for this study. The case study format was selected as the most apposite due to the level of flexibility it provided and the depth of information gained; thereby enhancing our understanding of concepts which they hold about their identity. The research design commenced with an extensive literature review surrounding the subject of identity, and specifically refugee identity. A reconnaissance - visit to Lebanon followed which identified gatekeepers and tightened the focus of the research.

In order to maximise the time and opportunities available, three Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) were chosen in the Beirut area: Mar Elias, Shatila, and Burj al Barajneh. During the data collection an opportunity arose to interview additional respondents from Ein el Hilweh in the South. In all, sixty-one respondents were interviewed from the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* and an additional seventeen interviews were conducted amongst NGOs working with Palestinian refugee youth. Not all the respondents lived in the camps; some resided in unofficial gatherings adjacent to the PRCs, or in the Beirut city area. Semi-structured interviews were utilised, enabling a richer fund of data and flexibility in adjusting the direction of the data collection. Additionally, observation techniques were employed to better understand the lives of the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* and the influences on their lives.

Data analysis was initiated on the first day of data collection and was a continuous process. Coding was employed and interview responses were grouped as emergent themes were identified. As patterns became evident, the development of theory became possible. The author was aware of the

dangers of researcher bias and every effort was made to retain objectivity. A paramount ethical concern was the safety of the respondents and the security of the data collected. A system of anonymising the identity of the respondents was utilised and the key to this was kept separate to the collected data at all times. Each respondent completed a consent form prior to interview and was provided with a data sheet which explained the parameters of the interview. The detailed methodology for this thesis is outlined in Appendix 'C'. This format is the recommended layout under University of Ulster guidelines.

Thesis Outline:

Following on from this introduction, which seeks to set the context and principal aims and objectives of the thesis, Chapter 2 opens with an examination of the literature pertinent to this research. It focusses on the subject of identity which is central to it. The development of scientific theory is examined and the different hypotheses, surrounding identity are presented. The importance of place is considered given the relevance of Palestine to the refugee diaspora. Themes developed in this chapter include tradition and memory; culture and belonging; home; nationalism; diaspora and globalisation. These themes will be explored throughout the following chapters and their relevance and importance to the Palestinian refugee youth will be investigated.

Each of the following four chapters beginning with Chapter 3 is a discrete, self-contained paper targeted for publication in a peer reviewed journal. Despite this separateness, each is a vital constituent to the overall success in achieving the research aims and objectives of this thesis. Chapter 3 examines issues surrounding the *Nakba* (the catastrophe). *Al- Nakba* as will be discussed is the reason why the Palestinians are in Lebanon today. As Allan (2014) posits this is the lynchpin of Palestinian identity. This chapter explores the degree to which this event has relevance to the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* and what part it plays in their concepts of national, collective and personal identity. The history of the events in the period preceding and following 1948 is presented. The transmission of this history

through the generations is explored and this chapter drives forward our understanding of how concepts of memory, tradition, belonging and collective identity are considered in respect of this generation.

Chapter 4 continues to examine concepts of loyalty to the Palestinian national identity using the right of return (*haq al 'awda*) as a foundation. As will be shown, the Palestinians regard this right as fundamental to their being, their *raison d'être.* This chapter examines whether the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* consider this as an absolute right, as their precedents do-envisaging a return to a homeland as it was pre-*Nakba*- or as something else entirely. Issues of agency, attachment to place and homeland are explored and how socio-economic and socio- political factors might be impacting on the traditionally held view of *haq al 'awda* are examined. Globalisation is posited as one of the factors which might be causing an alteration, in this regard.

Chapter 5 probes one of the most contentious issues for Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and both the GOL and the Lebanese polity, that of assimilation (*tawteen*). As will be discussed, in this chapter, rejection of *tawteen* has been considered one of the pillars of Palestinian national identity. This chapter explores whether the level of loyalty to this issue is as important to the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, and specifically examines whether there is a willingness on their part to accept some alteration to the purported rejection of *tawteen* as a solution to the Palestinian refugee situation. Concepts of nationalism, collective identity, place identity are among those considered in this chapter. Suggestions are made as to how this issue could be a partial solution to the Palestinian refugee problem in Lebanon.

Chapter 6 continues to investigate Palestinian identity at the collective and individual level and the search for agency amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, through the desire for emigration (*hijra*). Emigration has long been an outlet for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, but has been long frowned upon by the Palestinian nationalists and factions in the camps; as it is considered as being disloyal to *haq al 'awda.* This chapter explores the

willingness of this generation to emigrate, and the reasons why they are willing to attempt to leave, most often by illegal means. The availability of the internet, a by-product of globalisation, is examined to ascertain if this a factor. The internet, which was not so readily available to previous generations, allows this generation to view life and imagined futures elsewhere. Other factors considered include the increasing pressure on this generation caused by a degradation in the physical and socio-economic landscapes. An analysis is made to quantify what this generation considers to be the most likely identity at the personal and collective levels as a result of *hijra*.

The concluding chapter, Chapter 7 summarises the thesis, revisits its contributions, and offers some conclusions which ensue from the research. A review of how the research aims and objectives have been met is presented and some recommendations are offered for policymakers and academics.

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Chapter 2

The Literature Review: Conceptualising Place and Identity.

Introduction:

Torraco (2005:356) defines a literature review as a form of research that 'reviews, critiques and synthesises representative literature on a topic in such a way that new frameworks and perspectives on the topic are generated.' This literature review was initiated prior to conducting field work and has been conducted on an ongoing basis with the aim of informing the researcher of what research has already been completed in this area; and to identify any lacunae in those fields of study. It has also assisted an analysis of the data collected, and provided support for any new conclusions which may be drawn from that analysis. The purpose of this study is to explore some key conceptions which this generation hold on their Palestinian refugee identity in the PRCs of Lebanon. The parameters of, and configuration of Palestinian refugee youth identity and belonging is little known and understood. Ethnographers and anthropologists have assumed that all Palestinians subscribe to a homogenous Palestinian identity (Allan, 2014: 4-6). In order to progress this study, a critical review of the current literature on the subject of identity, was undertaken throughout the research project. This critical review established the cross and inter-disciplinary nature of studies of identity. A brief examination is presented of Personal Identity, Social Identity Theory, and Identity Process Theory. An overall understanding of these theories is important, because as shall be demonstrated hereunder, they have been incorporated by Place Identity theorists to validate their theories. Place Identity will be examined in greater detail, as it shall be shown that it is central to the concept of identity, as Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996:206) maintain, and the categories of community, culture, ethnicity, nationality, memory, home, and homeland amongst other subsets which form the basis for this research project. The subjects of religious and gender identity, whilst being important across the Middle East, were not germane to the focus of this

research, which centred on the political and cultural identity of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* in Lebanon.

The study of identity has involved many disciplines over the years, ranging from Psychiatry: Freud (1933), Jung (1964).; to Sociology: James (1890), Mead (1934), to Human Geography: Relph (1976), Proshansky (1978), Proshansky et al (1983), Twigger-Ross & Uzzell (1996), Hull et al (1994), and Massey (1994). The multiplicity of disciplines which have examined identity has resulted in a cross- pollination of theories and terminology, which has occasionally resulted in confusion and conflation. The subjects of personal and social identities were the main focus of the early theorists. Deschamps and Devos (1998:2) state:

> "Concepts of social identity and personal identity are based on the idea that every individual is characterised by social features which show his/her membership of a group…. on the one hand, and by personal features or individual characteristics which are more specific, more idiosyncratic on the other"

Doise (1998:13) saw identity generally to be 'considered as a very peculiar set of opinions, judgements, evaluations and attitudes manifested by a person towards him/herself.' Doise (1998:14) considered identity as 'unique and singular in the personal sense; shared group membership involves common characteristics' Ellemers, Spears and Doosje (2002) suggest the same.

Personal Identity:

Following on from the pioneering work of James (1890), the field of personal identity has been the subject of much research during the last hundred years. Mead (1934); Blumer (1969); Stern (1985); Stryker (1987); Burke & Stets (2009) are some of the theorists who saw identity as the means by which persons both understand and act within and with their environments. All agree that personal identity is substantially socially constructed through contact with other people and how those people behave towards them. However, there are unique facets to each individual

which Mead (1934) called the 'I' and the social constructs the 'me'. Both of these facets were dynamic, always developing, although most of the development process was carried out in the childhood years. In this formulation, identity is a cognitive process, dependent on the perceptions of the situation in which people find themselves. These perceptions depend on personally experienced memories and learned memories, which enables the person to project the actions of the person and others into the future. A key consideration for identity is what James (1890: 310) termed 'self-esteem'. Stern (1985) highlighted the term of 'agency'; the persons comprehension that they have control over their ability to influence their environments and which is integral to their ideas of who they are. Stryker (1987) and Burke and Stets (2009) introduce the idea of identity hierarchy and salience; which establishes the 'pecking order' of identities and which identity is likely to be adopted in any given situation.

The study of identity has also resulted in various theories which tell us that people possess a number of identities that are operating simultaneously (James, 1890). In Sociology and Psychiatry identity is defined as the nature of a person, which sets him or her apart from others-the recognition by the person and others of the 'self'. Other words could be used to define identity such as personality and personhood. Casey (2001: 405-406) put forward the theory that identity is both an internal process (in the mind) and an external one through the socialisation of the person with others, in the world i.e. in 'place'. Mead (1934: 135) highlighted the difference between the physical self and the concept of a psychological self which is not present at birth but which develops 'in the process of social experience and activity' as a result of 'his relations to that process as a whole' and to other individuals within that process. Mead (1934: 136-140) describes a reflexive cognitive process, in which the individual is both subject and object, which allows the self to see himself as others see him. Mead (1934: 140) finds it impossible to separate the self from society, because it 'is essentially a social structure and it arises in social experience.' Stryker (1987) was one of the first to use the term 'structural symbolic

interactionism' to describe this relationship of the self with society and also to assign importance to role identities

James (1890: 294) wrote that:

> 'Properly speaking, a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an image of him in their mind…. but as the individuals who carry the images fall naturally into classes, we may practically say that he has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares'.

He was followed by Mead (1934: 142):

> 'We carry on a whole series of different relationships to different people. We are one thing to one man and another thing to another. There are parts of the self which exist only for the self in relationship to itself.'

Together they were the first theorists to recognise that we possess multiple selves, which are activated by our interaction with society, giving rise to the dictum 'society shapes self, shapes social behaviour', as related by Stryker and Burke, (2000: 285). For James, Mead, and Stryker and Burke, humans possess multiple identities, which correspond to the number of selves which they possess.

Social Identity Theory

One of the main proponents of Social Identity Theory (SIT) was Henri Tajfel (1981). It was developed to explain a person's self-concept as a member of a social group. John Turner (1987) developed a theory of Social Categorisation and worked with Tajfel to synthesise the two concepts (Turner and Tajfel, 1978; Turner,1999). These theories examine the socio-cognitive impact of groups and social categories on the development of personal identities. They examine the issue of group dynamics in the formulation of identity, in particular the way in which social identities reflect social categories, groups and the networks to which people belong and the behaviours likely to occur. Deaux and Martin (2003: 104) describe

social categories as ‘large-scale sources of identity that often provide the pretext for the formation of community level social networks and groups.’ Memberships of ethnicities, religions or gender categories are exemplars of such categorisations. By the very definition of a ‘category’ imaginary boundaries are set out to delineate members who are defined as ‘in-group’ from non- members who are the ‘out-group’ (Hogg and Turner, 1987: 327, Hogg et al, 1995: 259).

It is through social categorisation that individuals have a perception of themselves and attain self-concepts. At any given time, individuals will have different self- concepts and it is their perception of the ‘good’ quality of the group to which they belong which determines the degree of loyalty to the group and the salience of the group identity. Hogg et al (1995 :260) found that the core function of the group for its members was its utility in boosting self-esteem. Hogg and Williams (2000: 81-97) following on from Tajfel (1981) proposed that people are pre-disposed to view membership of the in-group in a positive light, going so far as to ignore negative aspects of a group, or indeed to re-interpret them as positive. Festinger (1954: 117-140) was one of the first to propose the relative nature of the individual’s perception and evaluation of the group, a theory later supported by Hogg and Williams (2000), who stated that motivation, within the person, for the positive nature of discrimination of the in-group from the out-group arises when the in-group becomes a part of a person’s self-definition.

Identity Process Theory

Breakwell’s (1986) identity process theory, which resonates strongly within the research, proposed the concept of identity as both a process and a structure. Identity is a social product resulting from the interaction of memories, consciousness and analysis. The structure is symptomized by thought action and affect, basically a memory system, which involves assimilation-accommodation. This absorbs new elements, both personal and social. Breakwell makes no difference between personal and social identity, but is in agreement with Mead (1935) that socialisation shapes personal identity.

Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory in Palestinian Refugee Identity

Elbedour, Bastien and Center (1997:219) suggest that 'identity is a cognitive scheme closely related to specific definitions in which we find ourselves.' The ability to exercise agency in the development of that identity is critical: 'when people recognise that their power to influence their material and social environments is critical to their ideas of who they are' (*ibid*: 219). For Palestinians in the refugee camps in Lebanon, the ability to exercise their agency is limited by the physical and socio-economic landscapes which surround them. Within those constraints, some agency is afforded to them and their identity has evolved. Identity formation is a continuous process. This process is influenced and reinforced by how we see ourselves and how others see us. In the case of Palestinian refugees, identity is strongly influenced by the condition of displacement from their ancestral homeland. Mi'ari (1998:48), in a study on identity on Palestinian refugee youth suggested that identity for them was a 'social object frequently re-evaluated by the person and others.' He delineated three categories of Palestinian refugee identity. The first was objective public identity (the person as viewed by others). The second was public identity (the person's perception of how others view him). The third was self-identity (how the person views himself). Mi'ari (1998) suggested that the first two classifications of Palestinian identity have been lionised through depictions in the media and even by academics and often rendered into a stereotypical, homogenous construct. Clemens (2007:110) also bemoans Western media for portraying Palestinians in a typified manner, without understanding their diversity. The third classification of self-identity was more problematic, as it is an internal construct, and as Elbedour, Bastien and Center (1998:221) relate, in their research on Palestinian identity, there is always a difficulty in trying to understand the self -identity of others, as the observer is' always on the outside looking in.' Mi'ari (1998) nevertheless, identified a hierarchical nature of Palestinian refugee youth identity. The first position in this hierarchy was a national identity (Palestinian). Secondly, was a local identity (place of

residence). This was followed by an Arab identity. A religious identity was in fourth place and lastly was a clan identity, what Hourani (2012: Preface, xxi) terms *asabiyya*[9]. Each of these components of self -identity sits in a refugee identity, which gives them a right to the admittedly minimal UNRWA aid and assistance. Most importantly it also codifies their right of return (*haq al 'awda*) to the lands from which they were displaced and reminds the world of that displacement, and its responsibility to right that wrong.

Place and Place Identity.

Creswell (2009: 4) outlines the currently accepted relationship between space and place, originating in the latter half of the twentieth century, which he says is the 'most important contribution of humanistic geography'- the distinction between an abstract realm of space and an experienced and felt world.'

Edward Casey (2001: 404-405) explains the difference between Space and Place, which emerged in the 1970's and is now accepted by many theorists in the field:

> 'I maintain that "space" is the name for that most encompassing reality that allows for things to be located within it; and it serves in this locator capacity whether it is conceived as absolute or relative in its own nature. "Place", on the other hand, is the immediate ambience of my lived body and its history, including the whole sedimented history of cultural and social influences and personal interests that compose my life- history. Place is situated in physical space, but then so is everything else, events as well as material things; it has no privileged relationship to that space, either by way of `exemplification or representation.'

Prior to the late twentieth century, space was considered to have primacy over place, which merely served to designate a locational point with

[9] Hourani notes that *asabiyya* in its original meaning denotes a patriarchal family system, which is typical of Arab societies. He states that it has now come to mean 'a corporate spirit oriented towards obtaining and keeping power.'

specific relations to other points in space. However, as Casey (1997: 51-52) relates, the significance of place had been recognised much earlier, as far back as Aristotle (384-322 BC). Aristotle believed that everything had to have a place, which was a point in the void of space.

Relph (1976: 43) was one of the first to think anew about place, and to consider the importance which it plays in human experience:

> "The essence of place lies in the largely unselfconscious intentionality that defines places as centres of human existence. There is for virtually everyone a deep association with and consciousness of the places where we were born and grew up, where we live now, or where we have had particularly moving experiences. This association seems to constitute a vital source of both individual and cultural identity and security..."

He utilised a research method which he called a 'phenomenology of place' (Relph, 1976: 4-7) to examine human diurnal experience, which carries on unselfconsciously. This involved investigating the obvious assumptions which are taken for granted, in particular concerning nature as a dimension of human experience. For Relph, space and place are part of a logical disputation, which allows humans to understand space as containing the places we inhabit, which in turn derive their meaning from their spatial context. Relph (1976: 45) saw that people recognise identity of place ('the persistent sameness and unity which allows that to be differentiated from others') and that there were three parts to this phenomenon: physical setting; the activities, situations and events carried on there; and the meanings of both individuals and groups created by the experience of people in regard to that place. He used the idea of 'insideness' to demonstrate the concept of identity with place and in doing so formulated the concept of place attachment. He proposed that the more inside a place a person feels –the more his identity will be tied to that place. The Palestinian refugees in Lebanon have been portrayed as having a strong attachment to Palestine, even though most of those still living have only a vicarious experience of it (Sayigh: 1977; Sayigh:2001; Ramadan: 2009;

Allan:2014). Palestinian narratives, as Siddiq (1995:88) suggests contain numerous descriptions of an identity which is 'out of place', in a state of constant flux, which 'are an effort to counteract their dispersion by an overriding concern: how to reassemble a continuous recognisable Palestinian discourse.' He adds that Palestine is the place for which 'these narratives are a sustained quest for a return to homeland, selfhood and nationhood.' (*ibid*: 89)

For Relph (1976: 20) home: 'the central reference point of human existence' is the place of greatest significance in a person's life- where the degree of insideness is felt to be most profound. Home was also important for Tuan. 'Home is at the centre… home is the focal point of a cosmic structure' (Tuan, 1977: 149). Siddiq (1995:94) suggests that, in the case of Palestinian refugees, to be deprived of home and country, is to be 'deprived of all individual identity.' Tuan (1977: 197) differed from Relph (1976: 21) however on the concepts of 'rootedness and 'sense of place', which have often been conflated by other writers. For Tuan (1977: 156-159), 'rootedness' was an unselfconscious and secure state of being in a place. Merely being at home in that place has the possibility of causing the person to lose sense of the passage of time and the world beyond his immediate surroundings. For Tuan (1977: 3-8) sense of place is a faculty used by the person, in a self- conscious act, to create meaning by connecting with the physical setting of place, being as we are aroused by the landscapes which we experience. Sense of place is not as strong as rootedness. Cox (1968: 422-424) presented a good example of the difference between the consciousness of a sense of place and the unconsciousness of rootedness, through a narrative of long term attachment to place even though the physical setting of that place may have disappeared. This can be applied to the Palestinian situation as Pappe (2006) relates the obliteration of former Palestinian villages by the Government of Israel, has not diminished the level of attachment of the refugees in the diaspora.

The diametric opposite of Relph's term of 'insideness' was 'outsideness'. This is a location where people felt alienated from place. He postulated

that the human condition operated both of these feelings about every place, which modulated the degree of place identity that each place holds for individuals or groups. Schulz and Hammer (2003:86) describe the Palestinian refugees as living in a rootless condition, which triggers nostalgic interrogations of the past, 'nurturing a constant dream of reversing the past condition of denial, exclusion, humiliation and estrangement into a triumphant return.' For the Palestinians in Lebanon, the camps represent 'outsideness' and Palestine, either real or imagined represent 'insideness.' Relph (1996) was later to offer a self –criticism on his earlier work, in particular on what he called a 'lack of conceptual sophistication'. Relph felt that because he conceptualised his theory using diametric opposites (insideness/outsideness; place/placelessness, etc.), he was confined in his exposition to a black or white rigidity, with no allowance for intermediate shadings. Massey (1997: 323) further criticised him for his seeming attachment to place over placelessness, which perhaps demonstrates a failure on her part to understand his message, rather than an actual partiality on his part. Most importantly Relph was one of the first to elevate the concept of place from being a point on a map to a centre of human action.

Following the ground-breaking work of Relph (1976) and Tuan (1974 and 1977), Harold Proshansky published the results of his studies on place identity (Proshansky, 1978; Proshansky et al, 1983). Proshansky (1978: 154) proposed the idea that the development of self-identity was intricately bound with places and things and that commencing in childhood this process is dynamic and can occur at any stage in a person's lifecycle. This concept was novel because he proposed that

> 'the subjective sense of self is defined and expressed not simply by one's relationship to other people, but also by one's relationship to the various physical settings that define and structure day-to-day life' (Proshansky et al, 1983: 58).

For Proshansky as for Mead, the self operates at both the conscious and unconscious level, in order to allow the person to regulate behaviour.

Proshansky et al (1983:58) note that Erikson (1950) and Rosenberg (1979) have 'stressed the role of the social environment in the development of individual identity.' Allan (2014: 33) noted how the social environment in the PRCs in Lebanon had affected the development of individual and collective identities, which were divergent from those traditionally ascribed to them.

Proshansky's work was different from more traditional identity theories, because it did not assume that a person's identity (encapsulated in the self) was stable and unified. Proshansky was of the opinion that the self was constantly changing, in response to changes in the person's life cycle and the social and physical environment, in which he is situated. Proshansky et al (1983: 59) defined place-identity as a sub-structure of self-identity, consisting of 'cognitions about the physical world… representing memories, ideas, feelings, attitudes, values, preferences, meanings and conceptions of behaviour and experience' within that environment. Furthermore, these 'have served instrumentally in the satisfaction of the person's biological, psychological, social and cultural needs.' Proshansky et al (1983: 61) cite the work of Relph (1976), Cooper (1974), and Fried (1963) and identify a deficiency common across their work, in that their conception of place identity fails to go beyond the home to other physical settings. An individual will encounter a vast array of place settings in the course of his lifetime and they consequently must have an influence on the development of that person's place identity. Peteet (2005:25) maintains that Palestinian refugees in Lebanon

> 'construct and participate in the local while remaining connected to and participating other distant locales via communicative technologies, economic networks of exchange, and travel. Identities are profoundly shaped by and referenced within these exchanges.'

In the structure proposed by Proshansky et al (1983) the place identity of the person is contained in 'a potpourri of memories, concepts, feelings' (*ibid*: 62). However, these memories are subject to distortion, as the person and the physical setting change over time; in effect, these cognitions

lodged in the memory of the person are stylised and highly selective, and some cognitions will be lost. This process is largely subconscious and it is only when 'a physical setting becomes dysfunctional that a person becomes aware of his or her expectations for that setting' (*ibid*: 75). In essence Proshansky et al (1983: 80) set out their position on place identity, by stating that

> 'place identity cognitions express and reflect the physical settings and the properties they support and are directly relevant to the social roles and attributes that define who the person is …. any change in cognitions of place identity are caused by changes in the social roles and social attributes of the person and therefore in his self-identity'.

Peteet (2005:28) suggests that, for Palestinian refugee identity in Lebanon, place was a 'crucial and constitutive component in formations of identity, while identity shaped place.' This symbiotic relationship has persisted from times when Palestinian refugees were 'victims', to times when they were 'returnees' to the present day when they are 'refugees' again.

Korpela (1989: 241-256) while acknowledging the contributions of Proshansky (1978) and Proshansky et al (1983) in understanding place identity, criticised their failure to 'make use of an organising principle that would help account for conduct that is influenced by a person's place identity at any given time'. The essence of his work is that a person, both consciously and unconsciously, uses place- based meanings to regulate their self- definition by focussing on meanings that balance or respond to the pressures of diurnal, existential living. Korpela (1989: 245) stated, in contradiction to Proshansky et al (1983) that place-identity is 'not a confused potpourri of images and feelings about physical settings.' It has its own internal logic and coherence as a result of self-regulation, which serves to cluster different cognitions together and 'it applies to every physical environment and object that has a role in one's self-regulation'. Additionally, whereas Proshansky et al (1983: 62) proposed that place identity went beyond emotional attachments and belonging, Korpela

(1989: 246) maintains that place-belongingness is the basis for place identity, not merely one aspect of it. Korpela (1989: 245) was in agreement with Proshansky et al (1983:61) that place identity was not restricted to the home environment only, but extends far beyond considering it as essential and wholly comprising a person's place identity relationship. Peteet (2005:219), in like manner, states that for Palestinians in Lebanon, who have never left their 'homes', 'Palestine is envisioned in the desire for the security that place can provide and the rights entailed in being a citizen.' They are keenly aware of the complex relationship between place and identity and for them 'going to Palestine remains more than an issue of belonging and justice.'

In a somewhat similar vein, Stokols (1981: 396) described place-based meanings, in transactional terms, as:

> 'an index of the interdependence between groups and place in terms of the shared sociocultural images that are conveyed by physical environments. These images constitute the non- material properties of the physical milieu –the sociocultural "residue" (or residual meaning) that becomes attached to places as a result of their continued association with group activities'

McCarthy (1984: 105) and Sack (1980) were in broad agreement that not only were place-based meanings constituents of identity, but that they were of more significance than other social mobilisers, because they are more stable and can be more readily constructed and maintained by the person. Sack (1980: 86) states that

> 'Places are significant, not because of their inherent value, but rather because we assign value to them…they become specific as we give them meaning in relation to our actions as individuals and as members of groups'

Hull et al (1994: 118) suggested that place identity is a significant construct because it enhances a sense of community and may be a subset of a sense of place:

> 'Place icons serve as symbols of peoples' memories and values and thereby make the experience of place more personal, more intimate. When these icons are encountered they may evoke the valued memories and/or other associations and thereby evoke a sense of place.'

Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996: 206) maintain that 'rather than there being a separate part of identity concerned with place, all aspects of identity will have to a greater or lesser extent have place-related implications.' Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996: 218) make a significant contribution to our understanding of the way in which place is central to our identity in their assertion that 'all identifications have location implications; place is part of the content of an identification'. Peteet (2005:30) maintains that the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon although places of confinement, were organised to represent the spaces that Palestinians left behind, after the *Nakba* and are central to the consideration of Palestinian refugee identity.

Massey (1994: 168-169) offered a view on the dynamic nature of place and identity which is similar to both Bourdieu (1977) and Hall (1991):

> 'What is specific about a place, its identity, is always formed by the juxtaposition and co- presence there of particular sets of social interrelations and by the effects which that juxtaposition and co-presence produce. The identities of places are inevitably unfixed- because the social relations out of which they are constructed are themselves, by their very nature, dynamic and changing and because of the continual production of further social effects through the very juxtaposition of those social relations'….. the identity of place is in part constructed out of positive interrelations with elsewhere. The identity of a place does not derive from some internalised history. It derives in large part from the specificity of its interactions with the outside'.

For Massey (1994: 167) places and identities are not static, in contrast to previous formulations of the concept of geographical place, which

associated it with stasis and with an enclosed security. Hall (1991: 21) maintains that 'Identity is a structured representation which only achieves its positive through the narrow eye of the negative. It has to go through the eye of the needle of the 'other' before it can construct itself', even when considerations of place are involved. He agrees with Massey (1994) that identity, including that associated with place, is always a temporary and changing phenonomen, which is a product of recognising differences and temporalities. It is always incomplete and dynamic. Attachment to place and territory remain important in modern society despite (and possibly because of) the increased mobility of the population and the production of standardised landscapes. In the case of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, this attachment to Palestine, either the stylised 'frozen' nostalgia of the older generations, or the more pragmatic attachment filtered through the 'global-aware' vision of the youth, is still the bedrock for their identity, as Allan (2014: 66-67) suggests.

Collective Identity

Collective identity is usually based on symbolic myths and sites of commemoration, which have a very specific and basic function in the construction of a culture, society and nation (Ohana and Wistrich 1996). Walzer (1983: 314) wrote 'membership in communities constitutes an important part of our sense of individual identity'. Sandel (1984: 5-6) developed this further: 'If we are partly defined by the communities we inhabit, then we must also be implicated in the purposes and ends of those communities.' Palestinians refugees in Lebanon share a common origin, a common trauma of displacement, and the common experience in living in the harsh conditions imposed upon them by the Lebanese government. They have no shortage of myths and sites of commemoration. The events of the *Nakba* (catastrophe-refers to the displacement in 1948) have been passed on to subsequent generations, through families and latterly through media, such as films, books and the internet. The camps themselves are the embodiment of their exile and locations of massacres, such as in Shatila (1982,1985-1988) and Burj al Barajneh (1985-1988), perpetrated by the Christian Phalangists and Shia Amal. Schulz and Hammer (2003:88)

suggest that the 'sharing of harassment and injustice, the denial and exclusion and this common experience formed the basis of a collective identity for the Palestinians.'

Myths internalize collective memory and they are usually spatial. The possibility of identifying a specific geographical site for myths makes them more accessible emotionally, through the meanings which we ascribe to that site. Goffman (1959) was one of the first to consider that the meanings which we ascribe to places and spaces as central building blocks in the process of social interaction. Others such as Reed (1982) developed this concept further and saw place and region as components of both individual and group identity. Groups can be formed because of identification with the same place or because of similar aspirations. The essential element of understanding the importance of place identity formation is the meaning which is ascribed to it. This ranges along a continuum from the subjective (personal experience understanding) to the objective (sense of place as location), and includes cultural symbols of place associated with a particular community. Veyne (1984: 32) writes that the ascription of meaning is accomplished by an identity using a process of emplotment, which gives a structure to the understanding of events, both as they happen, and after the event. They are configured into narratives. Eastmond (2007: 254) relates how Palestinian refugees construct a meaningful world for themselves, emphasising agency and ability over victimisation. Individual and collective narratives 'may also illuminate the reaffirmation of the self, in order to contest over-generalised and de-individualising images promoted in a camp situation.' She contends (*ibid:* 257) that 'memories of *al-Nakba,* told over several generations attest to the transformation over several generations of Palestinians into a refugee nation.'

Mc Intyre (1984: 221) suggested that a person's social identity is inextricably intertwined in membership of a community, which has a collective identity. Carr (1986: 162) concurs with this view, 'a community exists wherever a narrative account of a *we* which has continuous existence through its experiences and activities' (emphasis in the original); for Carr

this relationship is dynamic. Bellah et al (1985: 153), in their study of US community encapsulates this concept of the dynamic nature of narrative and meaning in the understanding of and formation of identity at the personal and community levels. They state that a community is constantly retelling its constitutive narrative, re-stating its collective identity using examples of people who have been paragons in upholding that identity. These memories although situated in the past offer hope for the future and tie the aspirations of the person to those of the collective, allowing the individual to understand their contributions to a common good. As Allan (2014); Sayigh (1998); and Sanbar (2001) relate, the memory of the events surrounding the *Nakba* served to form the basis for the Palestinian refugee identity at both the collective and personal levels.

Tradition and Memory

What ties the concept of the community as illustrated by Carr, Mc Intyre and Bellah et al, is the concept of tradition. Traditions evolve from conflict and debate as well as agreement. Massey (1994: 141) writes:

> 'there are indeed multiple meanings of place held by different social groups… the question of which identity is dominant will be the result of social negotiation and conflict… the past is no more authentic than the present; there will be no one reading of it.'

Traditions are shared and are fundamental to individual identity formation and group cohesiveness. Taylor (1989: 54) saw tradition as central to identity at both the individual and collective levels because the past and present dictate how we proceed to the future. Hoelscher and Alderman (2004: 348-350) maintain that memory is tied to place, in an irrevocable bond and that it is continually unfolding. It is for them a social activity and serves as a binding mechanism of group identity, because although personal memory makes place out of space, collective memory is an important factor in peoples materialistic and symbolic understanding of place through shared knowledge of their surroundings, of historical occurrences, and of their sense of belonging to a specific place. Peteet (2005:204) suggests that the Palestinian commemorations of the massacres

associated with the events surrounding *al- Nakba* (1947-1949) and the more recent one of Sabra/Shatila (1982), although temporarally divided, are examples of 'a collectivity deriving meaning at the heart of a common identity' associated with Palestine.

Connerton (1989) writes of social memories, which contain a mix of ambiguous narratives which flow seamlessly from nostalgia to critical memories, grounded in actualities. Cashman (2006) makes the point that nostalgia is not necessarily reliable and can be fluid and contradictory. Connerton (1989) also states that societies remember not only through social memory, but also by commemorations and bodily practices. Political leaders may attempt to cause the people to remember certain memories, pertinent to their political goals, but individuals will have personal memories. Halbwachs (1992) was criticised for being too deterministic when he wrote that collective memory has a strong influence on the memory of the individual and his capability to remember. A constant constituent to the subject of identity is that of the importance of memory. Assmann (2008: 109) describes memory as the

> 'faculty that enables us to form an awareness of self-hood (identity), both on the personal and collective level; identity being related to time, making humans diachronic identities. The synthesis of time and identity is effectuated by memory.'

Halbwachs (1992) saw memory as dependent on socialisation and allows us to live in groups, which in turn builds group memories. Assmann (2008: 112-114) prescribes three levels of memory called individual, communicative and cultural memory, which reflect the inner self, the social self and cultural identity respectively. She saw the different levels of memory as a dynamic- creating tension and transition between the different groups to which we belong. Memory she says is 'knowledge with an identity – index; knowledge about oneself, as an individual, or member of a family, a generation, a community, or a nation'. Anderson (1991), Connerton (1989), Nora (1989) have stated that memory is integral to nation-building. These memories are both personal and individual; and

social and collective. Peteet (2005:111-112) iterates one way in which memory acts to preserve a collective identity for Palestinians in Lebanon. The naming of areas within Burj al -Barajneh refugee camp after villages of origin in northern Palestine was instituted in the early days of exile and these names persist to the present day, evoking memories of life before *al-Nakba*. In this way, a collective identity was formed and maintained.

Tradition involves individual and collective memory, what Halbwachs (1951, 1992) described as a current continuous thought which preserves, in a selective manner all that is important to the individual or group. Tradition also involves the negation of what is not considered important to maintaining it; the process of forgetting, either deliberate or subconscious. Battaglia (1993: 430, 440) writes that 'forgetting gives rise to society, in a productive social action.' In this way Palestinians 'forget' the hardships associated with the heavy toil of an agrarian existence, the inequity of their semi-feudal life, and their lack of political agency. All that is remembered is an idyllic 'land of plenty', where village relations are characterised by solidarity, unity and generosity. Rowlands (1999) wrote on the process of forgetting in relation to the interpretation of war memorials in memory construction and identity. He talks about the creation of an 'appropriate memory' and 'remembering to forget'. The danger is that by doing so in a selective manner, veracity cannot be guaranteed as the process involves forgetting in the construction of memory, and identity. Mc Dowell and Braniff (2014: 68) also deal with the problematic subject of forgetting in memory- work

> 'Memory- work often contains an element of forgetting, usually deliberate and often this forgetting casts long shadows rendering recovery of memory difficult and the dissemination of important memory much more troublesome.'

Harvey (1989: 218) makes the case that community is the repository 'for collective memory, for all those manifestations of place-bound nostalgias that infect our images of the country, and the city, of region, milieu and locality.' However, this evokes concepts of stable identities and static

places, and undoubtedly both personal identity and sense of place are dynamic, as are the relationships between people and places, at the individual and collective levels.

Community brings with it obligations and responsibilities; it links personal responsibility commitment and identification with other people. It is as Cohen (1985: 21) states important because its symbolic rallying points are 'polyvalent, providing an all-embracing concept which can contain the multiplicity of individual objectives and expectations.' Community maintains this cohesion partly through the transmission of tradition and also through the narratives which it constructs. These two facets situate social practices and identities historically and ensure that they are repeated. These narratives are important to the form and formation of individual and collective identities.

Culture and Belonging:

Studies of culture in the late 19th, early 20th centuries saw culture as a concept of social evolutionism – a 'complex whole including knowledge, belief, art, morals, law custom and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society' (Tylor, 1871, 1924:1). This definition, which was open to accusations of racism, was disowned by later anthropologists such as Malinowski as described by Young (2004).

Bernard (1972: 3) saw the members of a culture as

> 'sharing the same ways of behaviour, the same beliefs and institutions, the same language and historical background, the result not of biological or genetic traits, but part of their cultural heritage, formed out of common responses to common needs in the historical experience of their group.'

De Vos (1975: 9) offered a more succinct definition of culture as being composed of 'members of a self-perceived group who maintain a common set of traditions, not shared by others, with whom they are in contact'.

The connection between identity and culture was developed by Erik Erikson (1950), through his work with children, and showed that

personality was the end product of the internalisation of culture within the self and personality or identity was the projection of culture. Identity was now understood as a historically and culturally rooted self- image of a group of people which was continually enhanced and influenced by social contact with other groups. Importantly the identity of the individuals reflected the identities of their cultural group. Burke and Stets (2009: 126-127) illustrate this point by asserting that person identities are verified by enacting processes that define the social system, within groups, thereby receiving recognition, approval and acceptance from others within the group, and that individuals change their behaviour and identity when it differs from that of the group.

The current understanding of culture is that it is dynamic, fluid, and inclusive of diversity, no longer considered as 'bounded'. Wright (1998), Hall (1996), Cohen (2000), Bauman (2001) have written on the effects of globalisation, which have caused this newer concept of culture. Wright (1998) sees culture as a political process of contestation among individual members or groups to define social situations. Hall (1996) proposed the term 'identification' over 'identity', in order to make the concept of culture less essentialist in nature. Hall (1990: 223) offers two conceptualisations of cultural identity. In the first, he writes about the 'shared culture', which he terms the 'one true self' hiding inside the many 'other superficial or artificially imposed 'selves', which people with a shared ancestry and history hold in common. He argues that this 'oneness' is stable and provides unchanging frames of reference and meaning. However, in the second definition (*ibid:* 225), he goes on to offer the view that there are differences as well as similarities in 'what we have become'. Identity then is contingent and not ahistorical and undergoes a process of transformation. Cultural Identities are the 'points of suture', which are made in the discourses of history and culture. Baumann (2001), added weight to Hall's use of the 'identification' term, and stated that the individual within a culture is not tied to one identification, due to contacts with other cultures within the global society. This would lead to the assumption that globalisation has transformed the concept of culture as

stable because of the possibilities of contacts with multiple cultures in the modern age, in what Appadura1 (2001) terms: 'the contact zone'. The inference which can be drawn from this hypothesis is that people are developing multicultural identities and hybrid identities as a result. (Ewing, 1990: 253; Massey, 1994: 170-172; Bhabba, 1992: 57).

Van Mejl (2008: 172-173) develops upon Wright (1998) by commenting on the dynamic nature of culture, which for him is not confined to one voice. For him, there is a continual competition for the 'power to define social situations.' Van Mejl (2008: 180) suggests that modern society has been transformed by globalisation, causing clashes between the 'demands of their own culture' and the 'challenges of a global society'. This poses problems for adolescents in balancing the differences between their natal cultures and global society. He posits that a hybrid identity emerges, whose content requires constant combination and re-combination, resulting in 'multicultural identities'. Peteet (2005:220) touches upon this changing nature of Palestinian cultural identity and its hybridity. She asserts that Palestinians do not fit easily into past anthropological theoretical frameworks. She suggests that transnationalism, their nomadic existence and their engagement with other cultures, has transformed their cultural identity, while still retaining a desire for return to Palestine. Despite identifying oneself with a culture and being so identified by others, it must be taken into account as Whitebrook (2001: 137) notes that groups are made up of people with 'multiple simultaneous, sometimes even antagonistic commitments and allegiances.' It follows therefore that cultural groups are composed of people with individual aspirations, points of view and sometimes conflicting allegiances.

The Concepts of Memory and Belonging within Nationality

Home is 'where one best knows oneself' as Rapport and Dawson (1998: 9) wrote, even though 'best' means 'most' if not always 'happiest'. It is for them a cognitive place. Tuan (1977: 144) likewise describes home as an intimate place, where we experience life as real and (*ibid:* 149) as 'at the centre of an astronomically determined spatial system- the focal point of

the cosmic structure'. Home is created through residence over time and involves both good and bad experiences. It is the interstice of place and self- history, a place to which one can 'belong.' In this way, a sense of belonging stretches from our past and includes all our life experiences along the way. The Marxist stand on home is that it is one of a social process involved in the construction of place, specifically because of capitalism. Harvey (1993: 5) questions whether or not the social construction of home as a place is used in a regressive or reactionary manner, as a means of a bulwark against some menacing 'other' on the outside. Home can also be a place of contestation and as Creswell (2009: 5) points out feminist geographers have conceived of home 'as a site of patriarchal authority often associated with extremes of abuse, boredom and back-breaking labour.' Even so, home is generally conceived of as the site of the most intense sense of attachment and safety, a centre of meaning and identity. Allan (2014:194, 195) suggests that the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* increasingly regard the camps as home; 'places they authentically belong to and inhabit.' She adds (*ibid*: 214) that identity and belonging are constituted through and enmeshed in the 'local, material world that refugees inhabit' and that the PRCs (*ibid:* 217) 'form part of the warp and woof of refugee identity.'

Memory is an important constituent in our realisation of 'home.' This sense of belonging is not 'mere' nostalgia, but much more complex as Boym (2001: xviii) describes

> 'reflective nostalgia dwells in the ambivalence of human longing and belonging and does not shy away from contradictions of modernity... At best reflective nostalgia can present an ethical and creative challenge, not merely a pretext for midnight melancholias.'

Baumann (1996: 30) says something similar, but places nostalgia and homesickness in a temporal context:

> 'we need to distinguish homesick searching from nostalgic yearning-the latter is past- oriented, while the home in homesickness is in the future perfect tense…. It is an urge to feel at

> home, to recognise one's surroundings and belong there…. The value of home for the homesick lies precisely in its tendency to stay in the future tense forever'

Nationality is defined as 'the status of belonging to a particular nation'; the condition of being national; 'an ethnic group forming a part of one or more political nations'; and as 'a patriotic sentiment' (concise Oxford Dictionary, 1991: 789). Fairchild (1962: 201) defines it as a group that may exist without having a political identity or indeed any autonomy in political matters. He further identifies cultural homogeneity and a similarity in language, distinctive kinship patterns, ethical values and a desire for a commonly experienced lifestyle as markers for nationality. Lamser (1971: 183) identifies four main ingredients of nationality: a common blood line; a recognisable race; a perceived origin; and a unique language. Ownership of the territory where this conjunction of traits meets is not a necessary pre-condition for nationality. National identity may also be defined in terms of a group with national-feeling, viewed as such by others. The Palestinians, the Kurds, and the Basques are cases in point, even though they have not yet achieved a national state, they are considered to have nationality. Smith (1983 :168-169, 174) describes the process by which a group, either ethnical or cultural in nature, transforms its identity to achieve nationality. He suggests that it is the intensification of national consciousness, attitudes and loyalties that are more important than doctrines or ideologies in the formation of nationality. Members of a nationality strive to be differentiated from other peoples, by one or more attributes, based on racial and historical association.

Nationalism is related to nationality in that it derives its substance from the same source. Smith (1991: viii) says that it 'provides the most compelling identity myth in the modern world'. It is both a feeling of belonging to the nation and a corresponding political ideology. Ignatieff (1993: 4) provides the epitome of what is the modern concept of ethnic nationalism: 'the national spirit comprised of the people's pre-existing ethnic characteristics: their religion, customs and tradition'. Gellner (1983: 48-49) makes the case that nations like nationalism are constructed and that the idea that either is

'natural' or 'God-given' is a myth. In fact, he goes on to state that the reality is that nationalism can destroy pre-existing cultures. Hobsbawm (1990: 10) concurs with Gellner in this regard by his emphasis on the element of social engineering and artefact in the construction of nation-building and by inference nationalism. Anderson (1991: 6) agrees with Gellner in defining nationalism as 'not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.' Anderson (1991: 6-7) writes of the nation in terms of an

> 'imagined political community… imagined because members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind, each lives the image of their communion'.

Baker (2012: 23) argues that although Anderson's 'imagined communities' imply that they are located 'less in material place and more in imaginary place', even imagined community is 'placed' in some way as bodies 'remain, though mobile, situated in one place or another.' Yuval – Davis (2011: 26) criticised Anderson for his comments on 'imagined' communities:

> 'the national imagination also includes former and future generations. The inability, therefore, to meet all members of the nation is not just as a result of the size of the nation, but is inherently impossible. Anderson's definition seems to assume that, if all the members of the nation could meet face-to-face, imagination would be redundant.'

Smith (1989: 361) goes even further than Anderson by stating that the 'nation which emerges in the modern era must be regarded as both construct and process'. Schulz and Hammer (2003: 15) assert that diaspora populations, such as the Palestinians often embrace nationalist programmes and ambitions in their specific memories of place, in an effort to reunite the people to their ancestral home and undo their traumatic separation. It is, they suggest, for the Palestinians a strategy of resistance by the marginalised.

Nationalism is a method to interpret social space and this is embodied in the creation of the homeland concept. Williams and Smith (1983: 505) consider that the homeland does not come ready made; instead it is the result of the national construction of social space. They go on (*ibid*: 502) to make the point that the land is intrinsic to our understanding of nationalism and our understanding of a national identity. The land is converted into a national ancestral homeland by the perceptions of the people being nationalised. Blood is linked to soil and is perceived as being unique to the subjects and reinforces the 'them' and 'us' paradigm; thereby gaining control over the homeland, whether or not political control is attained. Nationalism does not necessarily have to be territorialised as Salazar (1998: 116) states "there are conglomerates based on the principle of birth that may generate loyalties and attachments, as strong as, or sometimes even stronger than the nation-state" He further states "one of them is the attachment to a grouping that ignores geographical boundaries" and which he calls "stateless nationalism". Schulz and Hammer (2003:17) support Salazar by stating that in the Palestinian case, stateless nationalism has succeeded in building a proto-state without territory, based on the idea of territory. Edward Said (1990:359), writing about Palestinian nationalism, described it as 'an assertion to belonging in and to a place, a people and a heritage.' Kaiser (2004: 231) offered the opinion, however, that homeland making is 'the politicisation and territorialisation of the population represented as the indigenous or autochthonous ethnic community.' In other words, homelands are constructed to instil not only a sense of spatial identity or emotional attachment to an ancestral homeland among the population being territorialised, but also a sense of exclusiveness. In this way, a 'national' identity is also constructed. Much of this identity formation is contained in memories, which range from family to state sponsored memories. Tuan (1977: 154-155) wrote that profound attachment to homeland is historical stretching back to the times of the ancient Greeks; homeland is the embodiment of the permanence of place and 'hence reassuring to him, who sees frailty in himself and chance and flux everywhere'. He also cites Doob (1952: 196), in a description of the

term *Heimat*: 'the mother earth who has given birth to our folk and race, who is the holy soil……is the landscape we have experienced… the land which has become fruitful through the sweat of our ancestors.' Khalidi (1997: 21) and Allan (2014: 41, 7, 70-71) describe how Palestinian nationalism has been mobilised to define Palestinian refugee identity, often to the exclusion of other more pertinent constituents, a finding which also emerged during the 2016 research, in Lebanon for this thesis.

Identity Symbols

Harley (1988: 277-312) has described the resonance of cartographic depictions of homelands and the influence which they have in reinforcing the re-imagining of the homeland, in the perceptions of the recipients by their portrayal of images of the historic homeland to the 'sacred soil'. He cites flags, and national anthems as potent symbols of nationalism which evoke strong emotional responses across all classes and genders. The homeland is sometimes sexualised, becoming for example in the case of the Palestinians and the French an intensely female persona, sometimes a mother figure, sometimes a beautiful young woman.

Figure 2.1. Copy of picture of a Palestinian woman wearing the *keffiyeh* in a home in Shatila. Source: O'Connor 2016.

The use of a female symbol in this way is important as Massey (1994: 10) points out: 'Woman stands as metaphor for Nature… for what has been lost (left behind) and that place called home is frequently personified and

partakes of the same characteristics as those assigned to Woman/ Mother/ Lover'. In Arab culture, the honour of men is associated with sanctity of a woman's honour. (Hasso, 2000:495). The alleged actual rapes (*ightisab*) documented in Morris (1987) and Pappe (2006), against Palestinian women, were well known during the events of the *Nakba* and caused many to flee. Humphries and Khalili (2007:212-213) describe how the term *ightisab Filastin* (literally: rape of Palestine) has been used to describe the appropriation of the lands of Palestine by the Israelis. Connor (1986: 16) maintained that homeland myths, images and symbols are being used to nationalise space and territorialise national identity:

> 'the ethnic homeland is far more than a territory. As evidenced by the near universal use of such emotionally charged terms as the motherland; the fatherland; the native land; the ancestral land; land where my fathers died; and not least the homeland, the territory so identified becomes imbued with an emotional, almost reverential dimension'.

Aburfaha (2008:3 44) relates how products of the 'land' can be used as powerful symbols to evoke nostalgia, belonging and nationalism amongst both Palestinians and Israelis alike. He asserts that the 'most prominent representations of nationhood and peoplehood has been their articulation of their rootedness in the land of Palestine.' This is in the face of Israeli physical isolation of Palestinians. The cactus (*Al-saber:* also meaning patience in Arabic) was a Palestinian metaphor of community prior to 1948 (2008: 346-348), being used not only to demarcate borders of cultivated land, but also providing fruit, even in times of drought. After the *Nakba (*1948), the orange (*Al-burtuqal*) became a symbol of loss of the orange groves of Jaffa; of a robbed nationhood (2008: 348-352). In the meantime, the Israelis appropriated the symbol of the cactus and the term *sabra* was applied to the young kibbutzim who were transforming the desert into blooming arable land. (Almong, 2000) After the defeat of the PLO in 1982, in Lebanon, the olive tree (*Al- zaytuna*) became a symbol of Palestinian rootedness and nationalism (Aburfaha, 2008: 353- 358). After the Oslo Accords of 1993, there was a fear that Arafat was bargaining away the

right of return for the displaced Palestinian population. The cactus has once again been adopted in Palestinian consciousness ‘as a witness that refuses to die’. (Aburfaha, 2008: 363-366) The new symbolism of the cactus is a reaffirmation of their attachment to the soil, the land and their identity-within the same system of meaning (Turner, 1967).



Figure 2.2 Depiction of *al-saber* alongside poster of Arafat and stylised housing in Palestine on a wall in Mar Elias PRC. Source: O’Connor, 2016.

Homeland is also constructed through the use of writers, poets, artists and composers. Examples of the use of these devices to instil a sense of belonging to homeland and nation abound. Aburfaha cites the short stories of Ghassan Kanafani (2000) in which he communicated the thoughts of the Palestinian refugees, the effects of exile on their psyche and the new schemes of consciousness and identity formation, which they experienced; by this representation the experience becomes shared for new generations of Palestinians. Kanafani (1999) was to use a later novella (Return to Haifa) to demonstrate that the homeland is not just memories of the past, but how those memories are used for the future. Aburfaha (2008: 351) maintains that in this way Kanafani ‘drew a new exiled Palestinian consciousness that moved Palestine from an object in the past to an object in the future, from *nostalgia* to an *aspiration*’ (Emphasis in the original).

Shatz (2001) wrote that Mahmud Darwish was regarded as the Palestinian 'national' poet and the Palestinian President declared three days of mourning after his death in 2008.

Mc Dowell and Braniff (2014: 14-15) discuss the importance of symbols in their 'ability to embody the past and stimulate remembering in fixed locales' and the ability of 'spatialisations of the past to construct identity and shape interpretation' and by doing so 'bind communities, societies and nations in the present.' Buckley (1998: 14) cited in Mc Dowell and Braniff (2014: 19) relates that the meaning of these symbols is liable to change and different interpretations, as the individual or social group for which it is a signifier is also liable to change. In an example of this change, Khalidi (1997: 15-16) writes about the use of place names to strengthen national identity and the idea of homeland. The changing of the name of Silwan (an ancient village adjacent to the walls of the Old City in Jerusalem) to 'City of David' was carried out by Israeli settlers to establish their hegemony over Arab lands. Similarly, he cites the practice used by Israeli authorities to refer to the West Bank as Judea and Samaria, a process which he calls 'decisively submitting them (the Arab inhabitants) to Israeli dominion.'

Kaiser (2004: 235-236) maintains that the construction of national monuments and commemorative sites are essential to the making of homeland. The 'linking together of history and territory is essential for the conceptualisation of a land as a national homeland.' This linkage acts to combine history and geography, by intertwining historical memory into spatial representation of nationhood and is a powerful motivator.

Diaspora and Identity:

Although connoted to refer solely to the Jews, the term diaspora has now come to mean any group of people who have been displaced under various criteria, which are similar in nature and which are examined below.

Tölölyan (1996: 12-15) sets out six characteristics for defining a diaspora, which comprise a traumatic displacement and resettlement; a group

identity; collective memory; community boundaries; the perception of connectedness to other diasporic communities and the desire for return. Safran (1991:83-4) reduces these characteristics to four. Cohen (1996: 515) qualifies Tölölyan's definition and adds three more including a troubled relationship with host societies; the possibility of a creative enriching life in host countries with a tolerance for pluralism; and an idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety and prosperity, even to its creation. Cohen admits the possibility that the dispersion may be for colonisation purposes. Both Cohen (1996) and Safran (1991) see that shared identities are important factors, because without a diasporic consciousness there can be no such community. This does not presuppose that different identity formulations may be constructed within the same group due to differences in the experiences of that dispersal.

Venn (2009: 4) refutes the assumption that the identities within diasporas are basically unchanging, homogenous entities, rather than the heterogeneous, polyglot plural, and existential entities which they are. He further asserts (2009: 4) that the 'crossing of routes and roots' must be reassessed in the light of the modern diasporic dispersions and that the traditional assumptions of a 'sense of belonging or unbelonging' must be re-examined. He also makes the point that dislocation caused by displacement 'occasion mutations in subjectivity and identity.' Brubaker (2005:12) also urges that a diaspora should not be considered as 'a unified, bounded group connected to a specific homeland', but instead as 'a claim, an idiom, a category of practice' which is used to articulate projects and formulate expectations and to appeal to loyalties. This is to move away from 'essentialist' conceptions of diaspora. In this Brubaker is in agreement with Sökefeld (2006: 265-267). Sökefeld interprets diasporas as not having 'sentiments of belonging' and 'attachment to a home and place of origin' as constituent factors; rather he sees diasporas as 'discursive constructions of imagined communities'. What both writers state is that the notion of diaspora as static and having a fixed membership is false and that

the identities within these diasporic communities are dynamic and continually in a process of development.

Werbner (2002: 9) also sees the diaspora as dynamic and it has the ability to 'envision utopian features', as part of an ongoing identity forming process. Hall (1990: 235) rebuts the essentialist conceptualisation of a diasporic people returning to a 'sacred homeland' in order to secure an identity, and introduces the concept of hybrid identities as epitomised by the inhabitants of America. He also rejects the notion that the diaspora 'must at all costs return' to the homeland, 'even if it means pushing other people into the sea.' This is for Hall a 'backward –looking conception of diaspora'. Hall (1990: 235) defines the diaspora experience as the 'recognition of a necessary heterogeneity and diversity, by a conception of identity which lives with and through and not despite difference; by hybridity'. In essence, he envisages diaspora identities as constantly reproducing themselves anew, through transformation and difference. Clifford (1994: 307) argues that members of a displaced community, who are the subject of rejection and prejudice 'cannot be cured' by merging into a new national community'. Instead they find resonance with 'positive articulations of diasporic identity.' This reifies their feelings of 'otherness' and reaffirms the diasporic identity. This is more difficult for displaced people due to antagonism and even racism amongst the host population and leads to the non-assimilation of diasporic peoples.

Peteet (2007: 627-646) calls into question the basis for categorising the Palestinian population in the Lebanon as diasporic, rather than classifying it as a refugee population. This she asserts could devalue their refugee status and their identity. Her main arguments include firstly non-integration with the host population (*ibid* :632); secondly lack of spatial depth (*ibid* :633); thirdly shallowness of temporal distance (*ibid* :633) and finally the risk of weakening the legal status as refugees (*ibid* :635). Upon examination, her arguments seem weak. The issue of non-integration with the host population or indeed outright hostility by the host population is one of the signifiers of a diasporic population as identified by Cohen (1996: 515) and Safran (1991: 83-84). Geographical proximity to the home

land has not prevented other populations from being considered as diasporic such as the Irish (McCarthy, 2005), and the Armenians (Tölölyan, 2012). Peteet (2007: 633) cites Marienstras (1989) as claiming that 'time has to pass' before a people can be called diasporic; however, she does not specify how much time must pass. The counter- argument to Peteet's (2007: 643) assertion that their status as refugees will in some way be 'eclipsed 'is provided by Hanafi (2003: 167) where he states that 'diaspora need not be regarded as the negation of the refugee.' Finally, it should be borne in mind that 'refugee' is a legal status, whereas 'diasporic' is an etymological classification. It is possible for a refugee to have a diasporic identity.

Globalisation and Identity

Massey (1994: 156) contends, in the Marxist tradition, that 'Globalisation does not simply entail homogenisation.' She asserts that globalisation of social relations (and identities) is yet another source of the reproduction of geographical uneven development. Yuval-Davis (2011: 21) cites both Giddens (1991) and Castells (1998) by stating that the effect of modernity and globalisation has made people's sense of belonging more reflexive and that effective belonging has moved, in a process of deterritorialisation, from the civil societies of nations and states into reconstructed defensive identity communities. Lovell (1998: 1) also makes this point by saying that identity is now being questioned in the context of 'displacement, dislocation and dispossession' in contemporary debates about what experiences should be retained and by inference what should be forgotten. Schulz and Hammer (2003: 229-230) suggest that 'there is a thinning out of homeland bonds, as the homeland disappears in distant memories of earlier generations' of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, caused in part by the forces of globalisation. While this may be true, the severe alienation and ghetto existence, and the lack of agency for the refugees, has in some respects served to strengthen the desire to reach the homeland or some other land, in search of a better life.

One of the effects of globalisation which hooks (1991: 148) has recognised is that 'home is no longer just one place; it is locations.' She says that this has implications for our identity 'as part of the construction of a new world order that reveals more fully where we are, who can become'. Tölölyan (2012: 11) also makes this point when he argues 'we must be careful not to locate the diasporic's home in the ancestral homeland too easily.' Additionally, he states that as a by-product of globalisation, the diasporic possesses a hybridity of culture and identity, 'or at the very least has developed a comfortable bicultural competence.' Parekh (2008: 185) offers the following analysis on the effects of globalisation:

> 'Globalisation leads to a porosity of cultural boundaries, in turn leading to increasingly cosmopolitan multiculturisation; and finally, to a plurality of every society'.

Parekh (2008: 192) sees globalisation, epitomised by Western moral values as causing a major destabilising influence on non-Western societies and a threat to their identities, through a disruption of culture and communities. Salazar (1998: 114) offers an alternate view by lauding the development of the 'global village' since he says it has had the effect of reinforcing ethnicity and national identities. Maalouf (2000: 93) bemoans the ever-increasing speed of globalisation, which in his view reinforces peoples need for identity certainty. He envisages religious communities as 'global tribes'; and attractive to people because they 'transcend national, regional and social affiliations' and used by them to proclaim the universality and certainty of their identities. Maalouf (2000: 123) warns against the adoption of a victim identity as a panacea for countering the universal culture of globalisation:

> 'To imprison oneself in a victim mentality can do the injured party even more harm than the aggression itself. And this is as true of societies as of individuals……they are afraid of the future, of the present and of everyone else'.

Salazar (1998: 123) also argues that globalisation does not give rise to homogeneity; the more probable outcome as he sees it is the development

of wider communities ‘on the basis of common elements, in which the sense of national identity is not eliminated, but transferred to a higher level.’ Van Meijl (2008: 166) however sees that increased transnational migration, a phenomenon of globalisation is ‘complicating culture and culture relationships’ and causing problematical dilemmas for the identity of the individual and the relations left at home. He urges a ‘dialogical perspective’ to take into account the ‘increasing number of voices and counter-voices’ that are represented in the multi-cultured and hybrid nature of identity in the global transnationals. Van Mejl (2008: 180) states that the core of modern society has been transformed by the globalisation process ‘into a contact zone or a network society.’ Individuals are compelled to contend with the demands of both their own culture and the challenges of a global society. Bifurcation is the result. Their own cultural identity of origin pulls one way and a new global identity pulls in the other. Those who are successful in assimilating both may develop a hybrid identity which will continually re-combine due to other influences. Those who are not successful are involved in ‘a never – ending struggle to work out to which situation they ideally belong.’ Beck (2002: 24) observes that

> ‘high mobility and increased mediation means that more and more people are living in a kind of *place-polygamy.* They are married to many places in different worlds and cultures, transnational place polygamy belonging in different worlds: this is the gateway to globality in one’s own life’. (Emphasis in the original)

Castells (1998) asserts that modern society has become a globalised network society in which effective belonging has shifted from the civil societies of nations into reconstructed defensive identity communities, in other words more reflexive in nature. Van Meijl (2008: 166) sees the result of this globalised network as a complication of culture and culture relationships, with ‘an increasing number of voices and counter-voices that are represented in the self.’

Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) in Lebanon.



Figure 2.3 Map of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon 2016. Source: Lebanese NGO Forum, 2016.

The arrival of over 100,000 Palestinians as refugees to Lebanon (Sayigh, 1994: 17) in 1948, was followed by in excess of 5,000 in 1956, during the Suez Crisis and several thousand more after the 1967 War and the events surrounding Black September in 1970, as Al-Natour (2007) relates. As Allan (2014: 10) recounts, most of the initial refugees came from Upper Galilee and the coastal towns of Mandate Palestine. Initially, there was little involvement by the Government of Lebanon (GOL) in assisting the refugees in an organised manner. Groups of families sometimes made their own ad hoc arrangements with owners of land, which later became formalised. The League of Red Cross Societies (LCRS) was instrumental in providing a more formalised and systematic approach as Roberts (2010:76-77) suggests. Working in conjunction with GOL, the LCRS provided accommodation in tents and former army barracks in locations

scattered throughout Lebanon. In addition, some religious organisations provided land for the refugees, such as at Mar Elias, outside Beirut.

After the establishment of UNRWA, in 1949, GOL gradually handed over responsibility for the refugees to that organisation, a process which ended in 1955. In 1948, the refugee problem was considered to be temporary, and it was expected that the majority of the refugees would return to their homes, in the new state of Israel. As time went on the initial ad hoc arrangements became formalised and UNRWA took up leases with GOL and private landowners for the camps (Peteet, 2005: 6). As Roberts (2010: 77) relates UNRWA had 16 Palestinian refugee Camps (PRCs) in Lebanon by the mid- 1950s. Of these only 12 remain, due to destruction during the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1989), (Hanafi, 2010); and the War of the Camps [10](1985-1987), as related in Suleiman (1999). One of the12, Nahr el Bared was partially destroyed in 2007, during a battle between the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Syrian-supported al-Qaeda affiliate Fatah al-Islam, who had taken up residence there (Schenker, 2012:68). In addition to the PRCs there are upwards of 40 'gatherings'-unofficial agglomerations of Palestinian refugees, most usually adjacent to or situated in urban areas in Lebanon (personal interview with United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) personnel, Beirut, 2015). While the residents of the PRCs are entitled to the provision of UNRWA services, those in the gatherings are not all so entitled. Residents in the gatherings are dependent on the local municipalities for provision of sanitary and associated services, which are not always provided.

The period between 1969 and 1982 was marked by the rise and dominance of a Palestinian military presence in Lebanon. This period is related in Cobban (1984), Sayigh (1977, 1994) and Fisk (1992) who suggest that it was a deliberate act to create a Palestinian national identity based on armed struggle and resistance. Chapter 4 of this thesis relates how the PLO came

[10] Nabatiyeh refugee camp near Tyre was completely destroyed in an Israeli raid in 1974. Three other Palestinian refugee camps in East Beirut, (Tal Al-Zatar, Jisr Albasha and Dikwaneh), were destroyed and depopulated at the beginning of the Lebanese Civil War. The War of the Camps refers to the attacks by the Shiite Amal on the remnants of the PLO, in the camps, after their withdrawal from Lebanon, in 1982. (Suleiman, 2006: 6)

to the ascendant after the battle of Karama in 1968. Karama is not only a place but is also the Arabic word for dignity (Khalidi,1997:196-197). Sayigh (2007:10) suggests that this period was one where the Palestinian refugees 're-discovered a national identity as Palestinians after two decades of 'burial' under the imposed and alien identity of 'refugee', the people of the camps felt reborn, activated, given a direction.' The Palestinian youth of today are still searching for dignity, as evidenced by the respondents, in interviews for this research. The construction of a Palestinian nationalist identity as an imagined community is suggested by Hassassian (2002: 50-55), which unites all Palestinians in the diaspora, as well as the Occupied Territories. Bowker (2003) and Litvak (2009) emphasise the importance of memory and mythology amongst the refugees in the construction of a Palestinian identity. Bowker (2003: 61-63) suggests that the narrative of dispossession and estrangement from the homeland were important factors leading to the rise in PLO ascendancy; and are vital components of the Palestinian refugee identity in the PRCs today.

Researchers such as Sayigh (2012:23); Khalili (2007) and Peteet (2005) have assumed that the traditional values associated with the Palestinian polity in Lebanon have been maintained and even renewed. These are exemplified through knowledge of places of origin, identifying with those places, strengthened networks of family solidarity, and increased Islamic piety. Allan 2014 (49,61,97) calls into question whether these assumptions still hold water. She maintains that most youth in the camps have little or no knowledge of their villages of origin and identify with the PRCs where they are born. Allan (2014:30) identifies temporary networks of association and solidarity which are supplementing and overtaking the 'moral familism' noted by researchers such as Sayigh (1979,1994). Observation carried out during the course of the 2016 research noted that attendance at mosques in the PRCs was comprised of predominantly middle- aged worshippers; there was a notable absence of the subjects of this research.

A number of researchers have reported on the poor socio -economic landscape and legal rights of the Palestinian refugees in the PRCs. Al-

Natour (1997); Abbas et al (1997); Ibrahim (2008), and Chaaban et al (2010,2016) outline the marginalisation of the Palestinians in the camps, which is also documented by Peteet (2005), Bianchi (2014) and Allan (2014). Schulz and Hammer (2003:54) state that 'exclusion and marginalisation remain the most prominent features of Palestinian experience in Lebanon.' The present- day conditions in the camps are examined in Chapters 3 to 6 of this thesis, through the personal accounts of the respondents and additional information is provided from the available literature. A constant theme of the homogeneity of Palestinian identity runs through the published research of Sayigh (1977,1994), Masalha (2009), Ramadan (2013) and Bianchi (2014) amongst others. This thesis challenges that assumption and proposes that the emerging Palestinian identity amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* is heterogenous in nature and that there are palpable intergenerational differences in how that Palestinianness is conceptualised and expressed.

Conclusion

This review has examined the concept of identity through the lens of personal, social and place identities. It has established the primacy of place over space. It has shown that place is a determining factor in all aspects of identity. Place is central to concepts of home, homeland, culture, ethnicity, nationality, nationhood. Concepts of diaspora, memory, symbolic meaning, and globalisation are all related to place identity. Far from being just a location on a map, or a point of reference, place is an essential component of a person's identity and also that of the collective. As Fried (1963: 156) stated 'a sense of place is fundamental to human functioning'. Relph (1976:43) also saw place as a 'centre of human existence' which constitutes a vital source of 'both individual and cultural identity.' Cooper (1976: 436) wrote that place was integral to rationalising one's own identity. Proshansky et al (1983: 57) saw that place was equally important for the development of self-identity to 'the making of distinctions between oneself and significant others.' Korpela (1989: 241) saw place as the means of maintaining 'psychic balance' and the 'coherence of one's self and self-esteem'; the basic components of personal identity. It is hoped that

this brief review of literature on identity has demonstrated the progression of our understanding of place from a bounded locale to place as a means of generating meaning and identity. This is a dynamic and ongoing process, incorporating historical understandings, imagined communities, and perceived realities. The end state of this understanding is as Hauge (2007: 50) observes that places are 'not only contexts or backdrops, but also an integral part of identity.' In the case of the Palestinian refugee youth, the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, place continues to be an important component of their identity, as the research for this thesis demonstrates. Chapter 4, dealing with *Haq al 'awda* examines whether the place in question ranges from the idealised place of Palestine, as passed on to them from the previous generations and through the symbolism transmitted through the literature and media; or a more pragmatic visualisation of what Palestine might be in the future. Place as represented by the PRCs also has an important influence on the development of their identity as many of them are not able to recognise place of origin in Palestine as will be developed in Chapter 3 dealing with *al-Nakba*. The importance of place elsewhere- imagined place- is also important for this generation as evidenced in Chapter 6, dealing with *Hijra*, either as a gateway to an eventual return to Palestine or as a base for a new home either in Lebanon (Chapter 5, dealing with *Tawteen*) or elsewhere.

Conceptual Framework

This thesis seeks to present an understanding of the world which the Palestinian refugee youth, in Lebanon, inhabit and the social worlds which they wish to inhabit and how they transmit their concepts of these worlds to others. By drawing on theories and multi-disciplinary perspectives, this thesis explores the socio-economic and socio-political landscapes of the PRCs. Giddens (1979:206-207) described place as the locale – 'a place spatially distinct from those with others' which he said applies to all social interactions. For the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* in Lebanon, place can mean either Palestine, or the PRC, or even places in imagined futures. This research seeks to capture the meaning of these locales for this generation and quantify what effects they produce on identity. In human geography,

the concept of lifeworld is central to an understanding of the totality of an individual's interaction with place and the environment experienced in existential living (Pickles:1985; Christensen:1982; Buttimer: 1976). For the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, it encompasses the conscious endeavours which shape their lives, and the subconscious impacts of the world which they inhabit. This thesis seeks to present an understanding of how these two facets are altering traditionally held ideas of Palestinian identity at the personal and collective levels and demonstrate the level of heterogeneity which is common to any grouping of humans including those of this generation.

The core elements of this thesis focus on place, identity, memory and belonging, in the context of this generation of PRLs and examines some of the factors which are thought to be causing a change in the long 'accepted' depiction of them, by previous researchers. The importance of place was increasingly recognised, in late twentieth century research, with the work of Relph (1976,1996); Tuan (1974, 1977); Proshansky (1978;1983); Korpela (1989); and Casey (1997,2001a; 2001b); amongst others, showing that place was central to the construct of identity. Previous to these writers, place was often considered as merely a geographical location, situated in space. Place became posited as an important constituent of identity, and the theory of place identity was born (Twigger-Ross and Uzzell, 1996:206; Massey, 1994: 168-169; Relph, 1976:45). It was also shown to be a dynamic concept, which changes in response to the perception of the individual and collective of the environment. In this thesis, place is considered, not just in terms of Palestine, but also with regard to the PRCs in Lebanon and imagined futures elsewhere. Mc Donald, Pini, Bailey and Price (2011); Thompson and Holland (2002) have published research about the imagined futures of youth but perhaps the work of Vigh (2009) on the imagined futures of would be immigrants in Bissau is most apposite in this context. The imagined futures elsewhere are a means to achieve agency for *the Jeel ma baa'd El Harb,* who are striving to drive beyond the restrictions imposed on them through the legal, socio economic and socio-political barriers in Lebanon. The varied nature of these imagined futures

indicate that they are intensely aspirational with a capability to exercise a limited form of agency, within the constraints of those barriers.

Identity has been the subject of research across scientific disciplines including Sociology, Psychiatry, Psychology and Geography. Many theories have been developed to explain the concept, some of which have borrowed from each other to form inter- disciplinary hypotheses. (Freud 1933; Jung, 1964; James, 1890; Mead, 1934; Relph,1976; Proshansky,1978; Proshansky et al, 1983; Twigger-Ross & Uzzell, 1996; Hull et al, 1994; and Massey, 1994). This thesis addresses aspects of the historical development of identity theories, and will explore some of the competing and complementary hypotheses. The influence of place on identity is considered due to the importance of Palestine, as *place* in Palestinian nationalist ideology as described by ethnographers through the years (Khalidi,1997; Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 1977). Allan (2014:33) suggests that 'placelessness, provisionality and poverty' may be producing its own form of Palestinian identity, one which is separate from a national identity, which is based on 'ancestral land and return'. This suggestion is unsurprising given that diasporic populations have been found to weaken the bonds to their ancestral home, with the passage of time (Venn, 2009:4; Sökefeld, 2006: 265-267). This thesis seeks to ascertain what importance place holds for the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb;* to determine if Palestine, either as it was pre-1948 or some entity within the borders of that area, is as critical to their identity, as it was to their predecessors; and to see if places other than Palestine, such as Lebanon itself and places represented by destinations in the wider world, are factors in their concepts of identity.

Memory is important for the maintenance of tradition and an important constituent in a person's identity. This generation can only have a vicarious memory of Palestine and the events surrounding the exodus from Palestine. Khalidi (1992:22); Sanbar (2001:90) and Peteet (2005:3) all agree with Allan (2014:41) when she asserts that memory and knowledge of the events of *al-Nakba* serve as the 'lynchpin of collective identity' and the 'essence of their identity and humanity.' The transgenerational transmission of memories is explored, in order to determine the importance

or lack of it as a constituent of identity for the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, today. Belonging, which is closely allied to memory is examined as part of the research into the collective identity of this generation. An appraisal is made to ascertain if this generation have a concept of belonging to one of the many manifestations of Palestinianness such as a Palestinian nascent nation; a Palestinian polity; a Palestinian diaspora; a greater Arab or indeed Islamic *umma*, all of which are different entities. As iterated earlier, ethnographers have ascribed to them a strong sense of belonging, in a nationalist archetype of the concept. It is explored here whether this depiction still holds true for this generation. Diasporic identity is examined in this context, to see if this generation have been impacted by existential pressures, which might impinge on the traditionally ascribed Palestinian diasporic refugee identity, by previous researchers.

Factors which may impinge on this generation's concepts of identity, attachment to place, absorption of memory and concepts of belonging are explored. The socio-economic, socio-political and physical landscapes are considered, in this thesis, as elements which may cause aberrations in the traditional ascriptions of Palestinian identity, as reported by academics in the past and outlined above. Authors such as Ulrich Beck (1994:18-20) suggest that life (sub-politics, as he terms it) is dominated by issues such as wealth, health, security, public services, agency, and only occasionally deals with collective nationalist issues. Allan (2014: 26) suggests that 'placelessness, provisionality, and poverty may be producing its own form of Palestinianness' (:33), one which is separate from a national identity, which is based on 'ancestral land and return.' Globalisation and the increasing availability and use of the internet are also examined. Both Massey (1994) and Parekh (2008) have noted that globalisation proceeds in an uneven way with the benefits not being equally distributed. Allan (2014) notes that Lebanon's voracious consumer culture is putting pressure on the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, who aspire to have what their peers in the Western world have. By analysing the ways by which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* achieve the social construction of places and the sedimented layers of meaning associated with those places, enclosed as they are in physical

space, this study attempts to capture concepts of identity and belonging for this generation, so that policymakers and NGOs can design better strategies for providing solutions and services. It will also assist academics to achieve a greater understanding of how identity is malleable and responsive to changes in demographics, socio-economic and socio-political landscapes and may inform analyses of other refugee situations.

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Chapter 3

Al-Nakba in the Twenty-First Century: Memory and Identity Constructs for Palestinian Refugee Youth in Lebanon.

Abstract:

Al- Nakba (the catastrophe)-resulted in the expulsion of thousands of Palestinian inhabitants at the foundation of the State of Israel. Knowledge of this primary causal factor of Palestinian refugee residence in Lebanon-has been consistently considered by academics, in the past, to be a central pillar of Palestinian refugee identity. It provides the root cause of their exilic existence. It serves as a reminder to the international community that Palestinians have been displaced from their place of origin and is at the crux of their belief in the right of return. This paper examines the degree of knowledge about this pillar amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* (the generation after the war), in order to measure their adherence to the 'accepted' view of Palestinian refugee identity. The data for the paper emanates from interviews conducted with this generation in four refugee camps and urban areas in Lebanon between 2015 and 2016. Exploring concepts of memory, belonging and place identity, it documents intergenerational differences in the remembering of *Al-Nakba* and suggests that it is possible to detect a change in how the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* situate the *Nakba* in their personal and collective identities. Some factors which may account for these changes are proposed.

Keywords: *Nakba,* Palestinian refugee, Lebanon, identity, ideology, collective memory, agency, civic rights

Introduction:

Constantine Zurayk (1956) was the first to coin the phrase 'the catastrophe' to describe events of the *Nakba* of 1948. May 15th 1948, associated with the foundation of the state of Israel, and the upheaval of the indigenous people of Palestine, has become synonymous to Arab scholars and the general populace throughout the Middle East, as the day of the catastrophe. This paper proposes that the origins of the *Nakba* pre-date the

events of 1948, by perhaps 50 years and that the *Nakba* was pre-meditated, rooted as it was in Zionist colonial policy. It is not historically static, at least in the minds of the Palestinian refugees as they perceive it as continuing today. This paper presents an analysis of the factors which contributed to the *Nakba.* Zionist colonial ambitions (Masalha, 2009); a lack of Palestinian unity (Khalidi, 1997); British mendacity (Barr, 2011); Western guilt over the Holocaust (Hirst, 2010); and regional rivalry (Masalha, 2009) were among the many factors which facilitated the *Nakba.* Western and in particular US support for the present day colonial ambitions of the state of Israel, continues to prolong the *status quo* of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon today.

The overarching aim of the research for this paper is to establish the relevance which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* (the generation after the war) ascribe to events surrounding *Al- Nakba* (the catastrophe). *Al-Nakba* occurred in 1948 with the formation of the state of Israel and the flight of the Palestinian people, either through fear or force, from the British Mandated territory of Palestine. *Al-Nakba* forms the basis for exilic Palestinian history and has been previously described by academics as the lynchpin of Palestinian identity and a watershed in the development of Palestinian identity. It has three core questions:

- To ascertain what knowledge this generation, possess of their historical origins and how this impinges on their identity. Knowledge of the origins of the Palestinian refugee situation in Lebanon has been held to be one of the pillars of their identity. Any diminution in this knowledge would indicate a weakening of this pillar and could also indicate a weakening in the memories passed on by the antecedents of this generation. It could also indicate that forgetting, the negation of memory, is occurring either on a deliberate or subconscious basis.

- To ascertain what importance the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* attach to *al-Nakba*.

- To identify any factors which interfere with the intergenerational transmission of knowledge of the *Nakba*.

This paper challenges the conventional representation of Palestinian refugee identity. This representation has been narrated as that of a homogenous group whose identity was comprised of three main components. Firstly, an immortalisation of their eviction from the lands of their birthright, in 1948 (*al -Nakba*) (Peteet: 2005). Secondly, a blanket opposition to naturalisation or re-settlement in other countries (*tawteen*) (Sayigh: 2001; 2012). Thirdly, a rejection for any option which did not include a right to return (*haq al 'awda)* to Palestine (Bianchi: 2014). In ascertaining if these concepts of Palestinian identity and belonging hold true for this generation, this paper investigates for the presence of any inter-generational divergences from the 'accepted' view. It also seeks to quantify some of the factors which may have caused such differences.

A conceptual framework for this paper is provided by Diana Allan's (2014) study, in which she proposed that the protracted nature of the Palestinian exilic condition had altered their formulation of identity and identification at the personal level. These articulations of personhood and collective identity do not always coincide with those which are more oriented towards nationalistic expressions of Palestinian identity as advocated by the Palestinian Authority (PA); the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO); and the Popular Committees (PCs) in the Lebanese Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) (2014: 26). Allan's (*ibid*: 2, 8) study highlighted the daily poverty, the struggle to survive, and the lack of agency which have been largely hidden from view, by the 'goals of Palestinian nationalism'. This, she states, is centred on a rejection of *tawteen* and a demand for *haq al 'awda.* She also maintains that 'the very anomalousness of camp life and refugee experience' may be producing a separate form of "Palestinianness", 'distinct from a national identity tied to ancestral land' (*ibid*: 33); this is particularly noticeable amongst younger generations, 'producing flickers of quiet personal resistance (*ibid*: 61).

The research for this paper was conducted using a case study methodology, through the qualitative research tools of interview and observation. The four PRCs of Ein el Hilweh, Burj al Barajneh, Shatila and Mar Elias were the primary sources of data collection. Additional data collection was undertaken amongst Palestinian refugee respondents in the urban areas of Beirut. The respondents were aged between 18 and 35 years and correspond to the demographic known colloquially as the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* (the generation after the war). This paper examines an area which has been overlooked in the past as it focusses on the next generation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. There have been various general academic studies published on Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, but none are specific to this generation. (Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 1977, 1994, 2001; Suleiman, 1999; Ramadan, 2009; al-Natour, 2007). This paper seeks to correct that imbalance by focussing on the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb,* in order to explore the effects of the deterioration in the physical, socio-economic and cultural prospects in the PRCs, on their conceptions of identity.

Displacing Palestine

Theodor Herzl, the founder of the Zionist movement wrote in his diaries in 1895 of transferring the indigenous occupants of Palestine to other Arab countries in the region and re-populating the land with Jews, in order to reclaim their 'historic' homeland, basing his right to do so on the Bible (Herzl, 1960: 88). He did not set a limit on how much territory should be appropriated, wanting an exclusively 'Jewish' state. This was to form the basis for Zionist ideology and the development of plans for the 'repossession' of the biblical inheritance of Palestine. Two years later he was instrumental in founding the World Zionist Organisation, which rapidly gained the support of Christian Zionists such as Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson, who saw the justice of a Jewish homeland in the 'Holy Land.' As Barr (2011: 32-35) outlines, the British also saw that the creation of a Jewish colony immediately East of Suez, would safeguard their control of the Suez Canal and at the same time create a favourable

impression amongst the Jewish diaspora. The Sykes- Picot Treaty of 1916 split the Ottoman Empire between the French and British, and Imperial Russia was to get Istanbul and Armenia. In 1917 this agreement was made public by the Bolsheviks (Barr, 2011:60). In 1917, Balfour the British Foreign Minister made his famous 'Balfour Declaration' (Pappe, 2006: 13), which offered support for the 'establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people.' The declaration, published in a letter to the prominent British Zionist, Lord Rothschild never referred to the indigenous population by name, using the term 'non-Jewish communities', and stating that 'nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights' of these communities.



Foreign Office,
November 2nd, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country".

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours

Figure 3.1. Copy of the Balfour Letter. Source Wikipedia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balfour_Declaration. Accessed 12 Nov 2014.

With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire (1918), Britain was authorised by the League of Nations as the Mandatory Power for Palestine (16 September 1922). Increased Jewish immigration followed, much to the resentment of the Palestinian population, who found themselves

dispossessed by Jewish land purchases and the Jewish policy of using only Jewish labour (Shapira, 1992: 53 – 82). Resistance increased culminating in the Great Arab Revolt (1936-1939), which was brutally suppressed by the British, with Jewish assistance (Hirst, 2010: 34, 37; Pappe, 2006:16). The British operated a policy of 'divide and rule' amongst the Palestinian elite, supporting rival factions, such as the Hussaynis and the Nashashibis, dividing up public roles between them, thereby weakening the Palestinian ability to oppose Jewish immigration and preventing a unified, effective, oppositional, political base (Barr, 2011: 168-169). As time progressed, Palestinian –Jewish disturbances became increasingly violent and the British became targets when they tried to curb Jewish immigration. After the Second World War (1939-1945), the revelations about, and Western guilt surrounding, the Holocaust (Hirst, 2010: 47) made curbing Jewish immigration problematic and with the increasing inter-communal and anti-British violence, the British decided to hand the problem of Palestine over to the United Nations (UN), in late 1947, announcing a departure date of 15 May 1948. This date marks the change of patronage of the Jewish proto-state from the British to the US, which was the ascendant superpower, in the region.

The UN, in late 1947, proposed a partition of Palestine, which neither the Jews nor the Palestinians accepted. The inter-communal violence intensified and by 15 May 1948, when the new state of Israel was proclaimed, Jewish forces had already succeeded in expelling 350,000 Palestinians and had destroyed 200 villages and towns Pappe, (2006:263; Preface xv). Masalha (2009:56) states that throughout 1948, the Israeli forces outnumbered all the Arab forces, both regular and irregular, operating in Palestine. Using Israeli military archives, he estimated that Israel 'fielded 35, 000 troops, whereas the Arabs fielded 20,000-25,000.' Pappe (2006: 44) puts the figures at 50,000 for the Israelis and 7,000 for the Palestinians, bolstered by 3,000 volunteers. Additionally, the Israelis were better armed in terms of artillery, tanks and aircraft, imported from the Eastern bloc. Masalha, (2012:71) asserts that the Arab coalition facing Israel was 'the most deeply divided disorganised and ramshackle coalition

in the history of warfare.' Pappe's assertion would seem to cast doubt on the official Israeli narrative of a David and Goliath struggle between a small Israeli force and overwhelming Arab armies (Masalha, 2012: 68-70; Geertz, 2000: 5; Shlaim, 2004).

Pappe (2006) has unequivocally described the events prior and subsequent to 1948 as ethnic cleansing. These include murder, rape, looting and appropriation of property in addition to the innumerable deaths caused on the trek of the displaced refugees to the neighbouring Arab borders. Pappe (2006: 208-211) is certain that 'severe cases of rape did take place', coupled with the robbery of women's jewellery and in some cases, such as at Tantura, the murder of the rape victims. The fear of rape caused many to flee, as did the reports of Jewish forces killing prisoners after a village had surrendered. Pappe (2006: 258) states that using a combination of Palestinian and Israeli military archive sources, it is possible to 'list thirty-nine confirmed massacres' perpetrated by Jewish troops between 11 December 1947 and 19 January 1949. It is virtually impossible to estimate how many Palestinians died due to murder, battle casualties or on the long treks to escape Jewish forces. The tragedy for the Palestinians was that the euphoria which surrounded the announcement of a new state for the Jews occluded the brutalisation and displacement of the Palestinian people, who bore no blame for the events of the Holocaust or the various pogroms in Europe through the centuries.



Figure 3.2. Map showing Areas of Origin of Exodus of Palestinian Refugees in 1948. Source: Suleiman (2006: 5).

Over 150,000 Palestinians were displaced to Lebanon (Khalidi, 1984: 37; Peteet, 2005: 6), with the formation of the state of Israel in 1948.This displacement was accompanied by a number of massacres and destruction of some 418 villages (Khalidi, 1992), perpetrated by Jewish forces and the Israeli Army. Morris (1987; 2004: 165, 236) states that this policy was a decision to 'destroy villages in strategic areas along crucial routes, regardless of whether or not they were resisting.' Morris (2004: 348) suggests that after the mass exodus in 1948 the military necessity for this destruction became political- the thrust of which was to prevent a return of the Palestinian occupants. This became known to the Palestinians as the *Nakba* or 'the catastrophe', when 14% of the exodus came to Lebanon. The refugees were Muslim, in the main, and were initially welcomed warmly

by the citizens of Lebanon. In 1948, United Nations General Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 194[11] was passed which guaranteed the right of return and/or compensation to the refugees, which Israel still refuses to observe. The UN established UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the Near East) in 1949 to cater solely for the Palestinian refugees in the Middle East[12]. This organisation tended to the humanitarian needs of the refugees, but, crucially afforded them no legal protection.

Palestinian resistance to Israel increasingly became concentrated in Lebanon, during the 1960's and in particular when the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) set up its headquarters there after their expulsion from Jordan in 1970. From this period until 1982, the Palestinian refugees benefitted from PLO power and remittances and they spurned the mantle of refugees, in an act of resistance, calling themselves 'returnees' (*a'idoun*) (Schulz and Hammer, 2003: 131). They no longer considered themselves as passive 'victims' *(ibid*: 131). The military operations carried out from Lebanon by the PLO resulted in many casualties, most of them innocent Israeli civilians. Israel's response was to invade Lebanon, first in 1978 and again in 1982, going all the way to Beirut. The massacre carried out by Phalangist, Christian militias, with the support of the Israeli Army at Sabra and Shatila, 1982 (Fisk, 1992: 358-381), had a profound effect on the Palestinian psyche, in Lebanon, resulting in the re-adoption of the 'victim' identity and that of refugee and which still persists today. Politically, the Palestinians had become allied with leftist Muslim parties and militias and eventually were dragged into the Civil war in Lebanon. The expulsion of the PLO from Lebanon, in 1982 and again in 1983, left the refugees largely defenceless and Shia militias attacked a number of camps during 1985-

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[11] UN Documents 1948, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194, Available at: www.un.org/documents/ga/res/3/ares3.htm, Accessed11 July 2013.

[12] UN Documents 1949, *United Nations General Assembly Resolution 302*, Available at*:* unispal.**un**.org/UNISPAL.../0/AF5F909791DE7FB0852560E500687282 Accessed 11 July 2013.

1987, which became known as the War of the Camps (Fisk, 1992: 604,609).

12 Palestinian Refugee Camps survive in Lebanon, today. The Lebanese Civil War was finally ended with the signing of the Taif Accords (1989). The Palestinians became scapegoats for causing that war. O'Connor (2013:17-18) suggests that among the reasons for the practice of blaming the Palestinians was the refusal of the main sectarian groups, in Lebanon, to recognise their inherent differences and a lack of resolve on their parts, to find a means to peacefully bridge the gaps between them. As Rogan, (2011:.479) says 'Differences between the Lebanese had grown so profound that the Palestinians were no more than a catalyst in a conflict to redefine politics in Lebanon'. A secondary reason to blame the Palestinians was a failure of the Arab nations to take responsibility for their defeat by Israel and to engage in diplomacy with that state in order to find a solution to the Palestinian problem. Finally, a reason for the scapegoating of the Palestinians can be found in what Barash and Webel (2009:136-137; 183-184) term as factors of racial intolerance, which they suggest explain the tendency to perceive the 'other' as hostile, while holding oneself blameless" and are useful in considering all the communities in Lebanon, at this time.

Consequently, the Government of Lebanon (GOL) re- introduced the harsh regime which had been in force prior to 1969. The Palestinians were now denied the right to work in anything but the most menial of employment, and suffered from a lack of civil rights. Their right to own property was stripped from them, and they were denied any prospect of integration into the Lebanese population. This situation remains largely unchanged today. Once again, Palestinian refugees refer to themselves as 'refugees', because they see that label as bestowing on them access to the limited assistance provided to them by UNRWA; it also serves to remind the international community that it has an obligation to them; and importantly it signifies resistance and defiance in the wake of their

perceived abandonment by Arafat in the agreements after the Oslo Accords[13].

Context of al-Nakba within Palestinian Identity and Collective Memory:



Figure 3.3. Palestinian Identity in Triadic Representation.

Using Georg Simmel's (1908, [1955]) geometric symbolism as a model, this paper encapsulates diasporic, refugee Palestinian identity as a triadic figure. One element is *al-ghurba* (exile) - a condition which spans history from the beginning of the Zionist colonialization of Palestine and which pre-dates 1948; existing today for those refugees in Lebanon; and likely to continue well into the future. A second element is the acceptance/rejection of *tawteen* (naturalisation) at both the personal and collective dimensions. Embedded within this factor are the concepts of the repression of the Lebanese government and the antipathy of large swathes of the Lebanese population to the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The willingness to accept *tawteen* demonstrates the economic pressures on the refugees,

[13] Interviews conducted by the author in Lebanon 2015/2016.

causing them to accept any solution to ameliorate their perilous situation. The rejection of *tawteen* by the Palestinian refugees epitomises the refusal to be subsumed into another nation and also to remind the world that the Palestinians have been wronged and that redemption is theirs by right. The third element is the belief in *haq al 'awda* (right of return), which has existed morally, since the first expulsions from Palestine and legally since UNGAR 194 was passed, in 1949. In this representation, these three elements are grounded upon the *Nakba*, which effectively constitutes the base of a triad. Each is a component of *al-Nakba*, each interacts with the other through the *Nakba*, and each has the *Nakba* as a causal factor. This representation of Palestinian identity can be considered in linear terms on a timescale from past history (events surrounding 1948) through the present (the ongoing *Nakba* and debates over *tawteen*) to the hope for a future (*haq al 'awda*). In this conception of Palestinian identity, the *Nakba* has shaped each of the three elements and has been as Peteet (2005: 3) and Khalidi (1997: 22) describe 'a watershed in the development of Palestinian identity' and a 'potent source of shared beliefs and values', which has reinforced both the collective and individual sense of Palestinian identity.

Allan (2014: 41-45) states that 'narratives about the *Nakba* have emerged as the symbolic lynchpin of collective identity and the bedrock of Palestinian nationalism' and that the continued existence of Palestine and its people, it is assumed, now depends on a 'consciously remembered history and cultural tradition.' She cites Sanbar (2001: 90) as being of the opinion that 'for refugees the memory of 1948 is presented as the essence of their identity.' However, as she suggests this statement does not account for the 'different experiences of the refugees' and the passage of time, nor the 'disparateness of individual memory. This institutionalised understanding of 1948 in 'starkly political terms', with refugees as the remnants of historic tragedy, 'puts the burden of remembrance on those with the least resources to bear it'- the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* youth of today.

Volkan (2004:1) opines that 'members of a massively traumatised group' cannot complete certain psychological tasks and they, then, transmit such

tasks to the children of the next generation(s) along with the 'conscious and unconscious shared wish that the next generation(s) will resolve them.' He says that the 'shared mental representation of the historical traumatic event' may emerge as a 'chosen trauma', which becomes a significant marker for the large- group identity. Khalidi (1997: 19- 34) charts the emergence of the collective Palestinian identity, which evolved over time, stating that it 'emerged unevenly', commencing in the early 20th century, and finding renewed strength with the foundation of the PLO. There can be no doubt that the events surrounding the *Nakba* were intensely traumatising for the Palestinians and that remembrance of these events is still strong amongst them. Volkan (2004: 4) proposes that if an event turns into a 'chosen trauma', what becomes significant is the fact that the group carries the mental representation of the traumatic event – along with associated shared feelings of hurt and shame- from generation to generation. During this transgenerational transmission, the mental representation of the event emerges as a significant large-group marker and the group draws the shared mythologised mental representation of the event into its very identity. Hirsch (1997: 22-24), although writing about the Holocaust, also suggests that traumatic memory transfer can be transgenerational with the transferred memory pervading the existential lives of subsequent generations, in what she terms 'postmemory'. It can be argued that there is a limited postmemory for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, even though post memory derives from lived experience, because the *Nakba* is still ongoing and furthermore it is yet to be widely known or acknowledged in the West.

Safran (1991: 83-84) sees the Palestinian diaspora as 'something more than an ethnic minority resulting from migration.' Diaspora connotes banishment, exile and estrangement from 'home' and the 'homeland'; what is called *al-ghurba* in Arabic, 'the term which most associate with the Palestinian condition'. For Safran, the origins of this *al-ghurba* are to be found in the *Nakba*. It is through the *Nakba* that one can find the origins of a specific Palestinian identity of suffering and struggle, which characterises their Palestinianness and enhances their desire for *al- 'awda* -the return- to

the ‘home’ or the ‘homeland’. This has sustained them for three generations and ‘made the pain of exile passable but not acceptable’. Clemens (2007: 96) sees Palestinian identity as being strongly influenced by a ‘collective sense of victimisation and nationalism’, caused by the events surrounding the *Nakba*, which is ‘passed on to subsequent generations living in exile.’ It can be argued that the emergence of the PLO, during the 1960s concentrated the individual sense of loss, victimisation and feelings of nationalism and served to combine these into a collective sense of identity. It is to be expected, then that there should be a high degree of knowledge about this traumatic and seminal event amongst the present generation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

The Palestinian refugee collective memory, in Lebanon can be envisioned as the consciousness of a group of people, or a diaspora embodying customs, traditions, myths, and beliefs shared by members of that group, who believe them to be true, without regard to their actuality or provenance being subscribed by historical veracity or reality. It is this collective memory that underpins and binds the collective identity of the society. As Edkins (2003: 8) suggests ‘by assuming a community exists we produce one.’ As members of a group we ‘reproduce that social institution at the same time as assuming our own identity as part of it.’ Collective memory then is an important constituent of collective identity and *ipso facto* individual identity, for Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon.

During the gathering of data for this research, constant reminders of Palestine were in evidence in the PRCs. Through the proliferation of posters and murals depicting stylised representations of homes lost; reminders of martyrs; and the naming of localities and buildings after villages in Mandate Palestine the collective memory was stimulated. It is to be expected then, that the proliferation of these reminders would have

reinforced the knowledge of the *Nakba*.

Figure 3.4. Mural with stylised house in Palestine with *al-saber* and Palestinian flag, on a wall in Shatila PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2016.

In addition, there were many posters on the walls at eye level and above which remind the observer of the supreme sacrifice of the *shahid* (martyr) in the cause of Palestine.

Figure 3.5. Poster of a *Shahid* on a wall in Mar Elias PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2016.

Posters and murals were also used to remind Palestinians in the diaspora of their place in the struggle against Israeli occupation of the homeland.

Figure 3.6. Flags and posters depicting the Second Intifada hung on a wall in Shatila PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2016.

Many of the streets and areas within the PRCs are named after places in Palestine, in the pre- *Nakba* era. In Burj al Barajneh PRC, some areas are named after northern villages of Palestine such as Tarshiba, El-Kabri and Al -Chaab (Peteet, 2005 and El-Ali, 2010). The naming of service centres such as the Ramallah school in Shatila PRC and the Haifa hospital in Burj al Barajneh PRC after cities and villages of that time, re-iterate the memorialisation process and enhance the sense of belonging.

Figure 3.7. Ramallah School Shatila PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2016.

In many of the homes visited for this research, there were posters of Palestine and symbols such as keys (to represent the homes lost) and ornaments such as the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem, which serve as reminders of the homeland. Items of jewellery worn by young and old women included necklaces with representations of Palestine. Additionally, there has been a return to traditional modes of dress amongst this generation. All of the female respondents for this research wore Palestinian headdress, except two. These most often wore the *hijab*, although one respondent, who was involved in Islamic religious studies, wore the *niqab*. It was explained to the researcher that this was most often a matter of personal choice. However, a UNRWA Project Director told the researcher that it was part of the phenonomen of a return to some aspects of traditional Palestinian culture, amongst this generation, noted by UNRWA. He said that it was a rejection of the secular revolutionary ideals of the previous generation, known as *Jeel al-Thawra* (The generation of the revolution).

Discussion:

As iterated previously, writers such as Peteet (2005) and Khalidi (1997) have described the narratives surrounding the *Nakba* as being central to the collective Palestinian refugee identity. It is to be expected then that this 'accepted' view of the identity of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* should encompass a good knowledge of and memorialisation of the events surrounding the *Nakba* (including a knowledge of their places of origin in Palestine); a rejection of *tawteen;* and an adherence to *haq al 'awda*. In the analysis of the data collected for this paper, a disparity became evident with the findings of previous researchers who had reported both a very good knowledge of the *Nakba* and of the respondent's historical origins. Three distinct levels of knowledge became evident.

Levels of knowledge about the Nakba

In the first instance, this research shows that only 13 or 24% of all respondents had a good or very good knowledge of the *Nakba*. Secondly, a total of 40 or 66% had a poor to fair knowledge of it. Finally, and

unusually, 8 or 13% didn't know anything at all about it. This is a surprising development, given the access to education and the internet amongst this generation. Many of those interviewed, did not pursue research into this cornerstone of the Palestinian *al ghurba* (exile) in Lebanon, beyond what they learned at school or from parents or grandparents. This is despite the fact that Wi-Fi and internet facilities were available to 77% of all interviewees. Amongst the three groupings noted above there was a strong positive correlation between education, employment and their knowledge about the *Nakba* and a concomitant lack of knowledge where these factors were diminished. There was no disparity between the genders in this regard. The reported rate of transmission from parents and grandparents was less than 50%, across all three groups, perhaps indicating that the practice of passage of information on this subject has dwindled and that this generation are less interested in their past. Across all three groups, this research noted a desire for agency; an expression of the poor socio-economic existential conditions; and an awareness of inter-generational differences in their loyalties to concepts of Palestinian identity.

Levels of knowledge of historical origins

This research has found a congruence with Allan's (2014: 49) reported research findings in that up to 75% of participants know little more 'than the name of, and the most generic facts about their ancestral village.' Additionally, in those cases where an ancestral village could be identified, it was more often down to the personal knowledge, of the interpreters, of the families involved. Arguably, the respondent's lack of precise details of origin does not detract from the importance of these places which lie in their remembered or metaphorical presence, and which can be as strong as tangible identification. Sayigh (2012: 26) also found that 'most young Palestinians know little of their history.' These participants identified themselves as Palestinians from whatever camp in which they resided. Taylor (1989: 47) says 'In order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going'. Given the importance of *Al-Nakba* in Palestinian life through the

generations, and the traditional method of its transmission across the generations, it would be expected that Palestinian youth should have a good knowledge of, and interest in, it and finding out more about it. The question which this author asked was: 'What has caused such difference between the findings of previous researchers and those of this research?' As the data collection and analysis progressed, the importance of economic data became evident as a factor in trying to answer this question. This paper proposes that the deprivation caused by the physical, economic and cultural landscapes imposed upon them, has lessened their allegiance to nationalist imperatives.

Importance of Economic Data for Research Outcomes

Allan (2014: 97-98) suggests that the 'existential bonds of suffering and indignities of daily poverty, in the struggle for survival' have shaped the meaning of what it is to be a 'Palestinian' and on once sacred notions of the *Nakba*. One of the significant pieces of information to emerge from an examination of the data collected for this research was the levels of unemployment and low earnings reported by the respondents.



Figure 3.8. Reported Employment Status *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 61).



Figure 3.9. Reported Unemployment Status by gender: *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 20).

31% of males and 34% of females reported being unemployed. 71% of all respondents reported earnings of less than $1,000 a month (includes 0 earnings). This compares with 56.8% of their peers in the general Lebanese population (Lebanese Ministry of Finance, 2017:6). The dire socio-economic conditions for the PRLs has worsened and led to a concomitant despair amongst some elements of the youth, so much that any solution is acceptable. Chaaban et al (2016: 82-83) report that the unemployment rate for PRLs, of all ages, is 21% (an increase from 8% for males and 32% for females in 2015, compared to a similar survey in 2010: Chaaban et al, 2010). The research conducted for this paper found general youth unemployment at 33%, with slightly lower unemployment for males at 31% but similar figures to Chaaban et al for females at 34%. Much of the employment was menial, temporary and illegal. The vast bulk of those working (86%) found sporadic employment within the camps, some with UNRWA (7%); the majority not.

Chaaban et al (2016: 9) also found that extreme and overall poverty rates are higher in the camps than without and have increased since 2010 in the Beirut area (by 9%). Furthermore, nearly all professions show poverty rates higher than 50%, 'reflecting the low pay and precarious work conditions PRL still experience'. Chaaban et al (2016: 84) outline the

prohibitions on gaining employment for PRLs, which are quite onerous, in particular with regard to the professions. Despite some concessions after 2010, 'Low income is still the primary cause of high poverty rates amongst the PRLs' (*ibid*: 54). Under Lebanese law, Palestinians are prohibited from owning property, and must make convoluted circumventions of the law to do so (Author's interviews Beirut: 2015, 2016[14]). The security situation in neighbouring Syria and within Lebanon, coupled with the large refugee influx and parliamentary stagnation in Lebanon, has put negotiations through the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) on the back burner. Some Palestinian youth in 2016 dismissed these as *haki fadi* (empty talk). The influx of refugees from Syria since 2011 has further eroded the prospect of employment, however menial, for the PRLs. There is anecdotal evidence that competition between PRL and PRS youth for these jobs has intensified, contributing to 'an increase in unemployment rates among PRL in the already limited pool of low-skill jobs' [conversations with UNRWA officials 2015 and Palestinian NGOs 2016; Chaaban et al, 2016: 84)].

An UNRWA official interviewed in 2015 supported this view:

> 'The camps are ghettos, pits of deprivation and misery. Two thirds live inside the camps, one third outside. Those outside have a better standard of life. You have people in Burj al-Barajneh, who have never been outside of the camp-even to Beirut, less than 5 kms away. They don't see it as theirs-it's *terra incognito*. All this history of deep misery *is* your identity. Relations between Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS) and Palestinian refugees from Lebanon (PRL) have not been perfect. Some of the PRS have left the camps, astonished at the horrible conditions under which the PRL are living.'

The three groups with differing knowledge about *al -Nakba* amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* are set out below. It is accepted that the basis for

[14] See also: Chaaban, J. et al (2016: 126-127).

determining the extent of knowledge about *al-Nakba* is open to the criticism of subjectivity, on the part of this researcher. Every effort was made to maintain objectivity by using the same methodology in probing for answers from the respondents.

Group 1 (Good/Very Good Knowledge about the Nakba)[15]

This group was divided between 10 males and 3 females. Members of this group demonstrated a high degree of loyalty to the 'accepted' view of Palestinian identity. Sami, a male aged 31 working with a Palestinian company exhibited a strong sense of a Palestinian identity, stating that he would refuse *tawteen* and insisting on *haq al 'awda*. He acknowledged that his level of knowledge about the *Nakba* and its importance was unusual for his generation, and he attributed the general lack of interest in it to the dire economic reality of the PRCs:

> 'As a Palestinian refugee living in this country, I want you to know that I have pain and *summud* (steadfastness), on a daily basis. I live under circumstances which are not favourable and I have tried to find out more about Palestine. Palestinian youth nowadays are a bit diverted, because they are busy in getting their daily needs. This is one of the issues facing the new generation of Palestinians their daily bread and they don't have time to think about their future.'

Allan (2014: 98, 102) suggests that the 'primacy of economic subjectivity' has altered this generation and the 'pragmatics of survival have weakened'

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[15] 9 had a university degree (these included: B. Comm in I.T. Communications; B. Arts in Tourism; Masters in International Development; B. Comm in Business and Computer Science; B. Arts in Communications; B. Comm in Logistics; B. Comm in Accounting; Masters in Sociology and Islamic Studies and a B. Comm in Business and Commerce); 1 had a university Diploma and 2 were students at university. The remaining respondent had failed to complete his Brevet. 4 had no job and depended on family for financial support. 2 were working illegally in the city. 2 were working with Palestinian NGOs, 1 was working for UNRWA and 4 were working for a Palestinian company. 8 of the group had computers and all had access to Wi-Fi and the internet and Social Media. 'In Lebanon, upon completion of Grade 9 (end of the basic cycle of education) students sit for the Lebanese official Brevet Exam, with those who pass awarded the Brevet Certificate, and able to progress to Secondary education. Approximately 62.8 per cent of the population over 15 years of age do not hold a Brevet compared to two thirds in 2010' (Chaaban, J. et al (2016: 79).

the traditional Palestinian values and identity, in Lebanon. She points out that there has been a shift away from the 'continuities of nationalism towards the contingencies of lived experience and material practice' in the camps. Sami also stated that his parents and grandparents were still 'living the *Nakba* since 1948'; however, while his generation were in the same situation, he wanted to move on and aspire to a better life, possibly elsewhere.

Musallan, a 26-year-old male also framed his responses in terms of the dire socio-economic conditions, and the lack of civil rights for Palestinians in Lebanon. Bar-Tal (1998: 112) has suggested that group beliefs may function as 'guiding forces for a group' and may therefore 'determine the direction, intensity and persistence' of the individual behaviour and beliefs, within that group. During his interview, Musallan exhibited a strong commitment to the Palestinian national ideals, based on his understanding of the *Nakba* and his apportioning of blame for it on the Zionist colonial enterprise and on the international community, either because of their collaboration with the Zionists, or their silence. Others in this group expressed a wish to retain their Palestinian identity and yet attain a better standard of life than their parents, and stated their frustration at the inequities of their lives.

Group 2 Fair to Poor Knowledge of the Nakba[16]

This group numbered 40 and was split across the gender divide with 17 being males and 23 females. Members of this group demonstrated varying levels of loyalty to the 'accepted' view of Palestinian identity. This group

[16] 7 had university degrees (including 1 Masters), 1 had a university Diploma and 10 were university students; 1 left his university studies unfinished. 10 had a Baccalaureate, 8 had the Brevet and 3 had a Vocational School qualification. 13 of these were unemployed and the others had employment within the camps, with Palestinian organisations, but none with UNRWA. Only 13 of this group had computers, and all except two had mobile phones with Wi-Fi and the internet and frequently used Social Media. 'In Lebanon, upon completion of Grade 12 (end of the secondary cycle of education) students sit for the Lebanese official Baccalaureate Exam, with those who pass awarded the Baccalaureate Degree, and able to progress to University education. 15.2 per cent have a Baccalaureate degree compared to 14 per cent in 2010.' (Chaaban, J. et al (2016: 79).

also demonstrated a high degree of intergenerational difference from their parents and grandparents, when compared to the first group.

Mahdi, a 23-year-old male, said that his poor knowledge about the *Nakba* was because it did not have the same significance for him as for his parents:

> 'They have memories and they live on those, expecting that if they return everything will be ok again, without taking into consideration of ability to work or contribute to the country. More of the younger generation have experience of living outside, of Lebanon and Palestine. We know nothing about Palestine; all our memories are of other countries and we want to return to these countries. It is causing internal conflicts within yourself, in what you think about yourself, or at least in what your parents made you think about yourself. They always try to make you not forget that you are Palestinian, then when you go outside you are rejecting that idea. Eventually young people want their own life and improvement and to be a bit selfish; they want to live, they don't care about their country (Palestine) anymore.'

Mahdi was of the opinion that agency for his generation could be afforded by the provision of better educational opportunities:

> 'The most important thing is to provide more scholarships for the Palestinians. The most powerful weapon is education; we lost too many people to war, to mafias in the camps who have weapons but no education, who are killing each other[17]. These Palestinians are not progressing in anything, and the only way to combat this is more education, to allow them to think for themselves. I really hate

[17] Mahdi is speaking obliquely about the political factions in the camps and the members of the Popular Committees (PCs). His comments reflect Allan's (2014:102) suggestion that there is a rising rejection of these in the camps. The Popular Committee, also known as *al –hakuma al –saghira*, or the small government of the camp was established by the PLO, in each camp during the 1970's. It is not elected. Representatives of each of the factions are members. It was appointed to oversee the management of the camp and remains a legacy from the time of *Jeel al-thawra* (generation of the revolution).

the idea of being a Palestinian; I would prefer to be called Muslim or Arab, not divided by our countries.'

Mahdi in common with many of the respondents found factional violence and the use of weapons to be abhorrent to them. Some of those respondents spoke in a positive manner of a young women's group who had started a campaign against the proliferation of weapons in Mar Elias PRC.

Figure 3.10. Sign on a wall in Mar Elias PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2016.

Khalidi (1997), as recounted above, has iterated the issue of Arab and Muslim identities. Palestinians have always acknowledged their position within those communities. It is within those personhoods that Palestinian refugee identity resides, as some of the respondents, (such as Mahdi) in this research have espoused. Not all Palestinian refugees are Muslim, and this research was able to interview only one non-Muslim. Palestinian refugee identity, as Allan (2014) relates is evolving, in response to the dire existential situation within Lebanon. Not all are willing to embrace a purely Muslim or Arab identity, or indeed a Palestinian one, if some relief can be achieved through another. Maalouf (2000: 23, 25) suggests that 'identity isn't given once and for all: it is built up and changes throughout a person's lifetime.' Identity amongst this youth group is not homogenous and is dependent on what influences are imposed upon them by the physical, cultural and socio-economic landscapes, in their daily lives.

Mahdi's self-conception as being Muslim or Arab first is not unusual elsewhere in the Middle East, despite the passage of time, since the death

of Nasser (1969), who propounded the ideal of Pan-Arabism. Mahdi was willing to take *tawteen* if it was offered to him and this taken with his comments about factional violence are representative of what Allan (2014: 60-61) has noted about fractures appearing in the ethnographer's 'accepted' view of this generation. She has identified flickers of 'quiet personal resistance' amongst them because they are finding difficulty in absorbing the dogma of a 'national belonging' into their identity framework. This should not be surprising given that Palestinian youth now have access to the internet and are more aware of the world around them. Elbedour, Bastien and Center (1997: 222) found that the extreme rapid social change that communities have experienced over the past decades has been caused by the trauma of displacement and has resulted in a 'deterioration of family structures' and changed the 'socio-cultural structure of the Palestinian community'. This in turn has caused inter-generational differences and alienation from their elders and their cultural roots, with the youth 'pursuing modern lifestyles' and having divergent concepts of their identities. Conversi (2004: 280-281) suggests that cultural globalisation, which is understood as being synonymous with Westernisation is pervasive and threatens to undermine the position of the family and clan and the socialisation of the youth within a group in its culture and traditions. This is altering the group identity at both the personal and collective levels. Robins (1996: 72) also notes that the increasing trans- nationalisation of markets, the growth of global media and communications, the 'mobility of populations' have combined to weaken significantly the 'old rigidities in the national cultures.'

Ennas, a 21-year-old female had a poor knowledge of the *Nakba* and said that she had never researched it, even though she spent a lot of time on Facebook. She saw her future in terms of the existential needs of the present. She wanted to continue her education, to degree level, so that she can get a job to support her family. She knew that she could never work legitimately in Lebanon, so the first thing she wants to do after graduating is to emigrate to the UAE. She said:

> 'I think that after these couple of generations past, the desire for *haq al 'awda* is fading away. The Palestinians who are living away are happy to live away from Palestine. We have a saying: *Baeed an al Ayn, Baeed an al Kalb* (away from the eye, away from the heart). I don't want *tawteen*, because the Lebanese themselves cannot get a decent life. My grandparents have stronger feelings for Palestine than I do, I have never seen it.'

Farah, a female, aged 20, studying for a B.Sc. and Azni, a 24-year old Barman in Beirut spoke of difference between their generation and that of their parents. They reported that their parents 'wanted to work, to survive day by day and wanted to return as if nothing had happened to the land as it was when they left 68 years ago.' They spoke of wanting civil rights, the right to own property and to travel. They also aspired to another nationality and agency for themselves.

Group 3 with No Knowledge about the Nakba[18]

This group numbered 8 and was evenly divided between 4 males and 4 females. This group exhibited a strong divergence from the 'accepted' view of Palestinian identity, but not exclusively so.

Ghazi, a 21-year-old male who left the education system with no qualification, as his father was too sick to work and who is unemployed, said:

> 'I know nothing at all about it (*al-Nakba*). I want to have a permanent job. I want better conditions and to live with dignity, with full civil rights and without problems. I want to have a nationality somewhere else. If I get this I will be happy not to have the Palestinian identity. This is more important to me than having this one. I would be happy to take *tawteen*. My parents had a hope of going back to Palestine. I don't believe in this.'

[18] 1 was a student at University, 2 had completed the Brevet and 5 had completed various stages of the Baccalaureate, but none had finished it except one. Only 2 of these had employment. None owned or had access to a computer, but all had access to Wi-Fi and the internet on their phones, and used them for Social Media purposes.

Both Ghazi and Kamal, a 28-year-old male, and unemployed saw their aspirations as being larger than their parents, and Kamal expressed the view that 'Maybe their time is over. We are living in different time.'

Badria, a 27-year-old female, who is unemployed and has passed her Baccalaureate, when asked to relate what she knew about the *Nakba* replied:

> 'My mother used to tell me, but I have forgotten about it. I do not remember anything about it. I am happy enough if I have enough to eat. I don't think about the future. I have had a lot of unhappy incidents in my life. I am losing weight worrying about it.'

Badria has a family member who is a drug addict and her father has left the family home to live with his girlfriend, leaving his family unsupported. She and her family face a continual struggle to find the means to eat on a daily basis. In that regard, she typifies many of the youth interviewed for this research. Kansteiner (2002: 194) suggests that an individual may 'subscribe wholeheartedly to certain historical interpretations,' however that individual 'would not be able to identify their origins even if one undertakes the cumbersome task of asking (that individual) directly.' Klein (1998: 301) cautions us that 'in order to remember, something must be forgotten'. This is necessarily true because new experiences interfere with memory and can crowd it out and cause it to have less significance both for the individual and the collective. This research posits the view that the existential hardships which the Palestinian youth endure in the camps of Lebanon are one source of Klein's forgetting, and that the *Nakba* has become less important for them. Since the *Nakba* is at the core of Palestinian identity, this 'forgetting' has importance for ethnographers when attempting to quantify the identity of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*. Allan (2014: 239) cites Nietzsche [1873, (1983: 62)] to suggest that this forgetting is a process which enables the Palestinian refugees to avoid a condition in which 'an excess of memory precludes action or future development.'

Despite the variation in levels of knowledge on and understanding of the subject, 56% of all those interviewed, were able to ascribe blame on the British and 7% on the American governments for their predicament. Fateh, a 35-year-old male learnt about the *Nakba* from his parents:

> 'A gang of Zionists raped our land and had a conspiracy with the British to deny us our land. We were forced to leave and promised to return within many days and are still struggling today. *Al- Nakba* still goes on. We don't hate all people, just this gang who did this to us.'

The Palestinian woman is frequently used in literature and art to represent the homeland. (Schulz and Hammer, 2003: 138; Slyomovics, 1998: 200-201). Fateh's use of the word 'rape' (*ightisab*) is a powerful metaphor to describe the destruction of the entity known as Palestine during the events surrounding the *Nakba*, as well as the actual rape of Palestinian women by the Hagannah, Irgun Levi and /or the IDF. In Arab culture, the honour of the female members of a family is linked to the honour of the family and the wider clan (Warnock, 1990: 23). Any hint of despoliation is the harbinger of shame on all the family members.

Figure 3.11. Copy of poster in a home in Shatila PRC, using a female figure to represent Palestine under occupation. Source: O'Connor, 2016.

In his interview Fateh displayed a strong commitment to his Palestinian identity and nationalism. He also spoke of Palestine as a feminine entity.

He upheld the Right of Return as 'sacred', but said that 'I don't believe that I will return to Palestine' and he iterated that his problem was not with Jews in general, but with the Zionists. He wanted to live with dignity and rights for his children. He said 'I see no future for myself' and had doubtful prospects for his son, but he was unwilling to surrender his Palestinian identity. Fateh's declarations epitomise what Bernard (1972: 3) states when he says that the collective identity of a group is bounded by the sharing of the 'same beliefs, language, historical background and cultural heritage, formed out of common responses to common needs in the historical experience of that group.' The only aberration of that collective identity is that Fateh would take *tawteen* if it were offered to him, due he said to the economic pressures imposed on him. He fully realised that in doing so, he would be risking losing his Palestinian identity.

Conclusion: reflections and pathways for policy

This paper has examined Palestinian refugee youth contemporary concepts of Palestinianness through the prism of the events surrounding the *Nakba*. The aim of this research was to determine the extent of this generation's attachment to, and knowledge of, the events surrounding the *Nakba*, as the cornerstone of their identity. As previously outlined anthropologists have presumed that this attachment was ineluctable and homogenous for all Palestinian refugees, across the generations in Lebanon (Peteet: 2005; Sayigh: 2001; Bianchi: 2014). This research has validated the incipient fractures in attitude and loyalty to that position, as noted by Allan (2014: 5, 26, 33, 60); and also validates her view that 'we need to bear in mind the radical transformations that have occurred over the more than six decades.' In so doing we acknowledge the 'primacy of economic subjectivity and the decisive shaping influence it has on what it means to be Palestinian' (Allan: 2014: 97-98). This research has found evidence that the present generation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are not a homogenous group in their loyalty to the 'accepted' idea of Palestinian identity.

This study proposes that there now appears to be a weakening of the knowledge of the *Nakba*; a diminution of the transgenerational transmission of the facts surrounding it; and a lessening of the significance which this generation affords it, which, in turn is resulting in a shift in identity patterns amongst the present generation of refugees -*Jeel ma baa'd El Harb.* Chatty and Hundt (2001: 41) have already noted that 'historical consciousness appears to be waning as the younger generation learn less about their past.' Allan (2014: 4, 5, 33) cites Desjarlais (1997: 223), in suggesting that 'felt immediacies' are producing a new form of Palestinianness – 'distinct from a national identity.' For a significant number of this group the existential diurnal conditions in the Lebanese refugee camps appear to have mediated their allegiance to nationalist dogma and the traditionally accepted view of what Palestinian identity entails.

Knowledge of the *Nakba* was found to be high in one group, spread across the camps and the gatherings. This group were substantially better educationally qualified than those with a lesser degree of knowledge. Furthermore, they were mostly employed and/or in pursuit of higher education. The responses given to questions were delivered in a more confident manner and it was obvious from those responses that they considered themselves to be less concerned with earning enough money to survive. In the group with a lesser knowledge, there was a diversity of educational achievement, mostly caused by the need to fulfil those existential needs. In the third group, lack of both education and employment impinged greatly on their lives and the need to provide sustenance for themselves and their families superseded any other concerns. It is possible to assume that this diversity in knowledge of history is typical of other societies but the environmental and socio-economic landscapes in the PRCs in Lebanon have served to intensify the phenonomen.

This research suggests that Palestinian refugee youth identity deserves to be reconsidered by academics and by policymakers. Van Meijl (2008: 169) stated that anthropologists treated culture as if it were a set of ideas or

meanings, which were 'shared by a whole population of homogenous individuals.' Similarly, Diana Allan (2014: 4, 8) makes the point that anthropologists, policymakers and ethnographers have also assumed that this generation will continue to view and live the *Nakba,* as did their antecedents.

This study demonstrates the need for a re-examination of policy at the international, regional and national levels to take account of the changes noted in 'Palestinianness'. At the local level, some form of modified *tawteen* could be offered to those of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb,* who may wish to avail of it, as many of the youth were born in the camps and are *de facto,* although not *de jure,* citizens of Lebanon. At the regional level opportunities could be made available to those who wish to travel for employment and education. At the international level, there is an urgent need to resolve the Israeli – Palestinian dispute with a renewed emphasis on the refugee situation.

Cultural groups are composed of people with individual aspirations, points of view and sometimes conflicting allegiances. This examination of Palestinian refugee youth identity would seem to suggest that there are inter- generational fractures in what importance the Palestinian refugees and in particular, the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* attach to the *Nakba*, their willingness to accept/reject *tawteen* and how they view *haq al 'awda*. This phenomenon will be further examined in Chapters 4-6 of this thesis. Some of those interviewed for this research were willing to reject as unacceptable the traditional aspects of Palestinian identity, due to the perceived irrelevance of those tenets based on a nationalist ideology. Some were willing to retain parts of that ideology and others remain fiercely loyal to all aspects of that concept. This research demonstrates that this generation is heterogenous and that no one size fits all approach will suffice. Allan (2014: 174) suggests that

> 'Younger generations understand the history of the community and their place within it but also how they view the future – less an

> immutable destiny than as determined by individual will and choice'.

In summary, this study has found a disparity between the findings of previous research on the importance of the *Nakba* to Palestinian refugee and specifically to the present generation. It is posited that the three levels of knowledge found in this study are strongly linked to socio-economic and socio-political influences on the identity of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*. As Proshansky et al (1983: 58) have found the physical and social environment which define and structure daily lives have a profound effect on the development of identity at both the collective and individual levels. A number of factors can be identified as contributing to the changes noted in this study. There is evidence of increased pressure caused by the influx of refugees from Syria resulting in competition for scarce resources and employment opportunities. The continued repression by GOL of the Palestinian refugees is another factor, coupled with the failure of the LPDC, the PLO, PA, and the PCs to deliver any amelioration in their lives. This coupled with the perceived corruption of the factions by the youth is causing them to consider them as increasingly irrelevant.

Memory and tradition are important constituents to collective and personal identity as Taylor (1989) suggested. However, as Massey (1994: 141) pointed out, those memories are subject to social negotiation and conflict and the importance which individuals ascribe to them, in their search for identity. For some of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, these memories have become irrelevant as the necessity to find the wherewithal to survive and the search for agency has taken primacy. This has caused intergenerational ruptures with the conception of the Palestinian identity of their forbearers, which was based on what Bauman (1996) described as nostalgic remembrance of a past life and what Smith (1991) suggests is the myth of nationalism. Despite the intergenerational differences noted, allegiance to place as Palestine was noted to be strong amongst this generation, despite the poor levels of knowledge about the *Nakba*. This would seem to chime with what Sack (1980) suggested, when he observed that group

belongingness enhances the importance of places of origin, and through them the identity of the individual.

hooks (1991) has suggested that that globalisation has implications for the construction of identity, and that place is now a multitude of locations and remembrances. Lovell (1998) also makes this point stating that the pressures of daily life and the effects of globalisation, sometimes causes memories associated with group membership to be altered or forgotten and causing consequent alterations in identity patterns. This study has found elements of that forgetting in which memories of the *Nakba* have faded or been deliberately forgotten as the quest for daily survival has taken primacy. Parekh (2008) has also associated globalisation with a breakdown of cultural loyalties and traditions. This study has also found evidence of this amongst this generation of Palestinian refugees in the reduced importance of the *Nakba* for them. The factor of globalisation will be further explored in Chapters 4-6, in dealing with some other aspects of Palestinian refugee youth identity.

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Chapter 4

Haq al 'Awda, the Right of Return and Palestinian Refugee Youth Identity in Lebanon.

Abstract: United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 1948 codifies *Haq al 'awda* (right of return), and is pivotal to the Palestinian narrative at both the individual and collective levels. It has been framed by academics, in the past, as a nationalist ideology based on territoriality. In this paper, *the Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* (the generation after the war) are surveyed in a series of interviews, using qualitative research methods, in order to ascertain how they view *haq al 'awda* and whether they regard it as an absolute right. The importance of place, home, homeland, identity and belonging are explored, in order to see if there are any intergenerational changes in how *haq al 'awda* is situated in the traditionally accepted Palestinian refugee identity concepts. Factors which may be responsible for any changes are analysed. The main finding suggests that the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* visualise *haq al 'awda* in a much more eclectic manner, including concepts of dignity, human rights, justice, and a better quality of life, than previous generations. These findings should assist policymakers and NGOs at all levels to devise better strategies and normative solutions to reconcile the ideational concept of *haq al 'awda* with a more pragmatic notion of the right of return.

Keywords: *haq al 'awda*; identity; dignity; belonging; place; human rights

Introduction: Hart (2014: 384) has demonstrated that not all of those classified, by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the Near East (UNRWA), as children or young adults in the families of forced migrants have experienced displacement during their own lifetimes. However, he suggests that the lives of the youth of those 'originally displaced are shaped in diverse and significant ways by this displacement.' Their daily existence is fraught with the 'limitations imposed upon them by the withholding of citizenship and the absence of economic opportunities' associated with that deficiency. These limitations include a lack of civil

rights; the denial of adequate employment; the exclusion from access to adequate medical and education services; and most of all to a lack of dignity and opportunities to achieve agency for themselves.

While Hart's (2014) work was centred on a more general approach to issues regarding children, and forced migration, this paper focusses on the consideration of refugee youth in the Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) in Beirut, Lebanon, specifically in terms of identity-based social science research. The primary and overarching aim of this research was to ascertain the degree to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Har*b subscribe to the traditional Palestinian refugee identity as depicted by previous researchers, and to identify any intergenerational dissonance in the expression of that identity. This paper seeks to measure the relevance of, and loyalty to the concept of *haq al 'awda* for the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* in Lebanon today. *Haq al 'awda* refers to the right of return, to pre-Israeli Palestine, which has been a core aspiration of Palestinian refugees through the years. *Haq al 'awda* has been one of the central tenets of Palestinian national identity as iterated by academics through the years.

Methodology

The semi-structured interviews utilised for this paper, as part of a qualitative research methodology allowed the respondents greater latitude in expressing their concepts of *haq al 'awda*. The case study used in this research centred on the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* (the generation after the war), permitted a greater depth of data collection than other techniques such as questionnaires. More triangulation of data and opportunities for probing questions were possible. This enhanced the reliability of data recorded and supplemented the observation conducted in the gatherings in Beirut and the PRCs of Ein el Hilweh and the Beirut area.[19].

The Arabic expression *haq al 'awda* translates as 'right to/of return' and is usually understood to refer to the Palestinian diaspora, or those living beyond Gaza and the West Bank. Support for this principle throughout the

[19] Appendix 'C' provides a detailed description of the methodology employed for this thesis

broader Palestinian diaspora fluctuates and this survey was particularly interested in determining whether the younger generation in Lebanon have a differing conception of *haq al 'awda* from their predecessors and if so, how this difference is expressed. This study also seeks to examine the factors which Allan (2014) suggests may be causing a shift in Palestinianness amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* in Lebanon. Qualitative research carried out amongst Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon, during 2015/2016, on the subject of identity and belonging, explores the changes which the cultural, physical and socio-economic landscapes have wrought on the present generation, and forms the grounds for this paper.

A deeper understanding of identity patterns amongst refugee youth is presented, which will be of assistance to policymakers as they seek to mitigate this long-standing and seemingly intractable problem associated with these groupings in Lebanon. This study also attempts to give a voice to the present generation, who feel helpless and forgotten. Both collective and personal identities are 'not fixed' (Allan, 2014: 214), always in a dynamic process of evolution; subject to internal and external influences and it is dangerous to consider them as anything other than heterogenous. The *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* in Lebanon are no different to other groups, whose existential conditions and future prospects lie largely outside their own control. This study attempts to show that a number of factors have combined to make their situation somewhat anomalous.

Place and Palestinian identity of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*

Palestinian identity is complex and highly politicised, representing an entanglement of historical and contemporary political and legal processes. One key element of this is that access to academic histories, outside of the international biblical-period focussed narratives amongst the Palestinian communities, is very limited. Histories and memory are then largely passed orally through generations and are reproduced in a myriad of ways within both the urban and rural landscape. Hull et al (1994:118) have suggested that 'place icons' provide symbols of people's memories and that when

these are encountered repeatedly they evoke a sense of place. The recreation of the place of Palestine in the Lebanese PRCs, by the naming of streets and areas after locations in Palestine and the occupation of these areas by clans or families, from the same region in Palestine (Schulz and Hammer, 2003:115), serve as what Tuan (1977: 152) calls 'rallying points' which bind the refugees to places lost and to each other. This collective belonging reinforces a sense of Palestinian identity, not only at the collective level, but also at the personal level, providing an enhanced level of self-esteem, which Korpela (1989) and Sarbin (1983) maintain is essential to balance or respond to the pressures of daily life. In doing so they are, in effect, recreating the landscape of their perceived homeland and reimaging their past within the contemporary urban environment of Beirut. This identity is reinforced continually by the use of wall paintings, photographs of martyrs; maps and flags of Palestine; posters of Arafat; and items of jewellery in shops and homes within the PRCs observed by the author. The inculcation of Palestinian ideology and nationalism is reinforced through the display of posters depicting leaders and the homeland, even for the very young. These pictorial landscapes represent an ideology of power and control and serve to constantly reinforce the messages of solidarity alongside politicised marginalisation and subjugation.

Figure 4.1. Poster of Arafat. Abbas and the Dome of the Rock on a wall enclosing a play area in Burj al Barajneh PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2016. (Note: The children playing are guarded by a DFLP armed sentry).

Sack (1997: 131-132) suggests that the 'formation of personal identity is directly connected to the formation of place' and that each is inter-dependent and would not survive without the other. It is also true that identity is adaptable and constantly subject to change and not static, unlike place. Casey (2001: 688) further suggests that this attachment to place survives through many years, because these places are 'in us' and indeed 'are us'. Places are embedded in us and become 'part of our very self, our enduring character' and we carry them forward and through this process they become passed on to subsequent generations. This is certainly true for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Having been physically displaced from Palestine, the refugee communities are now reimaging their historical place and sense of belonging through whatever means they can in the difficult urban confines of these camps. This paper uses an allegory of Aburfaha's (2008) research to present consideration of *haq al 'awda.* He proposed that Palestinians shaped their identity using symbols of trees

indigenous to the land of Palestine. Amongst them he asserted that *al-burtuqal* (the orange) represented the loss of Palestine; *al-zaytuna* (the olive tree) represented the Palestinian nation, rooted in the land of Palestine; and *al-saber* (the cactus), also representing rootedness in the land of Palestine, but also patience and resilience. All are related to the culture of *fellahin (*workers of the land), with which Palestinian identity is associated (Aburfaha, 2008: 344) and all are tied to *al- ard (*the land). These symbols also represent loss, and remember a constructed past that verges on an idyll of rural Palestinians working peacefully with the land prior to their expulsion and displacement.

This study proposes that we should consider Palestinianness, or Palestinian identity at the collective and personal levels as like *al -zaytuna*. This identity has its components firmly anchored in the land of Palestine through the roots of *al -nakba* (the events surrounding the catastrophe, in the past). The trunk of the tree is *summud* (steadfastness, in the present) which channels the nourishment up to the branches of *tawteen* (resettlement/assimilation/naturalisation in Lebanon); *hijra* (emigration) and *haq al 'awda* (right of return). The fruit of the olive is eventual *'awda* (return) to Palestine, which lies in the future. This depiction of *al- zaytuna* then is indicative of what both Parmenter (1994) and Swedenburg (1990) noted of the prominence of belonging to place in Palestinian identity construction. Depictions of all three trees were continually observed in the camps, during the course of this survey, on murals, on posters and on informal or unofficial paintings decorating various houses and shops.



Figure 4.2. Palestinian Identity Represented as *al-zaytuna* (Olive tree).

Creswell (2009: 8) suggests that because refugees are in a homeless condition, even though this exile is caused by compulsion, they are considered to be deviant to the normal conception of place. This does not detract from their attachment to Palestine as their homeland, origin and the place where as Tuan (1977: 149) suggests they 'feel to be the focal point of their cosmic structure.' Stokols (1981: 396) proposes that the 'non-material properties' of places forms the 'glue that binds people to place' and that 'place' contributes to self-identity. For the present generation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Palestine and the idea of the right of return to that point of origin provides that glue, as it has done for previous generations, in what Relph (1976: 141) calls 'the persistent sameness and unity' which allows Palestine to be differentiated from other places. Palestine remains for them as a 'significant centre' to counter the awfulness of their diurnal existence in the Lebanese Palestinian refugee camps (PRCs).

Historical importance of *haq al 'awda* for the Palestinians in exile in Lebanon.

The historical context for the Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon has been related in Chapter 3. Schulz and Hammer (2003:131) chart three

phases in the history of the concept of the right of return. The first of these took place in the immediate aftermath of the *Nakba*, when the individual demand for return was expressed and the Palestinians considered themselves as 'refugees'. An organised collective demand had yet to emerge; although the UN had passed UNGAR 194 (UN Doc, 1948 a), demanding the return of all Palestinian refugees to the lands from which they had been exiled. The second phase can be identified after the formation of the PLO in 1962 and specifically its consolidation in Lebanon, in 1969-1970. This led to the establishment of the 'Fakhani Republic', what Sayigh (1997:448) called a 'state-within- a state- in exile.' This period of Palestinian ascendancy was strengthened by the 1969 Cairo Agreement and accompanied by Arab Nation and PLO financial support.[20] Palestinians in Lebanon now began to refer to themselves as 'returners (*a'idoun*)', in what Schulz and Hammer (2003:131) term 'an act of resistance.' This terminology represented that their stay in Lebanon was temporary. It also was their way of expressing agency by rejecting the passivity of being a refugee. The third phase began with the defeat of the PLO and its exodus from Lebanon, in 1982 and continues to the present. This period saw the removal of financial subventions; the loss of armed protection; and a return to the adoption of the mantle of being a refugee. With the unilateral abrogation of the Cairo Agreement in 1987 (Peteet, 2005:132, 175) by the Government of Lebanon (GOL), Palestinian refugees were once again subject to the control of the Lebanese government. They once more became dependent on UNRWA support. With the ending of the Lebanese Civil War in 1990, they were once more subject to a regime which denied them civil rights, severe restrictions on the right to employment, a ban on owning property, and denied them access to adequate medical, educational and social services (Al-Natour, 2007; Chaaban et al, 2016). Schulz and Hammer (2003:140- 167) suggest that *haq al 'awda* has slipped from being a bedrock of PLO ideology and

[20] The Cairo Agreement legitimised the Palestinian armed elements in Lebanon and gave the PLO *de facto* control of parts of the country, most notably the South and West Beirut. It also gave employment and residency rights for Palestinians living in Lebanon (Schulz and Hammer, 2003:55).

strategy, even though it remains as 'a cornerstone of individual life-strategies'. During the course of this survey significant dissatisfaction was evident amongst the PRCs in Beirut. Many of those interviewed felt betrayed by the Oslo Accords (1993). This was a constant recurring theme and is one that remains central to contemporary narratives of displacement. A second, and possibly more significant theme that emerged during the 2016 survey was dissatisfaction with the PLO shift in focus away from return towards a two-state solution, in lieu of liberation. This is reflective of the continued, and possibly increasing elements of radical positioning that exists amongst these communities and levels of dissatisfaction amongst the younger groups in particular with the former leaders in the 1990s. This is also a further factor that demonstrates their continued fear of abandonment resulting in the principle of *haq al 'awda* becoming important to them.

The issues of legality surrounding *Haq al 'Awda*

While it is a highly politicised concept, deeply ingrained in the psyche of certain sections of the diasporic communities there are also significant legal elements to this. The Palestinian refugees have consistently maintained that they have a right of return to the lands from which they were displaced. The right of return has served as the 'bedrock of Palestinian ideology' and the 'foremost of rights of Palestinian rights' (Schulz and Hammer, 2003: 141). Comprehensive discussions on this subject are well presented elsewhere by authors such as Takkenberg (1998); Lawland (1996) and Akram (2001). One of the first mentions of the concept of a right of return for Palestinian refugees to their homeland was made in the first of two reports by the United Nations Mediator for Palestine, Count Folke Bernadotte on 01 Aug and 16 Sep 1948, to the United Nations Security Council (Takkenberg, 1998: 22). In the latter report, he stated that the 'right of return of refugees should be reaffirmed'. The following day he was assassinated by Israeli terrorists, but his successor, Ralph Bunche reaffirmed his recommendations (Lawland, 1996: 545). Following from these reports, United Nations General Assembly

Resolution (UNGAR) 194(III) was passed (UN Documents, 1948a). Para 11 of this resolution

> 'Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the Governments or authorities responsible.'

This resolution has been reaffirmed in nearly every UN General Assembly vote and supported almost unanimously by all states, except Israel, since 1948. It should be noted that UNGARs are non- binding and do not in themselves constitute International law; however, UNGAR 194(III) forms the basis for Palestinian claims of a right of return. Also, in 1948, UNGAR 217 A (III) (UN Document 1948b) was passed, more commonly known as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR48). This stated in Article 13(2) that 'everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own country and the right to return to his own country.' The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR66) (UN Documents, 1966) was ratified in 1966 and its Article 12(4) states that 'no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.' Israel is a signatory to this treaty without reservation. It is similarly a signatory of The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD65) (UN Documents 1965), where Article 5 (d) (ii) guarantees the 'right to leave any country, including one's own and to return to one's own country.'

Difficulties in interpretation arise in relation to the phrase 'his own' and 'one's' country, which appear in CERD65, UDHR48 and ICCPR66. Lawland (1996: 548-558) goes into great detail, on the meaning of these terms and concludes that through the reading of the *travaux prepétoires* for ICCPR66, in particular, that the terminology did not restrict the application of the relief offered to merely citizens or nationals. She cites the

Nottebohm Case (ICJ Reports 1955) as conferring entitlement to the Palestinians, due to their genuine links to Palestine, a country which they consider to be 'home and to which they are connected through history, race, religion, family or other ties.' The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Article 49 (IRC Doc, 1949) protects the right of return in international humanitarian law, stating that 'Persons thus evacuated shall be transferred back to their homes as soon as hostilities in the area in question have ceased.' In respect of subsequent generations of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, Lawland (1996: 547) makes a strong argument that they have right to 'enter their own country for the first time' as conferred on them through the *travaux prepétoires* of ICCPR66.

The fact that the British mandate in Palestine has been succeeded by the State of Israel does not disentitle the Palestinian refugees from a right of return. Furthermore, Israel has no right to arbitrarily de-nationalise nationals abroad [ICCPR66 (12) (4); (2) and (26); CERD65 5 (d)(ii)]. The establishment of the State of Israel was the successor to the British Mandate, where, as Lawland (1996: 558) reports, all inhabitants were Palestine citizens pursuant to the Palestine Citizenship Order of 1925-1941. Brownlie (1990: 661,664) states that on succession, 'the population goes with the territory' and it would be 'illegal for the successor to treat the population as *de facto* stateless.' Lawland (1996: 562-563) suggests that the 1952 Israeli Nationality Law was an arbitrary and discriminatory instrument to deprive Palestinian refugees of a right to return and their nationality. Israel has always defended these claims.

Historically, at least until 1974, as Khalidi (1992: 34) relates the Palestinians pressed their right of return to an antebellum status. In that year, the 12th session of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) declared that *haq al 'awda* was 'at the forefront of the Palestinian people's collective rights.' Both Lawland (1996: 542-543) and Takkenberg (1998: 244-245) make evident that the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and PNC conflated the right of return with Palestinian self- determination. Lawland (*ibid*: 543) opines that the two are not mutually exclusive and that an individual can make a claim and 'does not prejudice his or her rights as

an individual.' She further states that the right of return under ICCPR66 is an individual right, 'not that to be applied to an entire people.' Zureik (1994: 16), however makes the case that abandoning the collective right in favour of pursuing an individual right of return weakens community membership, a position endorsed by the PLO in the past. Furthermore, she states that Israeli state sovereignty is maintained to the detriment of Palestinian self-determination. This is at odds with Lawland's analysis of ICCPR66, CERD65 and UDHR48. Since the breakdown of the talks surrounding a resolution of the Israeli- Palestine problem, post- Oslo, the PLO have tacitly supported the principle of individuals claiming that right, in addition to a collective right.

Attitudes to *haq al 'awda*

Place and belonging is central to the identity of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, but it is but one element of identity constructs among these communities. In most societies there tend to be intergenerational differences associated with these constructs and this is also evident amongst the refugee youth with regards to *haq al 'awda*. This trend has been previously noted by Allan (2014:26), who identified a number of factors which might be causing a shift in Palestinianness amongst this generation. The first key finding of this research has established that the vast majority of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* see the 'right of return' as their right, even though some have no hope of its realisation. They also are conscious that concepts of this right are different to those of the preceding generations, in terms of realism, pragmatism and a willingness to consider practical solutions to the problem. Allan (2014: 5, 26, 33,60) has noted some of these differences due to 'the radical transformations that have occurred over the more than six decades' and she has quite correctly ascribed them as owing to the 'primacy of economic subjectivity and the decisive shaping influence it has on what it means to be Palestinian' (Allan: 2014:97-98).

Levels of awareness and consciousness of the principle of *haq al 'awda* was high. This research found that of the 61 interviews carried out amongst

the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, only four of the respondents professed to know nothing about *haq al 'awda.* Of the latter, 2 were female and two were male. Of these four, one female and one male were employed on low pay, with only basic education. Even within the context of the PRCs these could be regarded as marginalised individuals and they professed little interest in their political situation. Three of them knew little about the historical context of their community and professed to knowing nothing about the *Nakba*. Two of them, following discussion would take *tawteen* if offered to them. Everyone else had varying degrees of knowledge and understanding about the historical context, political framework and legal position associated with the right of return. Each of the 57 positive respondents stated that *haq al 'awda* was their right. This was not always a blind adherence to the mantra of the political factions (which are not highly regarded by many of this generation), and for most, there was an acknowledgement of the difficulties in realising it, but it does represent a highly symbolic and emotive association with the principle of return and illustrates the continuing place-attachment to Palestine, and the pivotal part it plays in their identity constructs.

The survey results would suggest that there now appears to be a greater willingness amongst the present generation of refugees (*Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*) to consider *haq al 'awda* in terms other than an immediate physical return, which they unquestionably regard as theirs by right. They understand that a realisation of this right is not achievable in the short or medium term; and it is not always their priority, especially in the context of the often very challenging socio-economic conditions that these individuals have to contend with. This research indicates that the worsening conditions in the PRCs have caused them to consider the achievement of *haq al 'awda* in more realistic and more idealistic terms. *Haq al 'awda* remains a guiding principle but the lived realities of their situation allow them to adopt a more grounded approach to its realisation. The responses of interviewees were informative on many levels but their responses to the principle of the right of return can be grouped under a number of common thematic responses. These included internal conflicts and lack of hope;

summud and religious perceptions; land; dreams, agency and dignity; generational shifts; insurgent nationalism; and a synopsis of the remedies offered by the respondents to the problem of *haq al 'awda.*

Internal Conflicts and Lack of Hope:

There was a realisation amongst some respondents of the conflict between the concept of *haq al 'awda* and accepting another nationality, or even *tawteen* (naturalisation in Lebanon, Chapter 5 refers). This research found that 27 or 44% of all respondents would accept *tawteen* if offered to them. Some of these would take any nationality as a vehicle to gain entry to Palestine, even fleetingly. In a typical response one 28-year-old female stated that she would take another nationality if it allowed her access to better employment opportunities. She recognised that this might run counter to the dominant political narrative but she wanted a better life for her children as she currently had 'no hope'. Her response was firmly positioned within a rights-based and economic opportunity framework.

Her testimony chimes with Allan's (2014: 51) finding that the 'indignities of daily poverty' sometimes supersede loyalty to places of origin and political nationalist dogma, and induces feelings of guilt and despair. The guilt is because they feel that they are being disloyal to their sense of Palestinian identity and the despair is caused by their realisation that their existence has little chance of improvement. Fatima, a 27-year old university graduate was also willing to embrace *tawteen,* or some other nationality. In gaining another nationality, even a Lebanese one, it would enhance her chances of getting back to Palestine, and avoid the 'discrimination' surrounding 'being a Palestinian refugee.' A number of male respondents had similar responses. Anis, a 25-year-old unemployed man with basic education did not believe in *haq al 'awda* and had no hope of its realisation. His focus was instead on basic living conditions and trying to achieve work. In common with other responses he also positioned the PRCs within the context of the Syrian crisis, and suggested that the influx of Syrian refugees from that region was making the situation worse.

> 'It is hopeless here, I have no hope. My only hope is to emigrate. We need better living conditions, to live with dignity and not to have discrimination against Palestinians; these are the most important things.'

The hopeless feelings of Anis and Sara are in keeping with the research of Evans and Cohen (1987: 590-591; 597-599) and similar to that of Michelson (1976), in that both studies found that when the present environment of the person does not provide the opportunities to fulfil their objectives; when the cultural, social and physical landscapes combine to work against them; when control is lacking, stress results and a feeling of helplessness ensues. In such situations, attachment to an idealised place such as Palestine is enhanced, as in Sara's case, although not in Anis's case.

These attitudes were reflected at an official level as well with one UNRWA official commenting in 2015 that there were certain groups of Palestinians stating that they would rather be sent to Germany than returning to Palestine. This was further evidenced by small scale protests outside of the UNRWA offices on a number of occasions in the 2000s where members of the refugee community were actively protesting against the right of return. This should probably be contextualised against the broader pattern of Syrian refugee movement into Europe and the associated perception of opportunities, but such public displays are significant and would unlikely have taken place in the politically charged and controlled atmosphere of previous decades.

Summud (patience/steadfastness) and Religious perception:

While the significant majority of the respondents supported the right of return they were also realistic in terms of its realisation. Most articulated this through the concept of *summud*, or the Middle Eastern notion of patience. Twenty-seven respondents did not think that *haq al 'awda* would happen in their lifetime but sixteen were confident that it would happen in their children's lifetime. In this regard, Nasir, a 35-year-old male, was a typical respondent. Although he had a degree in Computer Science, he

works illegally as a barman in a Beirut hotel because he cannot get legal employment. He was of the opinion that *haq al 'awda* is inevitable, and suggested that it would lead to a better future for his children and provide them with an identity, home and country.

Nasir's statement that the concept of *haq al 'awda* is inviolably linked to being a Palestinian is important in understanding how this generation view their identity. His responses reflect the common attitudes of his generation but tempered within the context of *summud.* Leila, a 30-year-old female reflected this in stating that *haq al 'awda* 'is our right. It is not achievable now, at this time, it is unachievable now. We must have *summud*.'

Schiocchet (2012: 80) suggests that *summud* is 'used to survive the quotidian' where the present is 'a temporary aberration to be abolished through *haq al 'awda*.' He suggests that the Quran lists *summud* as one of the divine attributes (*ibid*: 77) and that the present is a disturbance of the normal historical development of the Palestinian nation (*ibid*: 79). It is also reflective of the socio-political realities of the everyday lives of the younger generation camp residents who have been witness to the older generation's decadal struggle to return and the political barriers that exist. The Syrian crisis, and the access the younger generation have to social media and information highways relating to that crisis has also led to more realistic positions on their future.

A further theme that emerged from the responses was the positioning of the right to return within a religious context. All, but one, of the respondents were Muslim and the intrinsic alignment of political identity with their religion is unsurprising. Nine of the respondents directly framed their right of return in religious terms.

Wakeem, a 27-year-old male, employed as a sanitation worker stated that it was their right to go to Palestine as it was their own country and that as Muslims the refugee community

> 'have the *hadith* (report of the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad) and the Koran verses, which say that we will return. Jesus Christ

> will appear in Palestine and play a significant role in our liberation. This will not happen in the foreseeable future'.

Sarhan, aged 27, a Business Studies graduate from university, awaited 'God's promise' for *haq al 'awda.*

This religious framing was presented in more radical terms by Yasmeen, a 28-year old female, unemployed and with basic education who stated that 'God will kill all the Jews.' One feature of many of the responses were how differences in levels of educational attainment tended to frame the response. Those who had achieved higher or further education qualifications tended to present a more liberal perspective while those with limited educational exposure tended to be positioned more radically in the context of conflict-related struggle.

Anih (1992: 31) suggests that Man has to depend on the divine for all those things he cannot provide for himself. Oppong (2013: 13) suggests that 'religion is more likely to play a significant role in identity formation in a culture where youth confront a continually fluctuating social and political milieu.' It is an essential component in the development of youth identity and without it, the 'multiplicity of choices and options accessible to modern youth is more likely to breed despair, hopelessness and confusion.' Parekh (2008: 25) opines that Muslim youth who do not realise their life expectancies, often find little to be proud of in their lives and 'turn to Islam as an identity of refuge, the sole basis of their pride'. This normally occurs under unusual circumstances, such as in this case the historical and ongoing living conditions in the PRCs in Lebanon. Other identities might not be available or available only on unacceptable terms, or offer little of value, or might only 'involve obligations and no rights'. This increased religious adherence manifested itself in a number of different ways. During the course of the survey there was a noticeable increase in the wearing of the *hajib* amongst female youths in the PRCs and a large attendance at religious services during Ramadan in both 2015 and 2016 from earlier years. Aspects of the increasing influence of religion has been noted officially with an UNRWA official stating that:

> 'The modern young generation's greater access to the media and the internet are leading to more radicalisation[21] and to an extent to a much more regressive society, on the surface of it. If we project our Western experiences on the situation here we should expect that the youth should have more openness. It's had a reverse effect in these ghettoised communities- which has had to do in large part with the failures of the leadership to bring any result. If you see that your secular, nationalist leadership continually fail to bring anything for you and all you see amongst them is corruption and inefficiency and so on. This is not just here it is all over. Palestinian society here has gone backwards to the Islamic tradition and we have the Islamist view-not necessarily *Daesh* (ISIS).'

Land and Home:

The connection between land and Palestinian identity was also a common theme running through the respondent's narratives. Schulz and Hammer (2003:93) cite an old Palestinian proverb: 'He who has no land has no honour'. Sayigh (1998:49) suggests that the loss of their land became 'a core element of Palestinian identity.' *Haq al 'awda* offers the reversal of the wrong done to Palestinians and the return of their honour. Being *ahl al-ard* (people of the land) was important, in most respondent's narratives to allow them to have an identity (*hawiyya*), to have belonging (*intima*) and honour (*sharaf*), and most importantly, to have dignity (*karama*). While Zaima, a 25-year-old female student in university was of the opinion that the right of return was a future prospect, the Palestinian people still had a right to their land (*ard)* and their identity (*hawiyya).*

Sami, a 31-year-old male, working in a private company for Palestinians connected his Palestinian identity to his ownership of land and iterated his search for dignity

[21] This paper does not propose to discuss issues of radicalisation which will be dealt with elsewhere.

> 'I have ownership of land in Palestine. I have my identity from that. I should have access to all of Palestine, every Palestinian should have; it is a right of return every Palestinian should have. We need our *karama* (dignity) and *haq al 'awda* is the way for us to reclaim our dignity. I should have the right to own my *beit* (house). The *Nakba* is still there since 68 years. We are suffering, but we have *summud*.'

In conversations with Palestinians of all ages, during this research, there was an inter -generational difference in the description used to define the buildings where they lived. The older generations used the word *malja (*which means shelter, or refuge). They also used *chador*, which means veil in Arabic. Upon enquiring why, the word veil was used, in this fashion, it was explained that this word can also be used to mean a tent, or temporary shelter. (Shelter is also used by Western workers in UNRWA to define an abode) The *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* used the word *beit* (which means house, but also a home). This would agree with Sanyal's (2011:883) findings. Perhaps it also points to the maintenance of a provisionality in the mental conception of the older generations and that they are still waiting and hopeful of a return. In the case of the youth there it would seem to indicate an acceptance of their permanence in the Lebanese PRCs, despite their allegiance to the idea of *haq al 'awda.* Concepts of nationalism and homeland are intrinsically linked. Salazar (1998) has described how homelands are constructed in the minds of peoples to instil spatial identity that ignores geographical and temporal boundaries. Aburfaha (2008: 44) has suggested that 'the most prominent representations of nationhood and peoplehood has been their articulation of their rootedness in the land of Palestine.' For the older generations of refugees, this remains the case and they regard their home in Palestine as Relph (1976: 20) suggested 'the central reference point of human existence.' The *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, have only a vicarious knowledge of that home and the PRCs in Lebanon have become 'home the focal point of a cosmic structure… at the centre,' Tuan (1977: 197).

Hope, Dreams, Agency and Dignity:

While realism, patience and religion have featured strongly in the survey results, there was also a strong element of positivity and hope expressed by many of the respondents. Bronk et al. (2009:501) suggest that

> 'hope includes a belief that one knows how to reach one's goals and a belief that one has the motivation to reach one's goals (agency); hope involves both the will (agency) to pursue certain ends and the way (means) to do to so effectively.'

Farran et al. (1995) found that adolescents enduring adverse life events used hope as a means to counteract their situations. Hope is separate to optimism, which has been defined by Franken (1994) as a generalised expectancy that good, as opposed to bad, outcomes will generally occur when confronted with problems across important life domains. Optimism describes a positive attitude or disposition that good things will happen independent of one's ability to bring them about. In contrast, hopelessness is a system of negative expectations concerning oneself and one's future life. It has been defined as the expectation that highly desirable outcomes will not occur and that one is powerless to change that situation (Needles and Abramson, 1990; Beck et al, 1974). Misztal (2012: 106) suggests that the principle of human dignity, understood as the 'universal value that belongs to every person by virtue of being human, is also frequently associated with the call for social justice.' Smith (2006:38) argues that any denial of respect and dignity is humiliating as it 'forcefully overrides or contradicts the claim that particular individuals . . . are making about who they are and where and how they fit.'

Many interviewees, used differing levels of hope and hopelessness when expressing their concepts of *haq al 'awda.* Many expressed the realities of these concepts in terms of 'a dream' or an 'impossible dream'. One 21-year-old who was studying dentistry suggested that all Palestinians have a dream to return to their land. This was especially true of his generation as they had never visited it of seen it. This sense of emotive displacement was strongly reiterated in more negative terms by Fares, a male aged 29, who

has completed 1st Year nursing degree in Beirut, and is holding down three jobs to fund his way through college. He dismissed *haq al 'awda* as a dream and that 'there was no Palestine on the map'. Another solution had to be found. These two views reflect the spectrum of opinions when it comes to the dream association with Palestine. On the one hand there is the politico-romanticised 'dream' of returning to the homeland, tempered on the other hand by the politico-reality and futile 'dream' of returning.



Figure 4.3. Bronze sculpture evoking *haq al 'awda* in Aref's home in Burj al Barajneh PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2016.

This Bronze sculpture is in the shape of pre-1948 Palestine. It contains inscriptions such as 'we will not kneel; 'we are still upholding the right to return'; in addition to 'God is the greatest' and other Koranic quotations. It was fashioned by a Palestinian ex-prisoner of the Israelis, who was living in Burj al Barajneh.

The desire for *haq al 'awda* was similarly expressed in terms of a dream by Hanadi, a 20-year-old female university student, working as a part time teacher to fund her college fees and Aya, a 35-year-old woman, employed and married to a Palestinian, former fighter. Both were of the opinion that it might not be realised in their lifetimes.

For the *Jeel ma baa 'd El Harb*, perhaps Creswell's (2009: 1) definition of attachment to place as 'the nebulous meanings associated with a place, the feelings and emotions a place evokes' is an apposite encapsulation of their attachment to Palestine, a land of which they have no direct experience. Their knowledge has been acquired through the transgenerational transmission of their antecedents and the resulting imaginaries; their education and their own research. In the minds of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, the place of Palestine is not one that they have personally experienced, having being born in the Lebanese PRCs and deprived of *haq al 'awda*. Palestine is an imagined land which they have palimpsestically constructed both on the material places of their existence, and on what Relph (1976: 43) describes as 'the places where they grew up and lived and where they live now,' and also on the memories of their forbearers. In this way, they exemplify Anderson's (1996: 6) 'imagined communities', because as he suggests most of them will 'never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the mind, each lives the image of their communion.'

In addition to Sami, above, who spoke of land and dignity, Fares spoke of his need for agency and dignity…

> 'What if someone gives you $1 million dollars and you spend it the wrong way? It's not about throwing money at us; it's about giving self-respect. What about if someone gives you knowledge and you generate the $1 million? It's about your chances and your belief in yourself. I want, at least to leave something to be remembered by the people. I want to be someone special in life. It's not just about my nationality. I want my rights as a human. I want to live in dignity. Let life evaluate me.'

Fares used the expression *bidna n 'aysh bi-l-karama* (I want to live in dignity) several times as did other respondents. This has a special significance for Palestinians as Karama was the location of a battle where the Palestinians first defeated the IDF, in 1968, after the failures of regular Arab armies in 1967 (O'Connor, 2013 :13-14). His response tallies with

what Allan (2014: 194-196) suggests. She opines that younger generations are progressively confronting the dilemma of loyalty to the dream of a 'redemptive return to a Palestinian homeland' and the 'pragmatic desire for a secure and meaningful existence in Lebanon or abroad.' The 'return' which they articulate is the means to determine their own destiny, dignity and humanity, which 'has been long denied to them.' Fares remarks are typical of the responses noted during this research. Most of the youth made attaining human rights, dignity and the means to achieve a decent living their priority. Fares's testimony is indicative of a new Palestinian dialogue in which Palestinian refugees are conceptualising a "political society," composed of new claims, narratives, and political practices, which they base on a broader moral and political ground than that of nationalism and the nation-state. As Allan (2014: 102) posits there is a need to shift analytical attention away from the 'discursive continuities of nationalism' and instead focus on the 'issues that concern people's immediate future,' such as health, security, employment rights and the quest for dignity and agency, at the individual level.

Intergenerational identity shifts

Bamyeh (2003: 842) suggests that earlier generations of Palestinian refugees have linked and constructed concepts of *haq al 'awda* in physical terms. This concept was linked to a place, known and yearned for nostalgically, and a hoped for physical eventuality. The young generation, he suggested, view it in more symbolic terms. Rather than focussing on the short-term political aspiration of physical return they instead conceptualise it as the return of a dignity and humanity long denied to them through better lived opportunity. It is also a 'common heuristic or a candlelight to shed light on common suffering.' This study has supported that hypothesis of a generational shift in thinking and has found a movement towards more nuanced and realistic perspectives surrounding the right of return.



Figure 4.4. Reported Differences in Aspirations surrounding Return amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* from Previous Generations Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 61).

Of the respondents in this survey a majority of 54% wanted to return to the Palestinian homeland but 38% did not. This is significantly different for the older generations where the overwhelming majority want to return unconditionally. This generational difference was commented on by a number of respondents. One, a 25-year-old man, working illegally in Beirut suggested that the older generation want to return as if the intervening 68 years had never happened. He instead simply wanted a better life, with rights, property and the ability to travel. He further suggested that only 50% would return if the opportunity arose. Aya, a 35-year-old female, working for an NGO in the PRCs also recognised an intergenerational difference in the concept of *haq al 'awda*. She noted that her parents simply wanted to go back to their homeland from which they had been forced to leave by the war. She instead wanted 'to go back to a better future' for her children with proper access to education, health services and human rights.

The responses recorded during this study support the findings of the Shikaki Study (Shikaki, 2003: 160-162, Allan 2014, 202). This was the single largest survey ever conducted of the refugee opinion on the question of return. This study found that if there was an amelioration in the conditions of refugees in Lebanon, the majority would prefer to remain.

Only 23% would opt to return to their ancestral villages. It was swiftly denounced by nearly 100 Palestinian organisations as being part of a plan to resettle Palestinians outside of Palestine.

Schulz and Hammer (2003: 111) suggest that the yearning for a return is indicative of a search for identity as much as for a place, and Aya is looking for an identity free from the indignities of the PRCs and for a better life for her family. This was common to most of the respondents.

Fares recognised that his generation had a differing concept of *haq al 'awda* which he expressed as follows…

> 'My father and mother only wanted to live as a normal human. For me it is not like that. The generations before me were searching for a revolution to get back our land. Now, I am going to tell you the truth. I have the right to speak of all the lands of my age. All the people my age, I know because I live amongst them. They don't care about going back to Palestine. They know nothing about it, and they forget about it, you have to know that very well. All they are searching about is not to be a mafia, or a faction member [22]or working with weapons or involved in drugs[23]. They don't have the chance to live here as a human being. They are waiting for a chance to be a human and they don't care if you give them an Israeli identity also. I am telling you the truth; I hear this from all the

[22] Many of the youth interviewed referred disparagingly of members of the Popular Committees as mafia members. in this way. Sometimes they spoke 'off-record', with a plea 'Don't quote me'. The Popular Committee, also known as *al –hakuma al –saghira*, or the small government of the camp was established by the PLO, in each camp during the 1970's. It is composed of members of the political factions within the camps. It is not elected. It was appointed to oversee the management of the camp and remains a legacy from the time of *Jeel al-thawra* (days of revolution).

[23] It should be noted that questions surrounding this subject were extremely sensitive in nature, and are regarded as a taboo subject. The researcher was surprised by the candid answers given by most respondents. The political factions in the camps deny that there is a drug problem. However, UNRWA officials admitted that there was a drug rehabilitation centre in Burj al Barajneh and several respondents related to the author their experiences with the drug problem.

> young guys of my age. They don't care about the Palestinian identity, except to make them feel that they belong, for something.'

These attitudinal shifts are reflective of other processes active in the camps. While there are increased levels of realism associated with the principle of the right of return there is also clear evidence of insurgent nationalist sentiment. Druckman (1994: 48-49) suggests that nationalism is merely a more complex form of patriotism, which he defines as a' commitment, a readiness to sacrifice for the nation.' In this definition a person's social identity is tied to the importance of the groups to which he or she belongs, such as the Palestinian diaspora. There is a link between the self -esteem of the person and the esteem of the nation to which he belongs. Loyalty and identification with the nation become tied to one's own sense of self. That loyalty is constantly in question and the individuals have to prove that the group is important to them through their behaviour (Druckman, 1994:54-55).

Some of the youth were anxious to demonstrate their commitment to the cause of *haq al 'awda* and it has become a strong defining feature of their nationalist sentiment. One, 34-year-old member of a Palestinian NGO associated it with the dominant political sentiment associated with confrontations that took place in 2011 on *Nakba* Day, when he suggested 70,000 Palestinians across the Middle East directly confronted Israeli security forces at the border, resulting in 11 deaths at Maroun ar Ras by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). This event was again evoked by Kamal, a 28-year-old self-employed male who measured his commitment to *haq al awda* with reference to Maroun ar Ras. While he stated that he was there and that friends of his were wounded, he was still cautious stating that they would have to wait for generations for it to happen and that they had to have *summud.*

> 'I was in Maroun ar Ras in 2011, because I have the right to *haq al 'awda* to my land. Two of my friends were wounded there and those who were killed were also my friends. Return is not going to

> happen soon. We have to wait for generations; we have to have *summud*.'

Sanyal (2011: 887-888) maintains that the Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) by 'virtue of their particular marginality' support the desire for the right of return and create an 'insurgent nationalism.' Proshansky et al (1983: 65-66) relate how environments such as POW camps (which in many ways are analogous to the PRCs) can threaten the sense of self in occupants and when the physical setting becomes 'dysfunctional' the threat becomes heightened (*ibid*: 75). These settings enhance feelings of 'place – belongingness' (*ibid*: 76) to 'imagined' places where positively valanced cognitions outweigh the negatively valanced ones of the present, and where 'social expectancies' will be met. For the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* such a place is Palestine.

Other attitudes associated with the right of return also surfaced. One surprising element, in the context of the more realistic approaches to an actual return, was the simplistic perspective amongst a number of the *Jeel ma Baa'd El Harb* that simply sending the Jews back 'to their own countries' is a solution. Twenty-one of the respondents wanted the Jews to go back to the countries from which they originated. When pressed on what they meant by this solution, they invariably replied that they should go back to their countries of origin. When it was pointed out to them that many Jews had been born in Israel, some of them drew an analogy to their own situation. Most of the respondents were born in Lebanon, but saw themselves as belonging in Palestine. They suggested that the native- born Israelis should return to the countries from which their antecedents originated.

Solutions as to how a return for the respondents, would be implemented varied. Thirty-nine offered pragmatic solutions. Both Ennas (a 21-year-old, working for a Palestinian NGO) and Nasir (a 35-year-old male) suggested that all could live in Palestine (as one State) under a Palestinian government. Hosni a 31-year-old male working in a private company suggested a two-State solution as being workable. He saw the partition of

the old Palestine into two countries, one for the Jews and one for the Palestinians as a just and workable solution. Of the 18 others, they offered no solution but they were adamant in their commitment to the principle of the right of return.

A Legal solution?

This paper has also examined in brief the legal background to *haq al 'awda*. The legal basis for this concept has been outlined. The remit of this study does not permit a debate about how this right is to be achieved, or indeed what agency would take on the task. As highlighted, UNRWA has no protection role, providing only humanitarian services. UNRWA does not provide the same protection as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as Takkenberg describes (1998: 304-309; 316-317). Both Takkenberg (1998) and Lawland (1996) suggest that UNRWA's mandate could or should be changed to take on this role. This view is supported by Akram (2001). Changing UNRWA's mandate would most likely require another UNGAR, which is probably unlikely given the difficulties that organisation has in even securing a working budget. The absence of a viable Palestinian State means that no country is identifiable to champion *haq al 'awda i*n a realistic sense. The omission of the question of refugees from the Declaration of Principles (Oslo Accord) of 13 September 1993 effectively postpones into an indefinite future the resolution of *haq al 'awda.*

International/Regional Solutions

Lebanon was already a host to over 400,000 Palestinian refugees prior to the Syrian crisis in 2011. Post – 2011, refugee numbers have swollen to approximately 1.5 million. Lebanon is still a fragile state after a bitter civil war and years of occupation by neighbouring powers. It is still busy asserting its independence and territorial integrity. It suffers an intolerable economic burden due to this influx. Politically, it continues to engage in a delicate balancing act to maintain consociational equilibrium. The events surrounding the resignation of Prime Minister Hariri in November of 2017 have demonstrated its susceptibility to the effects of Saudi and Iranian

influences in the region. Lebanon was best placed, due to its geographic location to provide a safe haven for the refugees of 1948 and also of 2011. The refuge and support it provides, however minimal, cannot be sustained in the long run, without compromising its economic and political stability. Perhaps a viable solution to this problem could be reached if a supra-national and regional body such as the Arab League were to take on the role of finding a resolution to both the long-term refugees and those of more recent origin. This body would be able to investigate all possible remedies, including a modified *haq al 'awda*, as part of a package of measures to resolve the situation. At the international level, progress on *haq al 'awda* has stagnated, although the United Nations continues to reaffirm UNGAR 194 (III) annually. There is an urgent need to address the Palestinian refugee problem in Lebanon but unless the major powers take action to resolve the Israeli- Palestinian debacle, there is little likelihood that this will occur.

Bodies like refugees are not homogenous groups, but are comprised of individuals with differing needs, opinions and identities. Whitebrook (2001: 137) suggests the heterogeneity of people with ideas and identities, which are sometimes at odds with the groups to which they belong. The research for this paper would suggest that there are inter- generational differences in what importance the Palestinian refugees and in particular, the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* attach to *haq al 'awda* and how they view *tawteen* and the *Nakba* (Chapters 5 and 3 of this thesis, respectively). This research indicates that ethnographers and anthropologists need to be open to such diversity when reading and writing about the PRLs, to question previously held assumptions about their conceptions of identity and belonging, and to re-evaluate the importance of place in their psyche.

This study has established that the vast majority of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* continue to embrace the concept of *haq al 'awda* as a central tenet of their Palestinian identity. This conception is not necessarily or entirely framed in a simplistic Palestinian nationalist dialogue. There are infusions of agency, dreams, hopes and imagined futures, which are imbricated with elements of insurgent nationalism and dissatisfaction at the previous

generations loyalty to that dialogue. In their responses during interview, they demonstrated pragmatism in the solutions they offered as to how *haq al 'awda* might be achieved, which differ from those of previous generations, who wanted to return to Palestine as it was pre-*Nakba*. Their commitment to *haq al 'awda* speaks of their conception of place as Palestine and their Palestinian identity, deriving from that place. The research has also indicated that factors which may have strengthened that commitment to Palestine include their perceived abandonment by the PLO, after the Oslo Accords and the PA pursuit of a two-state solution over resolving the right of return of refugees to the homeland. A secondary factor has been the continued repression by GOL and a stagnation of the dialogue between the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) and GOL. Finally, the large influx of Syrian refugees since 2011 has put pressure on their already weakened economic prospects and on the limited assistance provided to them by UNRWA and NGOs in Lebanon and strengthened their desire to achieve agency in their homeland.

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Chapter 5

Tawteen: A New Approach to Naturalisation in Palestinian Refugee Youth Identity Negotiation in Lebanon.

Abstract: Ethnographers have reported in the past that t*awtee*n (naturalisation) has been rejected by both the Lebanese population and Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Its meaning has been interpreted differently by academics, politicians and political activists, depending on the context in which it is used, and the agenda of the commentator. An absolute rejection of *tawteen* has been described as a constituent of Palestinian refugee identity. An exploration of the importance of *tawteen* amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* (the generation after the war) forms the premise for this paper. The qualitative research methods of interviews and observation were utilised to evaluate the degree to which this generation reject or are willing to embrace the proposition of *tawteen* and how they situate *tawteen* in their concepts of Palestinian refugee identity. Attachment to place, in Lebanon, Palestine, or elsewhere was examined and factors which have altered the loyalty of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* to an absolute rejection of *tawteen* were identified. The findings of this research suggest that there are intergenerational differences in how this generation, in Lebanon, situate *tawteen* in their concepts of Palestinian identity and that a new approach to this contentious issue has emerged amongst them.

Keywords: *Tawteen*, identity, ideology, socio-economics, agency, civic rights, citizenship.

Introduction: Chapters 3 and 4 have already highlighted the lack of substantive identity- based social science research, which has its sole focus on the present generation[24]. This paper is the result of qualitative research carried out amongst Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon, during

[24] Several academics have written about Palestinian refugees (Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 1977, 1979, 1994, 2001; Suleiman, 1999; Ramadan, 2009,2013; al-Natour, 2007), but none have written solely about the Palestinian refugee youth in the Lebanese camps.

2015/2016, on the subject of identity and belonging. The aim of the research was to examine whether this generation had the same commitment as its predecessors to the traditional representation of Palestinian refugee identity.[25] Within the context of Palestinian refugee identity, the specific research aim of this paper is to evaluate whether or not this generation are willing to accept or reject *tawteen* (naturalisation*).* Incorporating this aim, the following research objectives were formulated:

- To evaluate the extent to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* reject or accept *tawteen* and the level of awareness of what this might entail to their concepts of Palestinian identity and belonging.
- To assess attachment to place, either in Palestine, Lebanon or elsewhere.
- To investigate what factors are altering the traditionally accepted view of attitudes to *tawteen,* amongst this generation.

Miles and Huberman (1994: 25) suggest that a phenomenon of some sort occurring in a bounded context becomes 'in effect, the unit of analysis'. The identity of the Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon and the issue of *tawteen,* then, is the unit of analysis for this paper. The method of research selected for this study was a qualitative case study, involving multiple individual case studies. In such multiple case studies, the researcher examines several cases, in order to understand the similarities and differences between the cases. Yin (2003 :47) suggests that such use of multiple case studies embedded within a single case study will elicit similar or contrasting results but for predictable reasons. A combination of semi-structured interviews and observation were utilised for this research. A total of sixty-one respondents, aged between 18 and 35 years, were interviewed amongst the Palestinian refugee youth. The interviews were conducted in the three PRCs located in the Beirut area and in a fourth, Ein

[25] A traditional view of Palestinian refugee identity casts them as a group memorialising the 1948 expulsion from their lands (*al-Nakba* –the 'catastrophe'); being steadfastly opposed to naturalisation (*tawteen*); and being rooted in a refusal to contemplate anything other than a right of return *(haq al 'awda*) to Palestine (Peteet: 2005; Sayigh: 2001; Bianchi: 2014).

el Hilweh, located in South Lebanon. A detailed methodology for this thesis is outlined in Appendix 'C'[26].

This paper examines the background to the issue of *tawteen* from both the Palestinian and Lebanese perspectives. *Tawteen* is an Arabic word usually understood to connote assimilation into the local population of a country, through a political process of naturalisation, and whose various meanings are subject to contestation as outlined hereunder. Research conducted in the Lebanese Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) in 2015/2016 suggests that this aspect of Palestinian identity deserves to be reconsidered by academics and by policymakers. This paper proposes that there now appears to be a greater willingness amongst the present generation of refugees (*Jeel ma baa'd El harb*: the generation after the war) to put aside the allegiance to the dogma of rejection of *tawteen*, as the existential quotidian conditions have worsened in the Lebanese refugee camps. Evidence of a possible paradigm shift in the old concepts of identity and belonging amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* has been uncovered calling into question whether those accepted modalities still remain relevant.

Background*:* Chapter 3, has recounted in some detail the historical background of the Palestinian refugee presence in Lebanon. Previous researchers have documented the historical resistance to *tawteen* (naturalisation) by the refugees (Peteet, 2005; Sayigh, 2001; Schulz and Hammer, 2003). These researchers have reported this resistance as being unanimous. This has been accepted as being the historical and universal position of all Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. However, as this paper shows there have been instances of naturalisation in the past. This has most often been for political purposes and not carried out for humanitarian reasons. As iterated in Chapter 4, the respondents for this research use the term 'refugees' as a self-reference. Local integration/ naturalisation is one of the three solutions (repatriation, local integration and resettlement) advocated by the UNHCR (UNHCR Documents 2008) for refugees in

[26] This format is in accordance with University of Ulster guidelines on the presentation of methodologies.

protracted situations. For Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, using the designation of 'refugee' allows them access to the limited assistance provided to them by UNRWA. Furthermore, it also serves to remind the international community that it has an obligation to them, stretching back over many years. Adopting the mantle of refugee denotes their resistance to their perception that the PA and the PLO were willing to ditch their cause, in lieu of an increasingly unlikely two-state solution, in the agreements after the Oslo Accords.[27]

Situating *Tawteen* in Palestinian Identity:

Knudsen (2007: 6) suggests that 'the three pillars of Palestinian political activism in Lebanon are the provision of civic rights for the refugees; resisting naturalisation; and upholding the right of return to their homeland/ natal villages.' It is possible to conceive of the essence of 'Palestinianness' and by extension, Palestinian identity at the national and personal level as resting on three pillars. These can be considered firstly, as an awareness of the facts surrounding the *Nakba*, and the preservation of that knowledge through commemoration and the education of successive generations, using storytelling and memorialisation. The second pillar is the utter rejection of *tawteen* and the third is the maintenance of *haq al 'awda* (right of return).

[27]Interviews carried out by the author in Beirut in 2015/2016.



Figure 5.1. Representation of Palestinian Identity as Resting on Three Pillars.

If one considers these three pillars in a linear temporal, historical progression, the *Nakba* represents the catastrophic events of the past which deprived the refugees of their civic rights in a previous existence and led to their exile (*al ghurba*). The repression and resistance embedded in the concept of *tawteen* represents the existential present and *haq al 'awda* represents futurity and hope. *Summud* (steadfastness) is the thread that runs through all three elements. It bears witness to the traumatic events of the past; defending the right to retain their unique identity in the abysmal conditions of the present. Having *summud* provides hope that the future will bring a restoration of rights, an improvement in their marginal conditionality and a recognition of the wrong done to the refugees at both the individual and collective level. Ethnographers and anthropologists have written how each of these elements or combinations of them is a component of the Palestinian identity (Allan, 2014; Sayigh, 1977, 1979; Schulz &Hammer, 2003).

The translation of the Arabic word '*tawteen*' can be problematic, emotive and in some cases subject to hijacking for political reasons. Ethnographers and anthropologists assign different terms to explain it. Social

commentators and political leaders in Lebanon also use it in varying ways to convey political messages, depending on audiences and expediencies. Sunni politicians may sometimes agree with Haddad (2000: 30) and Schulz and Hammer (2003:116) when they describe it as 'integration'. Palestinian factions and Christian politicians use it in a way in which it connotes 'permanent resettlement' as Ramadan (2009: 72; 2013:69); Bianchi (2014: 118); and Suleiman (1999: 71) explain it. Talhami (2003: 34) uses the word to mean 'settlement', which is politically more neutral and acceptable, while Hanafi et.al (2012: 34) styles it as 'naturalisation'. However, Knudsen's (2007:12) and al- Natour's (2007 :3) use of it as 'implantation' has definite provocative connotations and has been widely used by Lebanese politicians to arouse opposition to its adoption, in what Chaaban et.al (2010: 7) calls the 'scarecrow' effect. Shehadi (2010: 10) makes the point that terming *tawteen* as 'permanent settlement' of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon is 'an ideal subject to be exploited in political manipulation.'

Traditionally academics have been all too ready, in the past to make the assertion that both the Lebanese and the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon reject *tawteen,* as evidenced in Hanafi et.al (2012: 42); Sayigh (1994: 27,45); Fischer (2009: 61); Schulz and Hammer (2003:116); Weighill (1997: 308); and al- Natour (2007). Chaaban et.al (2016: 24) seem to acknowledge that not all Palestinian refugees reject it at the personal level when they make the comment: '*On a political level,* Palestine refugees have also opposed it'. Some academics in the past (Peteet 2005, Sayigh 2001), have assumed that the rejection of *tawteen* was a paramount and unchanging conviction of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. Conversi (2004: 271) terms this as a form of essentialist thinking, where 'entire groups are hypostasised as cohesive entities obeying self-perpetuating mandates and enduring injunctions.' The results of this research indicate that there are shifts in how the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* view *tawteen.* Indeed, Allan (2014: 60-61) has noted that fractures have appeared in the 'accepted view' of this aspect of Palestinian identity, in the younger generation. She has identified flickers of 'quiet personal resistance'

amongst them because they are finding difficulty in absorbing the dogma of a 'national belonging' into their identity framework. This is hardly surprising given that Palestinian youth now have access to the internet and are more aware of the world around them. Elbedour, Bastien and Center (1997: 222) found that the extreme rapid social change that communities have experienced over the past decades has been caused by the trauma of displacement and has resulted in a 'deterioration of family structures' and changed the 'socio-cultural structure of the Palestinian community'. This in turn has caused inter-generational differences and alienation from their elders and their cultural roots, with the youth 'pursuing modern lifestyles' and having divergent concepts of their identities.

Lebanese Attitude to *Tawteen*:

Historically, the Government of Lebanon (GOL) has opposed *tawteen* because it has argued that the influx of mainly Sunni refugees would upset the delicate consociational balance in the country (Takkenberg, 1998: 162). Additionally, it has insisted that the international community owes both Lebanon and the refugees a huge debt for agreeing to the foundation of the state of Israel and causing the displacement of such huge numbers (Takkenberg, 1998: 133). It has suited GOL to follow the general Arab position of ostensibly not wanting to put any obstacles in place to the refugees' right of return to Palestine (Takkenberg, 1998: 132; Allan, 2014: 245). As O'Connor (2013: 17-20) has suggested, GOL and many Lebanese hold the Palestinians responsible for causing the Lebanese Civil war (1975-1990). Naturalisation did occur in the 1960's, 1994 and 1995[28]. In total, it is estimated that 80,000 Palestinians were granted Lebanese citizenship, being in the main Christian and Shia, although a small number of Sunni were included. Most were naturalised for political reasons, to boost falling Christian numbers, when it was feared that the Muslim population numbers would overtake them. Nishikida (2009: 229-230) outlines an instance of where a number of Shia village inhabitants were naturalised for political

[28] See both: Haddad, S. (2003: 4); and Hourani, G. and Sensing –Dabbous, E. (2012: 188).

reasons. It was also afforded to a smaller number of wealthy Sunnis, who were able to pay for the privilege.

The population of Lebanon is estimated at 6.5 million[29] (CIA: July 2016), which includes all refugees. Since the Syrian Civil war, which erupted in 2011, an estimated 1.5 million Syrian and 58,000 Syrian Palestinian registered refugees have entered Lebanon. There are some estimated additional 40-50,000 Iraqi refugees residing in Lebanon. It is conceivable that the true numbers far exceed these figures, due to the fact as already pointed out that registration is largely voluntary. GOL does not want to destabilise the country's delicate consociational balance, by naturalising any of them. Furthermore, it argues that the economy of Lebanon would collapse if *tawteen* were to be offered to the refugees. Allan (2014: 3) has asserted however that GOL has 'exploited this situation as a pretext for withholding everything from healthcare, education and social security to the basic right to work and own property.'

As Allan (2104: 13) relates, the Ta'if Accords (1989) modified the Lebanese constitution to include the rejection of permanent resettlement of Palestinians in Lebanon. The accords perpetuated the sclerotic nature of the Lebanese political system, further accentuating the possibility of stagnation typified during the last four years[30]. Political stagnation has led to the perpetuation of the anti-*tawteen* policies of successive Lebanese governments, and has stymied the advances made by the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC), in improving the plight of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The problems associated with housing the

[29]Lebanon has not had a Census of population since 1932. See CIA Country statistics, 2016: Lebanon. Available at: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html. Accessed: 08 November 2016. See also Chaaban et al (2016: 8) for numbers of refugees caused by the Syrian civil war since 2011.

[30] Lebanon was without a President from May 2014 to October 2016, when Michel Aoun was elected, with the support of Hezbollah and Saad Hariri's Future Movement, with the apparent blessing of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Hariri was elected Prime Minister in November 2016, prior to which the Parliament had extended its mandate on two occasions. The abrupt resignation of Hariri on 04 Nov 2017 and his subsequent suspension of that resignation at the end of November opens the possibility of a return to the previous uncertainty.

estimated additional 58,000 Palestinians from Syria (PRS) in Lebanon, coupled with the influx of 1.5 million of (non-Palestinian) Syrian refugees, (Chaaban et al, 2016: 8) has put the economy under severe pressure, as well as deflecting the work in improving the conditions of the PRLs, through the LPDC. Palestinians are still blamed for causing the Civil war (Ibrahim, 2008: 38) and this blame in conjunction with 'opposition to *tawteen* is a glue that helps hold the political system together.' (Sayigh, 2001: 100). Brynen (2009: 4) states that the 'potent mix of sectarian – political – demographic tensions and bitter experience' has led to strong opposition to *tawteen* amongst Lebanese society. Bianchi (2014:135) reports that the Lebanese perceive: 'that any improvement of Palestinians' living- conditions facilitates assimilation and their permanent resettlement in Lebanon'.

Ahmed (1997: 163), even though in this case he is not writing about the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, correctly recognises that 'for a democratic state, the existence of a large segregated and discriminated population of foreign citizens is not conducive to stability in the long run'. Shiblak (1996: 39) outlines the difficulty across all Arab states, and not just in Lebanon, for the Palestinian refugees, in establishing their civil rights as being 'the absence of clear and well-defined legislation regulating their status.' Additionally, (*ibid*: 39) he comments

> 'Palestinian affairs are governed by ministerial decrees or administrative orders, which allow differing interpretations and abuses of power and can easily be reversed in response to changing political conditions.'

Discussion:

This paper has situated the concept of *tawteen* within Palestinian refugee identity and outlined the Lebanese attitude to it. It has also reported that previous researchers have ascribed opposition to t*awteen* as a unanimous position amongst Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. A pivotal finding of this

study indicates that this no longer the case. The research suggests that Palestinian refugee identity can no longer be considered as homogenous, and that there are intergenerational differences between the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* and their predecessors in the degree to which they will accept *tawteen*. Allan (2014 :3) suggests that 'any form of assimilation is taboo, because it is seen as forsaking nationalist aspirations and legitimising historical dispossession.' The main and surprising finding of this research has established that despite Allan's statement, Palestinian refugee youth, in Lebanon are so desperate because of the deprivation caused by the physical, economic and cultural landscapes imposed upon them, that many of them are willing to contemplate the acceptance of *tawteen*, which, as Chaaban et al (2016: 24) state, has been opposed by the Palestinians '*on a political level'*. This study found that 27 persons or 44% said that they would take this option if it was offered to them. This number was almost equally matched by those against it at 26 or 43%. A further 5 (8%) were unsure and 3 (5%) said that they did not care about the issue. Acceptance rates across the genders reflected the overall acceptance rates, with 41% amongst females and 47% for males. This would seem to lend weight to Allans' own finding (2014: 7), that 'during informal conversations nationalist imperatives would often give way to aspirations conceived in terms far more personal.'

Cultural Landscapes: Identity and Ideology Issues.

Allan (2014: 214) states: 'Refugee experience can no longer be adequately understood through the ideological lens of national attachment', when such attachment does not offer any relief to the existential suffering which the youth are suffering in 2016. Informal interviews conducted for this research in 2015/2016 reflect Allan's (2014: 102) assertion that there is a rising rejection of the factions and the Popular Committees (PCs)[31] in the camps by the youth, as they regard them as corrupt and self-serving.

[31] The Popular Committee, also known as *al –hakuma al –saghira*, or the small government of the camp was established by the PLO, in each camp during the 1970's. It is not elected. It was appointed to oversee the management of the camp and remains a legacy from the time of *Jeel al-thawra* (generation of revolution).

Allan's (2014: 100-136) account of the deficiencies of the PCs in managing the provision of electricity in Shatila was echoed in this research conducted by the author in 2015/2016; although it was always accompanied by the comment 'don't quote me.' A similar situation applies to the provision of potable drinking water in the camps. Another weakness spoken of was their inability to formulate a unified stance on advancing refugee rights, thereby further weakening their credibility. In that light, these bodies are regarded as increasingly irrelevant by the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb.*

Sami, aged 31 rejected the idea of *tawteen* on ideological grounds:

> 'It is personally unacceptable to me. I want the right to return to Palestine. As a Palestinian refugee living in this country, I want you to know that I have pain and *summud* on a daily basis. Palestinian youth nowadays are a bit diverted, because they are busy in getting their daily needs. This is one of the issues facing the new generation of Palestinians their daily bread and they don't have time to think about their future.'

Sami's rejection of *tawteen* on a point of principle was echoed by several other respondents, both male and female and across the employed and unemployed groups, who had varying levels of education. Bar-Tal (1998: 94-95) proposes that group beliefs are defined as 'convictions that group members are aware that they share and consider as defining their 'groupness' and that acceptance of these group beliefs is one of the important indicators of group membership.' A person joining a group must, at least 'externally express acceptance of group beliefs' Group beliefs unify group members, giving them their identity and differentiate them from outgroups. For Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, in the past, one of those group cultural beliefs was the almost universal refusal to accept *tawteen*. However, Van Meijl (2008: 172-173) offers a divergent position and he contrasts the old tradition of cultural beliefs (associated with a group of people, delineated with a boundary and static), with a new definition [such as that of Wright, (1998)]. This definition states that a

culture is 'multi-vocal, polyphonous and dynamic'. It is a 'political process of contestation among individual members or groupings over the power to define social situations'. The diversity of these research findings bears out his assertion and also echo Clemens' (2007: 110) caution that the Palestinian people are 'not a single homogenous group, but comprise a people with multiple identities'. This is despite what Clemens (*ibid:* 110) terms the tendency of Western media to depict the 'typified Palestinian – nationalistic, radical and militant- without understanding the diversity of the peoples who call themselves Palestinian.' Maalouf (2000: 4) iterates the difficulties in maintaining a singular identity when he talks of every individual being a 'meeting ground for many different allegiances' where these 'loyalties conflict with one another and confront the person who harbours them with difficult choices.' Any 'incident, a fortunate or unfortunate accident, even a chance encounter, influences our sense of identity more strongly than any ancient affiliation.'

Yousra aged 21 would take *tawteen,* if it were available to her, but she didn't want to lose her Palestinian identity. Aref aged 21, echoed this desire to maintain his *hawiyya* (identity):

> 'I have an opposite view to a lot of Palestinians. I have no problem with (accepting) it (*tawteen)*; you can still have the Palestinian nationality and identity. With the Palestinian identity (*hawiyya*), I can do nothing. I hope that I get another nationality and balance the two identities'

This statement appears to bear out Van Mejil's (2008: 180) observations on the likelihood of adolescents in the modern world developing a 'hybrid identity' in which they 'successfully combine aspects of both local and global circumstances'. However, these 'components of a different origin' require being re-combined continuously. This phenonomen requires a 'never-ending struggle to work out in which situation they ideally belong. Many people, adolescents, in particular, now develop multicultural identities'.

John aged 31 and the only Christian to be interviewed agreed:

> 'Whatever nationality, I will get, I will stay Palestinian. An example of this is the Armenians[32] in Lebanon. They got Lebanese citizenship, but today they are still Armenians.'

Schiocchet (2012: 81) counters this assertion when he writes:

> 'Taking up local citizenship equates to giving up one's Palestinianness. *Tawteen* allows for the erasure of a Palestinian's refugeeness, thereby undermining the consequences of *al-Nakba* and rejection of *haq al 'awda*.'

This research found that 57% of the Palestinian youth wanted to retain a Palestinian identity; 10% were prepared to abandon it and 62% were happy to have a double identity (not necessarily including a Palestinian identity). 31% were either ambivalent or not sure about retaining it. In contrast, many of the youth framed their acceptance of *tawteen* in terms of achieving an identity of their own, even if it meant forswearing their Palestinian identity. They also recognised the distinction between identity and nationality. These saw *tawteen* as a means to achieve agency, employment and the right to own property, which they saw as being denied to them. Sara aged 28 was one such respondent open to accepting it:

> 'Yes, I would take it, as it would allow me a better chance to get work; even though I know that it is against *haq al 'awda* (the right of return). I want a better education for my children, even if they don't have the right to work as Palestinians. I want human rights and a better life, and better opportunities for work, outside the

[32] Nishikida, (2009: 229-230) writing about the Seven Villages and the process of their naturalisation makes a distinction between the concepts of *tajannis* (nationalisation) and *tawteen* (naturalisation). In the case of the former, he states that it means 'getting nationality as a Lebanese citizen and does not mean to quit being a Palestinian.' In the case of the latter Nishikida imputes the term with the meaning 'to quit being a Palestinian.' All persons interviewed for this research understood precisely what was meant by *tawteen* and at no stage referred to the term *tajannis* and yet some of the answers given to the researcher are in congruence with Nishikida's definition of *tajannis*.

> camp. We are left with no hope and we have to fight for our chances.[33]'

This is an example of the personal struggle between the nationalist ideology of the group and a desire for personal agency, common amongst Palestinian youth and concurs with Worchel's (1998: 56) observation that in the Middle East, culture places 'greater emphasis on the collective- the group' and there is a stress on the individual's social identity; however, he also postulated that 'personal identity was emphasised during early childhood and adolescence' in tandem with this emphasis. Worchel (1998: 55-56) also writes of our life-long journey to find our identity, at the heart of which is 'determining our relationships with the groups to which we belong'. Group membership inevitably means the surrender of some of our personal identity. While we desire to be members of the group, we have a parallel desire to be recognised as an independent, unique individual. 'A constant struggle ensues', in deciding how much of our personal identity we will sacrifice for the substitute group identity, or indeed if we are prepared to abandon the group identity altogether as Salman, aged 23 put it:

> 'I am 50% for it because we can get civil rights and feel human; and 50% against it because it means that we will forget our identity, people and land.'

Physical Landscape: Socio-Economic Issues

This study found that 71% of all respondents earned less than $1,000 a month (includes 0 earnings). The dire socio-economic conditions for the PRLs have worsened and led to a concomitant despair amongst some elements of the youth, so much that any solution is acceptable. Chaaban et al (2016: 82) found that the unemployment rate for PRLs, males of all ages is 21% (an increase from 8% from a similar survey carried out by Chaaban

[33] The unwillingness to compromise *haq al 'awda* was a common factor in the high refusal rates of the refugee youth's willingness to accept *tawtee*n; however, despite an awareness amongst all respondents of that possibility, those who were conducive to acquiring civic/civil rights in Lebanon were prepared to take that risk.

et al, 2010) and 32% for females, of all ages, in 2015. This study found general youth unemployment at 33%, with moderately lower unemployment for males at 31% but similar figures to Chaaban et al (2016:82): (35%) for females at 34%. Much of the employment was menial, temporary and illegal. The vast bulk of those working (86%) found occasional employment within the camps, some with UNRWA (7%); the majority not.

Chaaban et al (2016: 9) also found that extreme and overall poverty rates are higher in the camps than without and have increased since 2010 in the Beirut area (by 9%). Furthermore, nearly all professions show poverty rates higher than 50%, 'reflecting the low pay and precarious work conditions PRL still experience'. Chaaban et al (2016: 84) outline the prohibitions on gaining employment for PRLs, which are quite onerous, in particular in the professions, and despite some concessions after 2010, 'Low income is still the primary cause of high poverty rates amongst the PRLs'. (*ibid*: 54). Under Lebanese law, Palestinians are prohibited from owning property, and must make convoluted circumventions of the law to do so (Author's interviews Beirut: 2015, 2016[34]). The security situation in neighbouring Syria and within Lebanon, coupled with the refugee influx has delayed negotiations between GOL and the Palestinian refugees through the Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC). This forum has been dismissed by numbers of Palestinian youth as *haki fadi* (empty talk), during data collection in 2016. The influx of refugees from Syria since 2011 has further eroded the prospect of employment, however menial, for the PRLs. There is anecdotal evidence that competition between PRL and PRS youth for these jobs has intensified, contributing to 'an increase in unemployment rates among PRL in the already limited pool of low-skill jobs' [conversations with UNRWA officials 2015 and Palestinian NGOs 2016; Chaaban et al, 2016: 84)].

[34] See also: Chaaban, J. et al (2016: 126-127).



Figure 5.2. Reported Acceptance Rates amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* of *Tawteen* Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 61).

A common view across the respondents who would accept *tawteen*, if offered to them was that it afforded them the opportunity to get better living conditions, employment, freedom to travel, the right to own property and civil rights. The response of John aged 31, is typical when he states that in taking *tawteen*, he saw a chance to have:

> 'A decent life, civil rights, to work for our daily bread, without needing anyone, and the right to own property, which is part of the discrimination against only us. We want to be free from fear of the future.'

Allan (2014: 161) suggests that 'poverty, chronic unemployment and political disenchantment conspire to diminish the expectations of refugees.' Mahdi aged 23, summarised the views, commonly held, of those who would accept *tawteen* and the intergenerational differences with their parents as follows:

> 'I think that they should give Palestinians the *tawteen* because we are a long time here, and we have no option, if we cannot get human rights and a decent education and earn a living, we cannot fight back. It is causing internal conflicts within yourself, in what you think about yourself, or at least in what your parents made you think about yourself. They always try to make you not forget that

> you are Palestinian, then when you go outside you are rejecting that idea. Eventually young people want their own life and improvement and to be a bit selfish; they want to live, they don't care about their country (Palestine) anymore. Palestinians are capable of providing the country with their help and also their families. I want to become a doctor and help my family; to own a house. Here in Lebanon, I can't work as a doctor; I don't have any right to work; I don't have residency, and they are afraid of me because I am a Palestinian'

The acceptance rates (44%) are important because they show a change amongst this generation in their attitudes to assimilation in Lebanon and fly in the face of previous research carried out amongst the PRLs. The results seem to indicate that this generation do not see acceptance of *tawteen* as a diminution of their Palestinian identity.

This research in 2016 found that 100% of the youth had a Mobile phone. 77% of all respondents had access to Wi-Fi and 39% possessed a laptop/computer. This implies that younger refugees are more exposed to the wider world and the internet, as a by-product of globalisation, than their predecessors. Tölölyan (2012: 11) makes the observation that as a by-product of globalisation, the diasporic possesses a hybridity of culture and identity, 'or at the very least has developed a comfortable bicultural competence.' Massey (1994: 156) contends, in the Marxist tradition, that 'Globalisation does not simply entail homogenisation.' Furthermore, as Allan (2104: 96) observes Lebanon has a 'voracious consumer culture, where social status increasingly appears to be determined by one's capacity to purchase commodities and brand-name goods'. The lack of a wherewithal to engage, in these 'market- based identities, can result in a sense of 'personal failing and an existential crisis,' being felt by the Palestinian youth. Access to the consumer culture is seen by many as being achievable only by getting civil rights, the right to work and earn money and the desirable route for some youth to attain these rights is to embrace *tawteen,* if it were to be offered to them.



Figure 5.3. Reported Opposition to *Tawteen* by Gender amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 61).

Opposition to *tawteen* (43%) was higher amongst females at 52% than males at 35%. Several reasons were given for their opposition. Loyalty to the idea of a return to Palestine was one reason given as Ennas aged 21 stated:

> 'No, I don't want it; I know that I will never have the right to work here, and that I will never own anything here. I have never seen Palestine, but I feel it to be home.'

Aya aged 35 felt that there would always be discrimination against Palestinians, even if they got Lebanese nationality:

> 'I don't think that it's good, as I do not think that it will give better conditions and there will always be discrimination against the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. I want a secure living with dignity, in peace and to be motivated by better work opportunities and I want better living conditions. I want full human rights.

Kamal, aged 28 was also emphatic in his opposition to *tawteen* and gave the reason as the poor state of the Lebanese economy:

> 'We don't need their nationality. Fuck it! The Lebanese themselves are leaving. We all want better for or families. We have a very poor future here. It cannot be done in Lebanon; but we hope that it can be better. We are not living, we are surviving!'

Conclusion

This paper has examined Palestinian refugee youth contemporary concepts of Palestinianness through the lens of the cultural landscape, dealing with aspects of identity and ideology. It has explored the physical landscape, dealing with the socio-economic factors which impinge on their consciousness. The aim of this research was to determine the measure of this generation's attachment to the traditional view of *tawteen*, as an immutable taboo, held by previous generations. The findings of this research tally with the incipient fractures in attitude and loyalty to that position, as noted by Allan (2014: 5, 26, 33, 60); and also adds weight to her suggestion that 'we need to bear in mind the radical transformations that have occurred over the more than six decades.' In so doing we acknowledge the 'primacy of economic subjectivity and the decisive shaping influence it has on what it means to be Palestinian' (Allan: 2014: 97-98). This concluding passage highlights the imperatives for improvement in the way in which assistance is delivered to the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* by the UN and NGOs. Anthropologists and ethnographers are urged to adopt new research methods. Lastly, new policy initiatives are proposed for international, regional and national bodies, in order to improve the situation.

Imperative to improve UN and NGO assistance

UNRWA which began operations in 1950 does not provide the same protection as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as Takkenberg (1998: 304-309; 316-317) describes. It has no mandate to pursue naturalisation for Palestinian refugees under its care. This research indicates that an amendment to its mandate should be considered to take account of the 'protection gap,' in order to acquire legal rights and uphold them for the Palestinian refugees. It is apposite that this mandate be reviewed to take account of this gap. An alternative proposition would be to extend the remit of the UNHCR, or co -ordinate the operations of the two UN bodies. Greater co-ordination with NGOs working with PRLs would lead to greater efficiency of service provision to

the benefit of the Palestinian refugees. UNRWA is dependent on donor funding for its operations and has had its budgets curtailed in recent times, leading to a reduction in service provision. This situation needs to be reversed and a more secure long term budgetary framework needs to be established.

Imperative for a re-appraisal by Anthropologists and Ethnographers

This research has highlighted a disparity with the findings of previous anthropologists and ethnographers (Sayigh: 1977, 1998; Peteet: 2005; Masalha: 2009; Ramadan: 2009), who reported that there was a universal rejection of *tawteen* amongst Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. The rejection of *tawteen,* as has been pointed out is one of the pillars of Palestinian refugee identity, and has been an important aspect of the 'accepted view' of that identity. The findings in this paper amongst this generation- the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* indicates that a change has taken place in the degree to which they subscribe to this rejection. These findings also indicate that a reappraisal is needed in how researchers construct hypotheses about what constitutes Palestinianness. Failure to do so risks the portrayal of Palestinian refugees in what Malkki (1996: 378-396), speaking about the depiction of refugees generally, describes as a homogenous 'miserable sea of humanity', when in fact that 'sea' contains many diverse and contrasting elements. Failure to recognise the heterogeneity of all groups as Whitebrook (2001: 137) suggests does a disservice to social science research. This paper has demonstrated that there are inter- generational differences in the acceptance or rejection which the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* afford to *tawteen,* which have not been previously recognised in anthropological research, on the subject of Palestinian refugee identity.

Imperative to reappraise policy initiatives

Given that the PRLs have been in Lebanon since 1948, with little change to their situation, a new approach to the resolution of the problem is necessary. The influx of 1.5 million refugees as a result of the war in Syria, in addition to the registered 400,000 PRLs, has caused a significant

deterioration in the economy of Lebanon. The danger of upsetting the delicate consociational balance of Lebanon's political and social balance is also very real. There is little likelihood of an imminent resolution to either the war in Syria or the situation of the PRLs. Three levels of actions to resolve the position of the PRLs could be explored. At the international level, a re-invigoration of the dialogue between the Israelis and the Palestinian Authority is necessary. The recent deterioration of relations between the two, since the election of Donald Trump as president of America, makes this increasingly unlikely. However, it is necessary to get negotiations between the two parties re-started. The United Nations could play a greater role in achieving a solution.

At the regional level, a body such as the Arab League could be mandated to investigate ways in which opportunities could be provided for those PRLs, who wish to do so, to immigrate and seek employment and possible residence in member countries belonging to that body. The Arab League has defended the interests of the Palestinians in the past, as and when it has suited their interests, and not very effectively.

At the local level, GOL could investigate ways in which PRLs could be granted limited civic rights, within Lebanon, without upsetting the consociational symmetry. Most of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* were born in Lebanon and some of them consider it as home and are willing to contribute to Lebanon's economy. Given the part that Palestinians have played in Lebanon's history, this would be difficult politically, but not insurmountable.

Perhaps a normative solution for those Palestinian refugees who wish to avail of agency, if not full *tawteen* in Lebanon is as Ahmed (1997: 163) suggests, (speaking about refugees generally), that as a host nation it should afford an 'opportunity to such a body of people to be incorporated into the nation through naturalisation'. He proposes that alternatively, if they do not want citizenship they may be granted 'substantial political rights and representation.' Gabiam (2006: 726) citing Iris Young, although writing about Native American Indians offers another solution which could

be applied in Lebanon. She suggests that ‘group specific rights should be instated in conjunction with ‘a general system of rights which are the same for all’. Young points to Native Americans who have ‘what almost amounts to dual citizenship’. Having resisted numerous attempts by the United States' government to assimilate them into the dominant culture, Native Americans are now entitled to ‘specific political, legal, and collective rights as members of tribes as well as to all the civil and political rights of other American citizens’. For Young, this dual system of rights enforces ‘the group's autonomy and protects its interests as an oppressed minority’. In a somewhat similar vein, Brynen (2009: 14) suggests that

> ‘GOL should adopt a legislative definition of *tawteen* as citizenship and voting rights, thereby facilitating reforms that don’t involve naturalisation and emphasise that improving the social and economic conditions of refugees are in the social, economic and security interests of Lebanon’.

In conclusion, as Massey (1994) and Maalouf (2008) have suggested, identity is not static, but responsive to influences from the environment. The socio-economic realities of deprivation and denial of agency have impinged on the traditional Palestinian identity of the *Jeel ma baa’d El Harb*, causing an intergenerational divergence from the accepted position of a rejection of *tawteen*. This has caused 44% of them to consider an alternative to that facet of the traditional Palestinianness. In so doing, they are conscious of the risk of losing all aspects of that identity. They are also conscious of developing what Van Meijl (2008) terms a ‘hybrid identity’ and the need to balance the two. 57% of them wished to retain a Palestinian identity, yet 62% were willing to have a double identity.

The importance for some of them of rejecting *tawteen* the hope of returning to Palestine indicates that they position place as Palestine, which as Siddiq (1995: 89) has suggested is a place where Palestinian identity can be realised. It also demonstrates their loyalty to a collective identity, what Bernard (1972) termed their cultural heritage. For those willing to accept *tawteen* it is not necessarily a rejection of that cultural heritage, but a

pragmatism and realisation that return to Palestine is not feasible. For others, within this group, it is a means of acquiring agency, because they see the PRCs as their home, in what Relph (1976:20) has termed 'the central reference point.' For others, willing to accept *tawteen*, there was a hope that acquiring any identity would eventually facilitate their return to Palestine. These divergent views are evidence of the heterogeneity of the present generation of Palestinian refugees and points to Whitebrook's (2001) assertion that groups contain sometimes conflicting allegiances. The findings of this study point to a new evolving Palestinian identity, which is more reflexive in nature and not necessarily tied to the old rigidities of an identity framed by nationalistic dogma.

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Chapter 6

Is *Hijra* (emigration) causing a paradigm shift in Palestinian Refugee Youth Identity in Lebanon?

Abstract Palestinian refugees in Lebanon are a discrete class of refugees in a protracted refugee situation, owing to the transgenerational legacy of their lengthy exilic status. Due to the legal restrictions imposed upon them by the Lebanese government, in terms of employment, lack of civil rights, ownership of land, and access to medical, educational and social services, there are few outlets for them to achieve agency. *Hijra* (Emigration) has long been a facet of Palestinian refugee life in Lebanon and has served as such an outlet in the past. Achievement of emigration has become increasingly more difficult for the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb*, due to the increasing reluctance of countries abroad to accept refugees. Despite the difficulties, many of them are willing to attempt the expensive and often dangerous travel abroad, in search of a better life. An assessment of this generation is undertaken in this paper, using qualitative research methods of semi-structured interviews and observation to gauge their visualisation of how *hijra* will impact on their Palestinian refugee identity. Attachment to place, and belonging are two of the themes explored. Findings which point to a realisation amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* of the alteration of Palestinian refugee identity are proffered and differences with the previous generations' loyalty to that identity are noted. The findings in this research seek to add to the corpus of knowledge amongst academics, NGOs, and governments, so that more appropriate programmes may be instituted to ameliorate the situation.

Keywords: *hijra; haq al 'awda;* identity; dignity; belonging; human rights; *al ghurba* (exile).

Introduction: Peterson (1958: 261) identifies two types of migration, which he labels impelled (when migrants retain some agency over the decision to leave or stay) and forced (when migrants do not have agency). Stein (1981) also seems to suggest that forced migrants are a distinct category of victims, when in reality they are individuals, with individual

needs and therein he risks dehumanising these migrants by denying them the role of purposeful actors and thus ordinary people. Van Hear (1998: 42), in contrast to Peterson (1958), suggests that almost all migration involves some form of compulsion. He adds 'almost all migration involves choices.' This is without question true, but perhaps rather than try to fit Palestinian refugee youth from Lebanon into a category, and thereby risk dehumanising them, it is more appropriate to consider Richmond's (1994: 55) assertion that the distinction between involuntary mobility and voluntary mobility is misleading. In the same vein, UNHCR (2013: 13) contends that there are 'deeper and often interrelated patterns of political, human rights and economic pressures …there are as many reasons for moving as there are migrants.' The problem therefore is that all migrants make the decision to move based on a number of factors which pertain to them, including but not solely, on economic grounds, persecution, or access to dignity, amongst others. This paper examines issues associated with Palestinian Refugee youth identity through the lens of *hijra (*emigration). The Arabic expression *hijra* has its roots in the flight of the prophet Mohammed from Mecca to Medina in 622 and it resonates with the modern-day flight of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, who are also fleeing from persecution and denial of human rights and dignity.

Research Aim

The primary and overarching aim of this research was to ascertain the degree to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Har*b subscribe to the traditional Palestinian refugee identity as depicted by previous researchers (Sayigh:1977,1998,2001, 2012; Ramadan: 2009; Masalha:2009; Khalidi: 1997; Peteet:2005), and to identify any intergenerational dissonance in the expression of that identity. It would be remiss if ethnographers, policymakers and anthropologists were to ignore the potential for change in concepts of identity in this generation, and to discount the possibility of heterogeneity amongst them, which Calhoun (1995: 293) and Whitebrook (2001: 137) suggest is the accepted norm for members of their peers in the West. This has consequences for the future development of Palestinian aspirations for return, for a nation state, for Middle East politics in general

and a resolution of the Palestinian- Israeli dispute. The specific aim of this paper was to establish how *hijra*, usually translated as emigration, impacted on the concept of identity and belonging for this generation. It has been estimated by Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) that 53.5% of Palestinian refugee households in Lebanon reported having immediate family abroad. The importance of *hijra* as an outlet for the Palestinian refugees, given their precarious existence in the PRCs and how their attempts at achieving a measure of that agency, is deserving of investigation.

Research Objectives

- To determine, by qualitative research, the degree to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* desire to avail of *hijra.*
- To assess the extent to which this generation visualise how achievement of *hijra* will impact on their sense of identity and belonging.
- To identify what factors are causing this generation to seek *hijra*
- To assess the degree to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* are willing to forgo their traditional Palestinian identity in pursuit of *hijra*.

Conceptual Framework

The conceptual framework for this research was constructed around issues of identity, attachment to place and refugee migration. The work of Relph (1976); Proshansky (1978); Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996); and Korpela (1989) are examined in relation to place as a component of identity, and attachment to place. Imagined futures elsewhere are explored through the research of McDonald, et al (2011); Thompson and Holland (2002); and Vigh (2009). This paper seeks to explore the factors which are causing the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* to contemplate taking *hijra* and questions whether what Allan (2014: 26) terms the 'contingencies of prolonged exile' are producing 'new forms of subjectivity and belonging' which are 'dynamically evolving attachments that cut across the grain of officially

sanctioned nationalism.' These factors include the effects of deprivation and disenfranchisement of the camps; the influx of 1.5 million Syrian refugees on an already overburdened camp population; and the increasingly diminished support services provided by UNRWA and NGOs. Allan (2014: 33) proposes that 'the very anomalousness of camp life and refugee experience' may be producing a separate form of "Palestinianness", 'distinct from a national identity tied to ancestral land.' In this context, it is important to consider that identity is always in a dynamic process of evolution; subject to internal and external influences (Massey, 1994; and Maalouf, 2000) It is therefore methodically unsound to consider identities as anything other than malleable and heterogenous.

Historical Background

The historical background to the present- day situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon has been narrated in Chapter 3. Dorai (2008: 24) suggests that the history of migration of Palestinian refugees from Lebanon can be broken down into three distinct periods.

The first period commencing in the 1960s and extending into the late 1970s he calls Labour Migration. Hovdenak (1997: 35) terms this period as one of emigration for economic reasons. As Chapter 3 relates, this period coincided with the ascendancy of the PLO in Lebanon and its provision of financial support for the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. However, the influx of refugees following the expulsion of the PLO from Jordan in 1970 was coupled with the arrival of Palestinian refugees in the aftermath of the Six-Day War (1967). This event is known amongst them as the *Naksa* (setback). This brought an unknown number of refugees to Lebanon, most of whom would not be entitled to UNRWA support (Chaaban et al 2016: 23). Many of these Palestinian refugees were eventually obliged to seek livelihoods outside of Lebanon. This timeframe also covers the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), when the fighting caused disruption of monetary assistance to the refugees and the start of the expulsion of Palestinians from South Lebanon.

The second period, that of the asylum seekers (Dorai, 2008: 24) ranges between 1982 and 1987. Hovdenak (1997: 31) terms this period as one of emigration for security reasons. During this period, the Lebanese Civil War had intensified. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) had invaded up to and including Beirut. The IDF had assisted in the massacres in Sabra and Shatila in 1982 (Fisk, 1992) and there was widespread fear of further massacres. The departure of the PLO from Lebanon occurred during this timeframe also and this resulted in further loss of financial subvention. The War of the Camps (1985-1987), where the Amal militia attacked the PRCs and killed many of the occupants resulted in further flight from Lebanon.

The third period identified by Dorai (2008: 25) covers the period from the early 1990's up to the present day, a period which he terms as one of illegal refugee migration. This period saw the end of the Lebanese Civil War (1990) with the Ta'if Agreement. The Ta'if Agreement ushered in a period of increased repression on the Palestinian refugees by GOL as Roberts (2010: 77- 80) relates. Any hope of naturalisation was removed by that agreement which expressly forbids *tawteen* (naturalisation), which would have been one means for the Palestinian refugees to get civil and economic rights. The influx of refugees from the conflicts in Iraq and Syria has swollen the numbers in the PRCs and put an unbearable burden on the Lebanese economy. When these factors are taken into account, emigration, by whatever means becomes a necessity for the Palestinian refugees.

Palestinian Emigration/ Migration from Lebanon:

UNHCR (2016: 22) estimated that '11.6 million refugees were in a protracted refugee situation' [35] by December 2015, in addition to 5.7 million Palestinian refugees registered to UNRWA worldwide (UNRWA: 2016), some of whom are arguably in the same predicament. Durieux

[35] UNHCR defined a protracted situation for refugees as one in which refugees have been in exile 'for five or more years after their initial displacement, without immediate prospects for implementation of durable solutions.' (Preamble to UNHCR, 2009, UNHCR Ex Comm. 2009).

(2009: 60) suggests that protracted refugee situations inevitably lead to a deterioration in the quality of life as time progresses, in addition to the loss suffered in the original displacement; in the case of the Palestinians in Lebanon, this is a valid argument. Schulz and Hammer (2003: 2) attribute the cause of Palestinian migration to 'attempts to securing improved living conditions,' as a consequence of their 'existential destitution and impossible living conditions.' Faist (2000: 15) notes that the lack of social capital[36] is initially the driving force for migration, and this deficiency enforces immobility and it then becomes the impetus for emigration. He suggests that migratory networks quickly become established and transnational as the initial migrants acquire social capital, facilitating subsequent migrants to follow suit. This has been the case of Palestinian emigration from Lebanon through the years and Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) estimate that 53.5% of Palestinian refugee households reported having immediate family abroad. The importance of those Palestinians who have already emigrated should not be underestimated. They have provided remittances and local knowledge of their new host countries and have influenced the choice of destination of subsequent emigrants. They have provided valuable knowledge of methods to circumvent legal barriers to entry into the new host countries. (Conversations with UNRWA officials Beirut, July 2016.)

The application of labels to Palestinian youth seeking to emigrate from Lebanon is a contentious issue, as highlighted in the introduction to this paper. Since the opportunities of legal migration are largely denied to them, the only option open to them is 'illegal' migration. However, this risks the criminalisation of a group who have no other choice, as Schuster (2011: 1404, 1412) implies in his study of Afghan refugees in Europe. Perhaps it is more fitting, methodologically, for this research, to include them under the classification of forced migrants, since they suffer inequitable access to basic human rights; poor living conditions and

[36] By loss of social capital, Faist means the degradation and loss of the normal informal social supports and community networks, which underpin economic life, especially where the vulnerable are struggling.

political persecution and restrictions on their agency as Richmond (1994: 59) suggests. This risks the very process of dehumanisation which is highlighted above. However, by giving voice to them as individuals, and demonstrating their 'ordinariness,' this process is nullified and we can identify with their lives and get a better understanding of their situation. In so doing, this research seeks to add to the corpus of study on migrants, which Crisp (1999: 4-5) criticised for its 'fragmentary nature'

This research seeks to highlight the heterogeneity of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, thereby moving away from considering them as passive victims, whose only needs are humanitarian and aid assistance. This research demonstrates that they are individuals and not a homogenous group-members of what Malkki (1996: 378) terms a 'miserable sea of humanity.' It seeks to 'unmute' this generation, confront policies of depoliticisation and present them as active agents in their own futures, despite the lack of agency afforded to them as Richmond (1994: 59) opines. The *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* are stateless and as Arendt (1996: 296) suggests are therefore deprived of the 'right to have rights.' Emigration is seen by many Palestinians as the only option open to them to achieve those rights. Allan (2014: 167) proposes that the youth in the PRCs view *hijra* as 'a metaphor for the social mobility and citizenship denied' to them in Lebanon, and enables 'broadening horizons of possibility' in diurnal living, 'allowing imaginative access to an "elsewhere", creating room for speculation and hope.'

Methodology

The methodology for this paper incorporated a qualitative research approach, examining issues surrounding *hijra*. A primary research methodology was utilised as secondary sources of data were scant. The group targeted for data collection was the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* (the generation after the war), in Lebanon, ranging in ages from 18 to 35 years. A total of 61 of these were interviewed. Additional background interviews were conducted with 17 NGOs working with the Palestinian youth, in Lebanon. The four PRCs of Shatila, Mar Elias, Burj al Barajneh provided

the sites for the research as well as the urban areas in Beirut. The research hypothesis for this paper asked the question: Is *Hijra* causing a paradigm shift in Palestinian refugee youth identity in Lebanon*?* The research techniques involved semi-structured interviews and observation. Data analysis was conducted with reference to the available literature published on identity and belonging. A more detailed description of the methodology for this thesis is attached as Appendix 'C' to this thesis[37].

Discussion:

The contemporary concepts of Palestinianness in the minds of Palestinian refugee youth are examined through the prism of attitudes to *hijra* in this section of the paper. It explores the significance which they attach to it. This research has established that a sizeable majority (59%) of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* interviewed for this research, see emigration as a means of improving their future elsewhere, even though it may entail extending the exilic condition of *al ghurba* and even though some have no hope of its realisation. They also are conscious that concepts of identity associated with *hijra* are different to those of the preceding generations, realising that they may not be able to, or not want to hold on to their Palestinianness. In their estimation of what *hijra* entails they demonstrate a more realistic and pragmatic approach, than their predecessors. Allan (2014: 5, 26, 33,60) has noted some of these differences due to 'the radical transformations that have occurred over the more than six decades' and she has, at least in the view of this researcher, accurately identified them as owing to the 'primacy of economic subjectivity and the decisive shaping influence it has on what it means to be Palestinian' (Allan: 2014: 97-98).

Emigration is seen as an outlet for frustrated ambitions and a reaction to the 'everyday histories of grinding poverty' and the 'felt immediacies of people's lives, which Allan (2014: 8, 27) has noted. It has become harder for the PRLs to secure even the limited and sometimes illegal employment opportunities, which had traditionally been offered to them for low pay,

[37] This format complies with University of Ulster guidelines for the presentation of methodologies.

due in part to competition from the PRS (Chaaban et al., 2016: 57). An UNRWA official gave his views on the reasons why the Palestinian youth put so much effort in trying to emigrate:

> 'Life is not very easy for these people. They are very poor, very marginalised and they live in bad areas-they have bad neighbours. Lebanon is not known for its stability-especially for its poor. It makes perfect sense therefore, that if you have any talent; if you manage to educate yourself and you live in a society that institutionally discriminates against you on top of all other discriminations, simply because you are a Palestinian, and you have no way of changing that, unless you are a woman and you can marry a Lebanese, and hope for a better future for your children; that you seek to emigrate. What can you expect from life in general? If you become a doctor, having an American certified education, ten years of university and you are still not allowed to practice medicine. Unless you are lucky enough to get a job with UNRWA-where you can get maybe $500 a month. So, if you have any relations abroad, you will be doing everything to get out of this place and, why shouldn't you? It doesn't mean that you don't feel proud of your heritage or that you didn't grow up with your grand or great grand- parent's legacy of living in tents and then sheds. All this history of deep misery is your identity. If you manage to lift yourself out of this hole, you have accomplished something, raising your children in relative prosperity in Europe or somewhere, how can you be more successful than that?' (Interview with Hermann 03 Jul 2105, Beirut).

The research for this paper found that 36 of the 61 respondents wished to emigrate from the PRCs in Lebanon. 19 were ambivalent or did not express a wish to emigrate, while 6 were definite in not wanting to emigrate. The advent of 1.5 million Syrian refugees, including 58,000[38]

[38] Conversation with 'Mary' a UNDP Director, Beirut, Jun 2015.

registered Palestinian Syrian Refugees (PRS) to Lebanon since 2011 has dramatically altered the physical, social and economic landscapes for the PRLs. Evidence of the financial pressures for the PRLs is presented by Chaaban et al. (2016: 52 -65), who reports an increase in poverty rates in the Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) in the Beirut area. Anecdotal evidence from this authors interviews and observations in 2015 and 2016 indicates that there is overcrowding in the PRCs; an increase in 'enforced idleness' due to lack of employment opportunities; and an increase in pessimism amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*. Many of the PRS have moved into the PRCs, which were already overcrowded, as Chaaban et al. (2010) reported. Camp Service Officers (CSOs) in Burj al Barajneh and Shatila reported increases in their PRC populations between 2015 and 2016.[39] There has been a concomitant pressure on waste collection, sanitation, water provision; and access to education and health facilities, which have been affected by reduced UNRWA budgets[40]. There is anecdotal evidence of a rise in the price of food and basic commodities, in interviews given by both UNRWA officials and the subjects of this research. Additionally, this author was struck by the increase in the amount of begging on the streets of Beirut between 2015 and 2016, which would seem to indicate that the poverty increase noted by Chaaban et al. (2016) above is not confined to the PRCs. The impact of *hijra* on the identity on the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* is examined through the following themes which emerged during data collection and analysis in Lebanon, during 2015/2016.

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[39] CSO Burj al Barajneh, in conversations with the author, reported the population of the PRC, as being 40,000 on 06 Jul 2015; and in excess of 45,000, possibly as many as 56,000 on 24 Jun 2016. CSO Shatila, similarly reported 25,000 residents on 23 Jun 2016, an increase of 2,500 from 2015, and a huge increase from 6,000 in 2000. Shatila PRC encompasses an area of 0.4 km. It should be noted that numbers in the PRCs are boosted by non-Palestinian immigrants, who cannot afford the high cost of housing in Beirut, and who may not have work permits for Lebanon. All figures are estimates only. UNRWA intends to conduct a census of all the PRCs to establish how many residents are Palestinian, in 2017.

[40] Conversations with UNRWA policy co-ordinators Beirut, Jun 2015 and 2016.

Hybridity and Balance:

Aref, a 21-year-old male, studying at the American University of Beirut (AUB) wanted to emigrate because

> 'I hate my nationality. It's so much exhausting to be a Palestinian. With Palestinian identity (*hawiyya),* I can do nothing. I hope to get another and balance the two. I have the opposite opinion to a lot of Palestinians; I have no problem with *tawteen;* you can still have a Palestinian nationality, even with Lebanese citizenship.'

In contrast to Aref, Yosura, a 21-year-old female, unemployed with 2nd level education was fearful that she might lose her right to be a Palestinian and she had a strong desire to hold onto her Palestinian identity:

> 'I hope to go to the UK and Canada and I may lose my Palestinian identity there. It's an important one. I hope to manage the two. In my mind, I won't lose it. I am thinking always of Palestine. Many of my friends in Palestine are thinking of leaving there, and I want to go there.'

Yosura's hope of managing the new identity in tandem with her Palestinian one is an example of the hybridity of the exilic condition as cited by Ashcroft and Ahluwailia (1999: 139), where 'one never abandons the old, nor completely accepts the new.' This would seem to suggest as Van Meijl (2008: 180) has observed that many transnational adolescents in the modern world develop a 'hybrid identity' in which they 'successfully combine aspects of both local and global circumstances'. These 'components of a different origin' require being re-combined continuously. This condition requires a 'never-ending struggle to work out in which situation they ideally belong.' Many people, adolescents, in particular, Van Meijl suggests, now develop multicultural identities. Appadurai (2001) has called the modern inter-connected and globalised world as a 'contact zone,' in which the stability of identities is challenged by their encounters with other cultures. A corollary of this leads to the assumption that people are developing multicultural and hybrid identities as a result. This

assumption has been echoed by Ewing (1990: 453); Massey (1994: 170-172); and Bhabba (1992: 57).

Agency and Dignity:

Aya, a 35-year-old female with five children, working for an NGO in the camps gave typical reasons for emigration, which can be extended to the *Jeel ma baa'd El Ha*rb in general:

> 'I want a secure living with dignity, in peace and to be motivated by better work opportunities and I want better living conditions. I want full human rights. I would take this in another country. They should offer us full legal immigration, with career development chances and full human rights, the same as the original citizens with a recognised state and identity. If I could I would immigrate to another country if I could have a better life for myself and my family. Even though my husband and I are working for earning good money, the high standards are not achieved as we have five children between us in school. We are paying lots of bills and we hardly make both ends meet, for the very high financial costs with low standards. In addition, there is the fear of the security situation and the high drugs dealing[41] and addiction inside the camps, that make us worry about our children.'

Aya's comments on an imagined future in another country with full civil rights and better opportunities is consistent with the published work of Mc Donald, Pini, Bailey and Price (2011); Thompson and Holland (2002); and Vigh (2009) on the imagined futures of youth, when the existential conditions of the respondents are so poor.

[41] Officially, according to the political factions, there is no drug problem in the PRCs. Drug addiction is viewed by them as a Western malaise, an example of degeneracy contrary to the ideals of Palestinian identity. However, a substantial number of respondents to this research project cautiously mentioned the problem, usually with the caveat: 'please don't quote me.' A Special Advisor to the Director of UNRWA in Lebanon spoke of a Drugs Rehabilitation Unit in Burj al Barajneh Camp, established and run by the camp residents themselves. The author requested access to this unit, but it was not facilitated.

Some youth were determined to hold on to their Palestinian identity, even though taking advantage of emigration as Maysoon, a 28-year-old female, working as a Support Teacher in the camps related:

> 'I would emigrate to have the better conditions, but I will still be a Palestinian. I am proud to be a Palestinian. I want a better home, a better camp for the people, so that our new babies don't have the same experience. I want to go back to Palestine. I want them (the world) to see our reality of living here in the camps and for them to know our suffering and for them to help us.'

Maysoon is an example of what Van Meijl (2008: 166) alluded to when he posited that increased transnational migration, a phenomenon of globalisation is 'complicating culture and culture relationships' and causing problematical dilemmas for the identity of the individual and the relations left at home, specifically the previous generation. He urges a 'dialogical perspective' to take into account the 'increasing number of voices and counter-voices' that are represented in the multi-cultured and hybrid nature of identity in the global transnationals. As already outlined in Chapter 2, several writers such as Korpela (1989: 245); Proshansky (1978); and Proshansky et al (1983:61) suggested that place identity was not restricted to the home environment only, but extends far beyond considering it as essential and wholly comprising a person's place identity relationship. Maysoon is an example of that phenomenon, in that she sees her future in more than one place, and not just in Palestine.

Fatima, a 27-year-old female, university graduate, working for a private company expressed her wish to emigrate in terms of:

> 'I would take another nationality in order to help my situation and to improve finances and civil rights. It is the only way to live in a more stable situation. The world does not like Palestinians. Even the Arab countries, like the Emirates, won't give us our rights I would like to go to Canada, the USA, or Ireland, not an Arab country. I want to buy a home. I want to be safe, it is the most important. I want to live in peace and have a normal life, outside a

> camp. I love Ein el Hilweh, but it is really very dangerous. Nobody outside the factions has authority. It is sad. I would take another nationality to get back to Palestine. If I go as a Palestinian, I will be taking discrimination; if I go with another nationality, they will deal with me in a different way. I do not want to go against *haq al 'awda*- it is our right.'

Bandura (1999: 35) commenting on the capacity for forethought in order for people to achieve agency in their lives, suggests that 'it enables people to transcend the dictates of their immediate environment and to shape and regulate the present to fit a desired future.' Furthermore, it provides 'direction, coherence and meaning to one's life.' Harrell – Bond (1986) argues that refugees are not necessarily passive and are not always dependent on humanitarian assistance in conceiving and developing their own agency, which may include onward migration. Turton (2003: 12) terms these agency architects as 'purposive actors', even though they may be refugees and thus ordinary people.

Generational Differences:

Both Maysoon, a 28- year old female and Fatima, a 27-year old female were similarly conscious of the generational differences in respect to *hijra*, as expressed by Fatima:

> 'My grandparents only saw the old Palestine and to return; my parents only want to live in peace and only have enough to live. They don't have a wide view of the future or wish to emigrate; only to have children and provide for them.'

Omar, a 35-year old male also recognised these differences:

> 'I am sometimes totally different to my family. Most of them are members of the Palestinian factions, even the Popular Committees,[42] but I am not a member of a political faction. Two of

[42] Many of the youth interviewed referred disparagingly of members of the Popular Committees as mafia members, in this way. Sometimes they spoke 'off-record', with a plea 'Don't quote me'. The Popular Committee, also known as *al –hakuma al –saghira*, or the small government of the camp was established by the PLO, in each camp during the

> them, one in France; one in Germany, and now one of them in jail; drugs problem and the security in the camps.'

Fateh, a 35-year-old married man who started but did not complete University education spoke in a similar vein:

> 'Even if I take another nationality, it will not make me forget Palestine and my Palestinian identity, until I can return to Palestine. *Haq al 'awda* is sacred. My parents said that we will return and were worried just about my education. I am fighting harder than them, to get better conditions for my children.'

Fateh's comments about return and his desire to get another nationality through *hijra* coincide with Allan's (2014 :172) finding that it is not uncommon therefore to 'encounter individuals who invoke return rhetorically, while simultaneously planning emigration materially. However, his comments also validate the observation of Twigger-Ross and Uzzell (1996: 218) that place (in this case- Palestine) is central to our identity in their assertion that 'all identifications have location implications; place is part of the content of an identification'

Abandonment:

Both Ghazi, a 21- year old unemployed man with basic education, and Bashar, a 24-year-old male, unemployed with basic education would also take emigration. Bashar was especially anxious to escape from the negative connotations which his Palestinian identity held for him in Lebanon:

> 'I would emigrate if I had the chance and lose my Palestinianness and all that goes with that. The Syrians are taking our jobs, working for less money. The youth of this generation are going in a bad

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1970's. It is composed of members of the political factions within the camps. It is not elected. It was appointed to oversee the management of the camp and remains a legacy from the time of *Jeel al-thawra* (generation of revolution).

> direction because of pressure, unemployment, plenty of time to do nothing, etc. There is drug addiction at 12 years of age in the Camps. Something bad will happen after a year if something isn't done. There is a lot of peer pressure. I have a 16-year-old brother and I am afraid for him. The dealers give out drugs like candy to get the kids hooked. It's mostly Capticon and Benzies. I want my human rights and dignity.'

Bashar's comments epitomise what Lassailly – Jacob (2000: 123) suggests in that the exilic condition of refugees means 'surviving in camps where the living conditions are so poor that few wish to stay on.' Fares, a 29-year-old male, holding down three jobs to put himself through university was also willing to contemplate losing his Palestinian identity:

> 'We are suffering a lot of racism here; in Lebanon. We are scapegoats for the war. I am classified as a foreigner; it's not based on your talents. I have lost a lot of chances of work, because I am a Palestinian. I deserve those chances in life. The only solution is that I get another identity/nationality I don't care where I can get it, from Sweden, Ireland or wherever. It makes you belong to a land. As a Palestinian you don't belong to any land. Without land, there is no honour. I want my own identity.'

The statements of Ghazi, Bashar and Fares illustrate the desperation of those refugees who are willing to contemplate the abandonment of their Palestinian inheritance. Cernea (1997: 1572-1573) posits that the lack of land, access to wages and employment, housing, cultural space and agency combine to produce a 'psychological downward slide of… confidence in one's society and self.' It causes the individual to question his very identity.

Refusal:

Omar, a 35-year-old male, who is a university graduate and working for a private company was one of the few to adamantly refuse the opportunity to emigrate if offered to him:

> ‘I have opportunity to take nationality in many countries, but I refuse to take emigration. There is a movement in the camps against this type of emigration. I want to visit countries, but not to stay. It’s a decision, actually. Tell the world to invest in Palestinian youth and people. It is important now, more than any other thing. We have no other thing in the camps but people.’

Relph (1976: 20) suggested that home is ‘the central reference point of human existence,’ and for Omar the camps are as Relph (1976: 43) describes ‘the places where they grew up and lived and where they live now.’ Omar was unwilling to consider an alternative outside of the only certainty which he knew. He was also unwilling to go against the nationalist dictates of the PCs in the camps. Allan (2014: 172) notes that ‘the decision to go is politically charged, as it can be regarded as tantamount to the abandonment of community and homeland.’ Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) noted that some opposition to emigration was promoted by some of the factions within the PRCs in 2014. They saw it as betrayal of *haq al ‘awda* and Palestinian identity. Alarmed at the actions of Mohammed Dahalan and his wife Jalila, urging emigration, in 2014; Fatah and a loose coalition of factions organised demonstrations to counter their influence. (Conversation with Abdullah, a high ranking DFLP official, Beirut, Jul 2016). However, given that, as this research indicates, respect for the political factions is limited amongst this generation, the *Jeel ma baa’d El Harb* have largely chosen to ignore their admonishments and continue to pursue their quest for emigration.

Failure:

Sometimes attempts to gain asylum or even opportunities to work abroad are not successful. Mohammed, a 35-year-old male, unemployed with basic education and five children explained

> ‘I am just back from Germany, where I was trying to get emigration. I came back because I was treated badly and didn’t succeed. I want to get a non-Arab nationality for my children, but I don’t want them to forget that that we are originally from Palestine.

> I wish my children to have a good education, to work in a secure good job and for the Lebanese government to allow us to work.'

Mohammed had been shot, in the head and stomach, as a young child by the armed wing of Amal (a Shia Political Party) during the War of the Camps and has an artificial intestine. His case for asylum was turned down and he was held in a German detention centre for six months while his case was being adjudicated. He had previously tried to get into the UK, but failed. He stated that due to his inability to work legally in Lebanon, that he has no other option but to try to emigrate again, by whatever means possible, as soon as he can generate enough money to pay for it. Mohammed's search for a better life and his constant movement is akin to what Bauman (1996: 28) relates 'wherever the vagabond goes, he is the stranger; he can never be the 'native', the 'settled one', one with 'roots in the soil'. Each place is for the vagabond, a stop-over, but he never knows how long he will stay in any one of them; 'this will depend on the generosity and patience of the residents.'

One of those who did not wish to have her interview recorded on tape, was 'Nahla', a 23-year-old female, university graduate, in Computer Studies. She recently returned to one of the PRCs after a failed attempt to emigrate from Lebanon by illegal means. She was the eldest of four children, whose father was dead. Her immediate family and relatives had clubbed together to raise $7,000 to finance her trip and were now destitute. She had been on a boat which set out from Tripoli in the North to go to Turkey, but the boat sank and some passengers were detained by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). She managed to avoid detection and eventually returned, but she still lives in fear of discovery and was desperate not to be identified. It is unusual for women to be selected for this type of trip, but her prospects due to her education were seen to be good. Allan (2014: 170) notes that most would -be migrants are men, partly because of the expectation that they will earn more than their female counterparts and the money gifted for the trip is seen as 'an investment in the earning power of a family member who will eventually send remittances home.' Emigrants also act as sponsors and guarantors for others. The family are now under

consideration as a Special Hardship Case (SHC) by UNRWA. While $7,000 might seem somewhat insignificant by Western observers, it is an exorbitant amount for Palestinians in the camps of Lebanon.

Globalisation and Manifestations of Western influences in the PRCs

Maalouf (2000: 93) sees the acceleration of globalisation as intensifying 'peoples need for identity.' Parekh (2008:192) has suggested that globalisation, by which he means the spread of Western values, has caused a disruption of cultures and collective identities. Schulz and Hammer (2003: 229-230) posit that this in turn has caused a dissolution of attachment to the old rigidities of the traditional Palestinian identity. Van Meijl (2008:180) comments on the contest between a pre-existing traditional identity and an evolving global identity and suggests that a new hybrid identity results. It can be posited that in a similar manner that the process of globalisation has sharpened the need of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* for dignity, human rights, the right to work and own property and access to better education. Their attachment to place is altered by globalisation, in what Beck (2002: 24) terms 'place-polygamy'. The desire to return to Palestine is strong, but amongst this generation, there is a realisation that this may not be possible, in the near future and the need for agency becomes paramount.



Figure 6.1. Reported Access to Wi-Fi and Internet amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* Jun/Jul 2016. (n= 61).

The use of the internet has become widespread in the PRCs and the youth are like their Western peers spending more time using it and they are questioning why they cannot have the same rights and material things as their counterparts elsewhere. Allan (2014: 187) suggests that as the future elsewhere has come to seem like something available only to other people, they have 'increasingly turned to emigration as a means of regaining agency and control in their lives', and to 'carve out better and more secure lives for themselves and their families.' Emigration from the PRCs is as Allan (2014: 189) notes 'spawning their own diaspora, creating cross-currents of attachment that unsettle our understanding of how Palestinian identity and affiliation should now be conceived.'

Dress

While female dress was in the main conservative, there were some examples of western styles observed. Almost all women wore Arabic headdress, either the *hajib* or *niqab*. Two examples of the *burqa* were seen during this research in Shatila PRC; although these were worn by older women. Where trousers or jeans were worn they were covered to the knee by a cloak. Brand names were popular with both genders and followed Western fashions. Where nail varnish was worn, several young women of the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* used designs and colouring commensurate with their western peers. Males bought jeans under western brand names, or cheap copies. They also followed western fashions in their choice of footwear. Males seemed to have more freedom to wear what they wanted.

Hairstyles

As nearly all young girls wore headdress, it was not possible to ascertain if they were following western styles. Most of the male youth styled their hair in Western fashion. One of the respondents owned a salon which catered for both men and women. She told this researcher that young men, in particular, followed western fashion and asked for hair styles to match rock and pop stars and sporting heroes. It was evident that young males took great care in matters of grooming.

Speech

It was noticeable amongst both male and females that modern western styles of speech were used, when English was spoken. The word ‘like’ was inserted into conversations, in the same manner as it is now prevalent in the West. Males used a curious admixture of phrases such as ‘He’s my bro’ and ‘It was my bad’, in the same manner as their western peers, but interspersed with sentence constructions typical in the Middle East. When questioned about these phrases, respondents said that they had picked these up by watching movies and popular TV shows on the internet, and also in conversations with their emigrated relations and friends living abroad.

Food Preferences

It was reported by both the *Jeel ma baa’d El Harb* and adults that consumption of traditional food has declined. There are pizzerias in both Shatila and Burj al Barajneh. These produce traditional Arabic flatbreads as well as pizzas. Food from these outlets is relatively cheap and has become the staple diet of many of the youths. These food outlets also provide meeting places for the youth to ‘hang out’.

Figure 6.2 Pizzeria in Shatila PRC. Source: O’Connor, 2016.

Recreational activities

There are very few spaces for recreation in the PRCs due to the density of population. Teachers and parents who spoke to this researcher bemoaned the fact that the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* spent too much time on their phones, lap tops playing games, or on the internet. Many of the respondents spoke of their use of Google, Facebook, Snapchat and Instagram. They used these social media to maintain contact with actual and virtual friends in the camps and abroad, and to access western media sites. Young males tended to group together in the streets, alleyways, and cafes of the camps and talk and smoke, as their western counterparts do. A type of 'café culture' is common across the Middle East. The difference in the camps is that it is an all- day occurrence due to the 'enforced idleness' caused by high levels of unemployment. Young women do not follow the same custom and are rarely seen unless they are accompanied. They do not loiter in the streets.

Figure 6.3. 'Enforced Idleness' in a Shatila PRC café. Source: O'Connor, 2016.

Posters and Photographs

In the public areas of homes, there was little evidence of western influences, except for the presence of the ubiquitous television sets. Access

to private rooms in residences for the conduct of this research was limited. In the few instances where access was permitted, the researcher found that photos and posters of western footballers and rock stars were placed side by side with traditional Palestinian art and photos.

Conclusion

The aim of this research was to determine the measure of this generation's attachment to the traditional view of Palestinian identity and to determine if there were inter -generational differences in the loyalty to and visualisation of it. It also sought to identify any factors which may be causing these differences. This paper proposes that there now appears to be a greater willingness amongst the present generation of refugees (*Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*) to consider *hijra* as one of the few avenues open to them in pursuit of a better future in which they may achieve the full range of human rights which are denied to them in Lebanon. This research indicates that the worsening conditions in the PRCs, coupled with exposure to other cultures through the internet, a by-product of globalisation, have caused many of them to consider *hijra* as an imperative. It has also shown that they are aware of the of dangers that availing of *hijra* poses to commitment to the maintenance of the traditionally ascribed Palestinian identity and belonging. This is especially valid given the fear of being disloyal to the precepts of *haq al 'awda*, as was iterated by a number of respondents. This would seem to suggest a heightened sense of self-awareness amongst this generation, or a lack of substantive research on this aspect by previous researchers.

Responsibility of Anthropologists and Ethnographers

This research indicates that ethnographers and anthropologists must take cognisance of this development. It is no longer sufficient to present Palestinian refugee identity as homogenous. Palestinian refugees are composed of many diverse and often contrasting elements, holding what Whitebrook (2001:137) describes as 'multiple allegiances.' Researchers

need to be open to the possibility of change, because as has been pointed out previously identity is not moribund, but evolves in response to alterations in socio-economic and political landscapes.

This examination of Palestinian identity would seem to suggest that there are inter- generational differences in what importance the Palestinian refugees and in particular, the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb,* in Lebanon, attach to other facets of Palestinianness, such as *haq al 'awda* (Chapter 4). Difference has also been found in how they view *tawteen* (Chapter 5) and the *Nakba* (Chapter 3). This suggests that the paradigm of this identity has been imbricated with elements of history, the struggle of daily survival in the PRCs and increasingly the influences of the West. In the light of these facts researchers need to be aware of the changing nature of Palestinian refugee youth identity in Lebanon.

Responsibility of Policymakers and NGOs

This research indicates that the influx to Lebanon of 1.5 million refugees including 58,000 PRS, since 2011, has had a detrimental effect on the lives of the PRLs. There has been an increase in pressure on the economic and physical landscapes in Lebanon, with increased unemployment, overcrowding and higher levels of hopelessness amongst this generation. The lack of the basic right to meaningful employment, and the continued denial of civic rights by GOL has heightened the desperation which many of this generation of respondents has reported. The reduction in UNRWA services due to budget constraints has been another factor in the daily struggle to survive. The failure of leadership at the Palestinian Authority level and the perceived corruption of the PCs by the youth has served to heighten the desire for *hijra* as a solution to what Allan (2014:8) calls 'the everyday histories of grinding poverty.'

This paper suggests that policymakers and NGOs need to re-examine strategies at the international, regional and national levels to take account of the changes noted in 'Palestinianness'. A re-invigoration of dialogue between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian Authority is overdue. In the present political climate this seems unlikely, however, it should be

pursued, by the United Nations and the United States. At the regional level, the Arab States could initiate policies to provide employment opportunities for the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* and relax restrictions on border restrictions. If *hijra* cannot be realised in the near/medium term, then possibly some form of naturalisation should be afforded to the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* by GOL. As the research for Chapter 5 has shown, numbers willing to avail of it would most likely be small. That group of PRLs who wish to remain in Lebanon, could be afforded a limited form of assimilation, not necessarily a complete form of *tawteen.*

Carens (2009: 7- 10), writing about the efforts of the United States to debar entry to migrants, offers an opinion that could be applied to the situation of the Palestinians in Lebanon. He suggests that a person acquires a moral right to membership in the state, after an unspecified period of residence. His argument is that such a person will have established personal, social and economic connectivity with the state and its citizens over time; a failure to include these persons is tantamount to an abrogation of the principles of a democratic and liberal state.

Maalouf (2000: 160), although not writing about the Palestinians in Lebanon. is perhaps giving the citizens of Lebanon a message when he says:

> 'In the same way, societies themselves need to accept the many affiliations that have forged each of their collective identities in the course of history, and that are shaping them still ….so that every individual may recognise himself in the image of the country in which he lives, and may feel encouraged to involve himself in it rather than, remaining an uneasy and sometimes hostile spectator.'

The provision of assistance needs to be transparent and co-ordinated. Where there is reduced clarity, ulterior motives for aid provision may be surmised, even when there may be none. Perhaps given the focus of past UN policies of resettlement as solutions to the worldwide refugee problem, it is understandable that there is a certain amount of suspicion that any offer of assistance, no matter how altruistic in nature, may be seen to

threaten the *haq al 'awda* or Palestinian identity. Bassima, the director of a Palestinian NGO which provides loans to Palestinian youth for educational purposes was apprehensive about the motives of some foreign governments:

> 'I was talking to a woman from to the British Embassy and she was getting me to encourage them to study for two years here and go to England to get a Masters to get a scholarship for the Palestinians and never to come back. Yesterday we had information about a Resettlement Scholarship from the Canadians-you go there for 1 year- covers University, food, all expenses, but only for 1 year because they become Canadian. They become part of the system there and they can manage to go to the university as Canadians. This is important. This is another kind of resettlement of young people in the camps. All the young productive people will be taken from the camps to other societies and after twenty years the old people will die off in the camps. There is something that is going on in this.' (Interview with Bassima 17 Jun 2016, Beirut).

A paradigm shift in Palestinian refugee youth identity in Lebanon?

The danger of forming a conclusion of an absolute shift in Palestinian youth identity based on an extrapolation of the results of the small sample of this research is recognised by the author. Williams (2000: 215) opines however, that it is possible to produce '*moderatum* generalisations' in which qualitative research findings 'can be seen to be instances of a broader set of recognisable features.' Taking into consideration the fact that the research was conducted across four PRCs; the 'gatherings'; and the urban districts of Beirut and Sidon, utilising gatekeepers and facilitators from diverse origins, there are definite indicators of such shifts from the previous generation. The 'accepted' view of Palestinian refugees as a homogenous group, as taken by ethnographers and anthropologists in the past, is no longer valid, as has been demonstrated by this research. Clemens (2007: 110) reminds us that the images that are portrayed in the West of Palestinians fail to understand their diversity and that 'they are not

a homogenous group, but comprise a people with multiple identities.' Calhoun (1995: 293) cautions that the assumption of homogeneity amongst a group is pernicious and makes no allowance of 'differences which are basic to human life'.

This research indicates a strong desire for *hijra* amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* in Lebanon. Taken in isolation this is not a marker for a shift in their concepts of personal and group identity. Cross – correlation with other research undertaken by this author on *tawteen* (Chapter 5); *al-Nakba* (Chapter 3); and *haq al 'awda* (Chapter 4); indicates a shift in attitudes to Palestinian identity at both the personal and collective levels, which is at odds with those of the previous generations. Elbedour, Bastien and Center (1997: 222) posit the view that younger generations are pursuing modern lifestyles, seeking better living conditions and find themselves speaking a different language from their elders, thereby distancing themselves from their cultural roots. Allan (2014: 33) writes that the desire for *hijra* is about reclaiming agency, even amongst those who lack the resources to realise that goal.

Only 4 of the respondents did not know of the *haq al 'awda*. As indicated previously, *hijra* is seen a threat to *haq al 'awda* and Palestinian identity by the PCs and factions within the PRCs, because as Allan (2014: 172) notes it is seen as 'a betrayal of national interests…. privileging of individual aspiration over long -term political goals.' Despite the proscription by the PCs and factions, a substantial number of youth were willing to risk a lessening of their Palestinianness by taking *hijra* and as Allan (2014: 32) noted spoke of *haq al 'awda* and *hijra* in a way that was 'contrapuntal, speaking both languages fluently' when thinking about their future. Some were prepared to lose their Palestinian identity as typified by Ghazi and Bashar, underlining as Robins (1996: 72) has noted that the increasing 'transnationalisation of cultures and mobility of populations has worked towards the dissolution of the old rigidities in the nationalist cultures.' Others such as Maysoon wanted to keep that identity. Yosura was one of many who hoped to be able to balance two identities. There was an awareness that transnational migration would lead to some

alteration in, and accommodation with, their Palestinian identity as Van Mejl (2008: 180) suggests.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* are engaged in a constant quest for agency and a better life for themselves. This may necessitate them disavowing the accepted collective strictures, imposed upon them by a less relevant nationalist ideology. Stern (1985) highlighted the importance of 'agency'; the person's comprehension that they have control over their ability to influence their environments and which is integral to their ideas of whom they are and who they can be.

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Chapter 7

Conclusions and Recommendations:

Mercer suggests 'identity only becomes an issue when it is in crisis, when something assumed to be fixed, coherent and stable is displaced by the experience of doubt and uncertainty' (Mercer, 1990: 43). This research centred around questions of Palestinian refugee identity amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* in Lebanon. It explored the nuances of memory, belonging and place amongst this generation. It set out to validate or repudiate the traditional view of Palestinian refugee identity as reported by previous ethnographers and anthropologists. This traditional view portrayed the Palestinian refugees as memorialising the events surrounding the *Nakba* (the events surrounding the expulsion from Palestine); refusing to accept *tawteen* (naturalisation) and engaged in a campaign for *haq al 'awda* (right of return). This view also considered this identity to be static and homogenous in nature. The research aims for this thesis were guided by a critical appraisal of the available literature, and by the extensive field-based research undertaken in the PRCs in Lebanon.

Primary Research Aim

The primary and overarching aim of this research was to ascertain the degree to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Har*b subscribe to the traditional Palestinian refugee identity as depicted by previous researchers (Sayigh:1977,1998,2001, 2012; Ramadan: 2009; Masalha:2009; Khalidi: 1997; Peteet:2005), and to identify any intergenerational dissonance in the expression of that identity. This is important because it will add to the body of academic work around issues of identity, memory, belonging and place. It will, as outlined above, assist in providing more focussed and appropriate strategies for NGOs and inform policymakers at the international, regional and national levels in the formulation of solutions to the refugee problem.

Findings

Intergenerational Differences:

This research found that there are intergenerational differences in the loyalty which this generation ascribe to the traditional view of Palestinian refugee identity as reported previously by academics (Sayigh: 1977,1994, 1998, 2001; Hanafi: 2003,2010; Masalha: 2009; Ramadan: 2013; Bianchi: 2014). Although 35 (57%) reported a wish to retain their Palestinian identity, 6 (10%) were prepared to relinquish it and 1 (1.6%) didn't care. Interestingly, 38 (62%) reported satisfaction with having a hybrid or dual identity, with 19 (31%) being ambivalent or unsure about what this would entail. These findings would seem to indicate that the intergenerational transmission of identity has attenuated and that other influences are accentuating the fractures with previous generations. These range across the spectrum from a deterioration of the socio-economic, physical and political landscapes to the increasing impact of access to the internet.

Mannheim (1928) suggested that under normal circumstances cultural transmission across the generations is effective; but that in time of social change, young people will consciously set themselves apart from the culture, tradition, values and ideas of the older generations. Davis (1940) added to Mannheim's suggestion by positing that a generation gap in cultural transmission was not merely an aberration caused by social change, but was an inherently normal characteristic of modern society. He admitted however, that this gap could be exacerbated by a detrimental deterioration in socio-economic landscapes; youth find their own meanings from the world around them and make their own decisions on what is relevant to them. Grolnick, Deci and Ryan (1997) suggest that as youths grow older, their autonomy increases within the structures of family and community and the process of intergenerational transmission of culture is stultified. This suggestion is in congruence with Berry (2007), who identified three forms of cultural transmission: vertical (from parents and grandparents); horizontal (from peers and educators); and oblique (from social institutions, media and the internet). Berry (2007) opined that as

youths grow older the horizontal and oblique transmission forms become more relevant. Trommsodorff (2009: 147) also suggests that there is a general preference for individualistic values and less ascription to a collectivist identity, more intergenerational differences and more intergenerational inconsistencies in cultural value orientations, amongst populations exposed to Western culture.

Previously published research (Lee et al 2005, Ying et al 1999, and Sluzki 1979) on the subject of intergenerational differences amongst refugees and migrants indicate that older generations adhere to their cultural beliefs and traditional values. The conflict between the tempting attractions of the forces of modernity for the youth and the demands of their conservative parents creates confusion for the younger generation. They commonly subscribe to Western values, because they do not see the relevance of those of their parents. Often a hybrid mixture of the two sets of values and identities ensue. Mary Bucholtz (2002: 532) cautions however, that it is all too easy to exaggerate the phenomenon of intergenerational difference. 'Researchers in a variety of cultural settings have found that the divisions between youth and elders, modern and traditional, conflictual and consensual are blurry and ambiguous rather than clearly differentiated (Gable 2000, Rasmussen 2000, Rea 1998, Sharp 1995)'. The research for this thesis has found a somewhat similar situation. However, there are undoubtedly intergenerational differences in how the Palestinian refugee youth view their identity; in the importance, they attach to memory and belonging; and their loyalty to the tenets of traditional Palestinian nationalist dogma. As Peteet (2005) reported, previous generations saw memories of the events of the *Nakba* as central to their identity. This generation, as reported in Chapter 3, have not assigned the same priority to this tenet. The levels of knowledge about it were surprisingly poor amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*. 8 (13%) had no knowledge; 17 (28%) had poor knowledge; 23 (38%) had a fair knowledge; and 13 (21%) had a good or very good knowledge (Figure 7.1 refers). This would seem to indicate that the level of transgenerational transmission of knowledge about the *Nakba* has weakened. Additionally, the lack of interest in seeking information

about it was unexpected, given the availability of the internet, and devices to access it, in the PRCs. This would seem to indicate that there are differences with previous generations and the loyalty which they hold for the traditional view of Palestinian refugee identity.

Pattaro (2015: 321) argues that the 'presence of the new media in everyday life assumes an important role in the construction of youths' and adolescents' identity and becomes a significant instrument for young people's agency.' Buonfino and Thompson (2007: 5) agree and suggest that the new media enable people to be 'immersed in cultures located elsewhere, and to cultivate multiple identities'. As a result, concepts of belonging become more complex. Memories are attenuated as the attractiveness of other cultures (such as Western culture) become more relevant to the youth. Bourn (2008) suggests that young people everywhere are affected by globalisation, a phenomenon, which must be taken into account when discussing identity. The *Jeel ma baa'd el Harb* are not immune to its effects. The use of social media amongst them is widespread, as discovered in the research for this thesis. 45 (77%) of respondents had access to Wi-Fi, either on their phones or on laptops at home (See Figure 6.1). Additionally, there are a number of internet cafes in the PRCs which were used by them, sometimes on a daily basis. As Dolby and Rizvi (2008) indicate the proliferation of often non-traditional cultures and cultural symbols on the internet is causing a cultural dissonance for youth everywhere as the more conservative identities of their predecessors are called into question and in some cases abandoned. The global consumer cultures are causing the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* to search for agency and a better life, wherever they can find it as evidenced in Chapters 5 and 6. 36 (59%) professed to hold an aspiration for *hijra* (Figure 7.8 refers). 27(44%) stated an aspiration for *tawteen (*Figure 7.4 refers*)*. Chapter 4 discovered that awareness of the principle of *haq al 'awda* remains strong in this generation with 57 (93.4%) showing an awareness of it during interviews. There is a more pragmatic acceptance of the likelihood of its implementation, with 27 (44%) accepting that it is unlikely to happen during their lifetime.

Subsidiary Research Aim 1

This subsidiary research aim was to establish the relevance which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* ascribe to events surrounding the *Nakba* (catastrophe). *Al-Nakba* occurred in 1948 with the formation of the state of Israel and the flight of the Palestinian people, either through fear or force, from the British Mandated territory of Palestine. *Al-Nakba* forms the basis for exilic Palestinian history and has been described as the lynchpin of Palestinian identity Allan (2014: 41-45) and a 'watershed in the development of Palestinian identity' (Peteet, 2005: 3; Khalidi, 1997: 22).

Findings



Figure 7.1. Reported Knowledge of *al-Nakba* amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* Jun/Jul2016. (n = 61).

Chapter 3 of this research indicates that there is a diminution in the level of knowledge about the *Nakba* amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* in Lebanon. *Al-Nakba* is regarded as a seminal event in the formation and maintenance of Palestinian refugee identity. Levels of knowledge about it and the importance it holds amongst this generation would be expected to be high. Surprisingly low levels of knowledge were found across all interview sites. When the data were examined in terms of education and

employment, the results show marked differences, suggesting that these factors are important constituents in the maintenance of Palestinian refugee identity. A correlation between higher levels of education and higher earnings; with knowledge of about the *Nakba* and the importance which the respondents ascribed to it was found in the reported answers to the interview questions.



Figure 7.2. Reported Education levels amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 61).



Figure 7.3. Reported Monthly Earnings amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* Jun/Jul 2016. (n = 41).

8 (20%) of the 41 (67%) respondents in employment were classified as 'higher earners'. All had completed, were undergoing or had quit university education. 12 (20%) of those in employment had middle incomes. These respondents had a mix of lower and higher educational attainment. 21 (51%) had lower earnings and most had only basic education. 23 (38%) of respondents had a fair knowledge and 13 (21%) had a good knowledge about the *Nakba* and considered it as important. This latter group were in secure employment in the higher or middle-income brackets. They were not as concerned about finding the means to live. This thesis suggests that the level of loyalty to traditional Palestinian refugee identity is moderated, in part, by socio-economic factors, such as lack of education and the increasing level of unemployment for the PRLs in Lebanon. The ingress of 1.5 million Syrian refugees to Lebanon since 2011 has led to ever diminishing opportunities for employment. The dropout rate in education, as reported by Chaaban et al (2016: 73-75) at 7.1% has increased, with 12.4% reported as needing to find employment, to sustain their families. Employment opportunities are limited with Chaaban et al (2016: 86) reporting youth unemployment at 36.4%, a finding broadly supported by the results of this research, with 20 respondents (33%) unemployed.



Figure 7.4. Reported Employment Status amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* Jun/ Jul 2016. (n = 61).

The findings in Chapter 3 indicate that where the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* are focussed on securing employment, the *Nakba* becomes less important for them, as Allan (2014: 9 7-98) suggests the 'primacy of economic subjectivity and the decisive shaping influence it has on what it means to be Palestinian,' changes. This finding in Chapter 3 would seem to support Allan's (2014: 5,26,33,60) suggestion that a radical change has occurred in the knowledge of and loyalty to one of the accepted tenets of Palestinian refugee identity. This research suggests that there is a heterogeneity in the identity of this generation and that the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* cannot be considered as a homogenous group, where their identity is concerned. It is acknowledged that there is no guarantee that the snapshot obtained in this research will not alter, in responses to changes in the socio- economic, physical and political circumstances, in the future. Rousseau and van der Veen (2005: 688-689) and Oyserman, Elmore and Smith (2012: 70) and Maalouf (2000: 23,25) have all suggested that identity, a social construct, is malleable and not static, but responds from interactions with the environment.

Subsidiary Research Aim 2

This research aim was to measure the relevance of the concept of *haq al 'awda* for the *Jeel ma baa'd El harb* in Lebanon today. *Haq al 'awda* refers to the right of return, to pre-Israeli Palestine, which has been a core

aspiration of Palestinian refugees through the years. *Haq al 'awda* has been one of the central tenets of Palestinian national identity as iterated by academics through the years (Knudsen,2007; Khalidi, 1992; Sayigh, 2001; Abu-Sitta, 1999).

Findings

Chapter 4 explored the degree of attachment to place amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* using the concept of *haq al 'awda* as a basis for determining one of the tenets of Palestinian refugee identity. As Nasir said 'If there is no *haq al 'awda*, then there are no Palestinians.' 56 respondents (91.8%), for this research, reported an awareness of *haq al 'awda*, which indicates a high level of awareness. Only 1 person didn't want it. 30 (49%) of respondents were convinced that it would happen in their lifetime. 27 (44%) saw it as happening at some indeterminate period in the future. The levels of loyalty to the principle of *haq al 'awda* can be described as high, indicating a significant degree of attachment to place as exemplified in Palestine. There were some significant differences in the responses of the respondents and a smaller degree of similarities; these were most evident in the areas of education and employment. When cross-correlation was carried out with the results found in Chapter 3, on the *Nakba*, it became apparent that those who were in secure employment and those whose standard of education was at the lower end of the scale were more supportive of the idea of *haq al 'awda* than those in the middle ranges. These results are also found in Chapters 5 and 6. This may indicate that those in good employment are secure enough to consider *haq al 'awda* in terms of a nationalist and political right. It may also indicate that those who are unemployed and lacking the educational qualifications necessary to secure employment are desperate for a better life elsewhere. The loyalty to the concept of *haq al 'awda* is a means to achieve that aim.

This research has indicated that despite the realisation and affirmation of *haq al 'awda* as an absolute right for the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, a significant number 27 (44%) have no hope that it will happen for them. Many of these expressed it in terms of a dream, or an ambition which may

never be realised. However, (30 or 49%) suggested that it would happen in their lifetime.



Figure 7.5. Respondents Solutions to the Problem of *Haq al 'Awda* Jun/ Jul 2016. (n = 61).

Amongst all respondents, differences were noted in their interpretation of the concept of what that might entail. Some of those echoed the concepts traditionally reported by researchers in the past. These most often envisaged a return to Palestine as it was pre-1948, suggesting in a simplistic way that the Jews should be returned to their countries of origin. This group were in a minority (21 or 35%). The vast majority of respondents (39 or 65%) offered solutions ranging from a two-state solution to a one state-solution (with Israeli Jews living under Palestinian rule). 33 (54%) of respondents admitted intergenerational differences in the concept of *haq al 'awda* with their predecessors, in willingness to consider alternative and pragmatic solutions to the resolution of *haq al 'awda*. There was an awareness that those who were willing to accept *tawteen* or to attempt *hijra* were in danger of betraying *haq al 'awda*, but such was their desperation to achieve agency and dignity for themselves, they were willing to risk losing their Palestinian identity. Many of those interviewed saw *haq al 'awda* in terms of a search for identity as Schulz and Hammer (2003:111) proposed, either because their present Palestinian identity was

insufficient to their needs or because they hoped for a better life in Palestine, to escape the confines of a suffocating environment which increasingly offered little hope for improvement.

Subsidiary Research Aim 3

This research Aim was to evaluate whether or not this generation were willing to accept or reject *tawteen. Tawteen* is a problematic term variously translated as assimilation, settlement, naturalisation, and implantation. It is a highly emotive term, in a country where the divisions of the recent civil war remain unhealed. It is subject to political hijacking by politicians who want to use it to convey alarm for the Lebanese population. This thesis adopts the meaning of naturalisation, which is the most neutral and probably the least contentious definition. *Tawteen* is regarded as one of the pillars of Palestinian national identity (Knudsen: 2007), and has been regarded by some researchers as abhorrent to all Palestinians (Sayigh,1977; Masalha,2009; Bianchi,2014). Within the concept, dimensions of attachment to place, personal and collective identity, homeland and belonging are intertwined.

Findings

Chapter 5 examined Palestinian refugee identity amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* through the lens of *tawteen*. *Tawteen* as iterated above is a highly disputed word, for both the Lebanese population and Palestinians refugees. It was anticipated that this facet of the research would be difficult, due to the narratives of previous researchers, as highlighted above, who reported that it was a taboo subject. It turned out to be the easiest subject to investigate in the research for this thesis, because the respondents all had an opinion on it. It would appear that this generation are more willing to at least debate the subject rather than dismiss it outright. Two main groups can be identified, those who wished to accept *tawteen* and those who rejected the proposition. 27 (44%) of all respondents indicated that they were in favour of it, 26 (43%) against it, 5 (8%) indicated that they were unsure, and 3 (5%) didn't care.



Figure 7.6. Reported Acceptance/ Rejection of *Tawteen* amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* Jun/ Jul 2016. (n = 61).

All respondents expressed an opinion on it. The rates of rejection of *tawteen* were again most prevalent amongst those who were in steady employment, with enough money to sustain themselves and with a good education. Many of these adopted a nationalist stance, in accordance with Palestinian nationalist ideology. However, the 'rejectionists' also included a cohort who were unemployed, or lacked second or third level education. Many of this latter group expressed the view that *tawteen* was of no use to them, since many Lebanese citizens were in a similar dire economic situation. Those among the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* who professed themselves as willing to accept *tawteen* were drawn to do so, most often in the hope of achieving agency for themselves. They saw it an improvement to their long- term situation. Members of this cohort included some of those with good education, but no employment, due to Lebanon's restrictive policies on hiring Palestinians and also those who had little education, beyond basic levels.

Cognisant of the dangers of diminishing or losing their Palestinian identity, 35 (57%) of respondents expressed a desire to retain it and these were spread across both groups. The 6 (10%) who wished to lose their Palestinian identity were confined to the group who were unemployed.



Figure 7.7. Respondents acceptance rates for a double or hybrid identity Jun/ Jul 2016. (n = 61).

The finding that 38 (62%) of all respondents were happy to have a double or hybrid identity is an indication of a more pragmatic conception of their identity. There was a realisation that this new identity would impinge on their Palestinian identity and might eventually cause its eradication. These respondents were spread across the two groups and would seem to indicate a shift from the refusal of previous generations to accept any identity other than a Palestinian identity. 19 (31%) were ambivalent or unsure about the prospect of a double identity, indicating a reluctance to abandon whatever tangible benefits having a Palestinian identity entails. 4 respondents or 7% did not express an opinion on a hybrid identity, and this question was not pursued with them. The findings in this research are strikingly different from those reported by previous academics. Previous studies reported a refusal to even countenance the acceptance of *tawteen*, amongst all Palestinian refugees. Several factors seem to be at play here. One factor is undoubtedly the declining socio-economic landscape, with diminishing prospects for the youth. A secondary factor is a growing lack of satisfaction in the Palestinian political leadership's ability to provide improvements. In that regard, the dictates of nationalist rhetoric on refusal of *tawteen* become increasingly irrelevant for this generation. Furthermore,

the stagnation of the Lebanese- Palestinian political dialogue is another possible factor, because without progress in this area, no amelioration in their situation is possible and a sense of hopelessness pervades. There is also a recognition of the diminishing capability of UNRWA to provide adequate resources to the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, in terms of health services, education and employment, due to its own diminishing resources. On the international scene, there is a recognition that the Israeli-Palestinian dispute shows little hope of being resolved. The tightening of borders in the USA and in Europe reduce the opportunities for a better life abroad and so *tawteen* becomes an attractive proposition, even if that means surrendering Palestinian identity. This does not mean that their attachment to *place* as Palestine is diminished. Amongst those who accepted *tawteen*, 93% indicated that even if they took *tawteen*, they would still like to return to Palestine, either to visit or to live, if some solution could be found to the question *of haq al' awda.*

Subsidiary Research Aim 4

This research aim was to establish how *hijra*, usually translated as emigration, impacted on the concept of identity and belonging for this generation. It has been estimated by Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) that 53.5% of Palestinian refugee households in Lebanon reported having immediate family abroad. The importance of *hijra* as a means of achieving agency for the Palestinian refugee youth, given their precarious existence in the PRCs, and how achieving that agency is deserving of further investigation.

Findings

Chapter 6 investigated the willingness of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* to embark on *hijra* (emigration) and explored their concepts of how *hijra* would impact on their Palestinian refugee identity. It also analysed some of the factors which might be causing this generation to aspire for *hijra*. As reported, *hijra* has long been a facet of Palestinian refugee life in Lebanon. Traditionally, Palestinians have travelled to the Gulf, Europe, the USA,

South America, and elsewhere in the Middle East in search of employment, some of whom have never returned. Access to those traditional destinations has dried up, as nations enforce immigrant quotas and border restrictions.



Figure 7.8. Reported willingness to avail of *Hijra* amongst the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* Jun/ Jul 2016. (n = 61).

36 (59%) of all respondents indicated a willingness to emigrate, with 6 (10%) refusing to contemplate it and 19 (31%) unsure or did not express an opinion on it. Many of those who opted to take the emigration route were cognisant of the dangers of losing their Palestinian identity. Some were confident of being able to maintain that identity, despite being citizens elsewhere, recognising that a new identity would intrude and a balance was required between the old and the new. Some saw the danger of *hijra* impinging on *haq al 'awda* as a threat to their Palestinian identity, but were willing to pursue it nonetheless.; some of whom were determined to hold on to their Palestinian identity. Some saw it as a means to achieve *haq al 'awda* (with another nationality*)*. The willingness to aspire to *hijra* was consistent across the divides in education and employment. The refusal to consider it was mainly confined to those in better jobs, with a better standard of education. Those who most consistently wanted to lose their Palestinian identity were to be found amongst those willing to attempt *hijra.*

There was also a recognition of intergenerational differences in how the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* saw *hijra* in terms of their identity and their aspirations. Most of them expressed their desire for *hijra* in terms of achieving agency and a better life. Most also affirmed that their expectations of the end result were more ambitious and realistic than those of their parents and grandparents, who they said were more simplistic in their outlooks. Overall, the responses of the interviewees displayed a pragmatism and realism, largely devoid of the traditional view of Palestinian nationalist ideology.

The factors which are considered to be causing a desire for *hijra* amongst this generation include, a lack of agency in Lebanon for the youth; increasing demand on diminishing NGO resources due to a high influx of refugees from Syria; the failure of political and civic leadership on both the Lebanese and Palestinian sides to resolve the refugee situation; the continuation of the Israeli- Palestinian dispute; and the attractiveness of cultures and life elsewhere afforded by access to the televisual media and the internet. When taken together with a weakening of intergenerational transmission of Palestinian culture, history and tradition, an increased demand for *hijra* is one of the few means to achieve agency available for the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* in Lebanon.

Note on generalisability of findings:

A qualitative research project such as this one is normally specific to a small number of participants and locations. It is methodologically dangerous to assume that the findings in one research project can be applied automatically to other populations and environments. As Erlandson, Harris, Skipper and Allen (1993) point out, all data collection and data analysis procedures are defined by the contexts in which they occur. However, both Stake (1995) and Denscombe (1998), while accepting the uniqueness of every case, suggest that it may also be an example of a phenomenon within a broader group, and the possibility of generalisability should not be dismissed out of hand. Williams (2000: 15) argues for the possibility of making what he terms a *moderatum*

generalisation, in which qualitative research findings 'can be seen to be instances of a broader set of recognisable features.' In cases where researchers are engaged in similar studies, Bassey (1981), while agreeing with this stance, also makes the point that it is up to the new researcher to make that extrapolation, a position also made by Lincoln and Guba (1985), and Firestone (1993), providing that a modicum of contextual information regarding the original case is presented. The findings in this thesis therefore, have the possibility of being generalised to a broader population of Palestinian refugee youth. However, this research was bounded contextually by the environment in Lebanon and the socio-political and socio-economic landscapes in that country. There is no guarantee that the same findings are applicable elsewhere. Further research is needed to validate that supposition.

Recommendations:

The Israeli -Palestinian dispute has been largely stagnant for some years now. The resolution of that dispute lies at the centre of the Palestinian refugee problem. Without the agreement of all parties, this situation will continue interminably. The responsibility for finding a solution lies with both parties but also with countries at the international and regional level. The imponderables are not merely legal, but there is also a moral imperative to solve the refugee crisis. The research for this thesis indicates that the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* are willing to consider novel and realistic solutions to enable a resolution to this long -standing dispute. As the inheritors of the future, they deserve to be heard and at least have their opinions in the public domain and considered. There appears to be no forum for this to take place. The UN should establish a Commission of Enquiry to establish if the views expressed by respondents in this thesis are indicative of those of the Palestinian refugee population throughout the diaspora.

A re-examination of the role and mandate of UNRWA is proposed in order to address the 'protection gap' highlighted in Chapter 4, especially as no

solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is in sight. It is encouraging that UNHCR has now commenced to account for numbers of Palestinian refugees in its statistics and also have issued a report on the situation of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon (UNHCR: 2016). A more enhanced co-operation regime between the two organisations is recommended, in order to develop improved strategies to resolve the situation. UNRWA depends on annual contributions from donor countries for its budget, which is formed annually. There has been a reduction in contributions over the years which in turn has resulted in a reduction in the level of service provision afforded to refugees. Effective long-term planning is not possible in this type of environment. UNRWA should seek three or five- year budget strategies, which will enable a measure of stability for the organisation to deliver improved outcomes in the areas of housing, education, education, medical, relief and social support services. Greater co-ordination with the multiplicity of NGOs operating in the PRCs and urban areas will ensure less duplication of services leading to greater efficiency, less waste and more confidence in the organisation from the refugees. UNRWA should further develop a bottom up approach to policymaking, involving and empowering the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* to achieve agency for themselves.

The question of giving the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* some form of civic rights in Lebanon needs to be addressed. This thesis has established that they are *de facto* and not necessarily *de jure* citizens of Lebanon. It is understandable that the scarecrow of *tawteen* is raised when any question of giving increased rights to Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. A limited form of citizenship was proposed in Chapter 5. It would not be acceptable to all Palestinian refugees, as indicated in this research. However, for those willing to accept it, it would alleviate their dire situation. The Lebanese Palestinian Dialogue Committee (LPDC) should be re-invigorated as presently it is seen by many Palestinian refugees as little more than a talking shop. This body has the support of the government and most of the political parties in Lebanon. The provision of improved civic rights can be progressed through this body, if the political will on both sides is available.

Presently there is a legislative backlog in the Lebanese parliament, which means that some of the legislation proposed to alleviate restrictions on the Palestinians has not been promulgated. This needs to be addressed as a matter of urgency.

A system of emigration to other countries should be investigated, by UNRWA, as the body representing Palestinian refugees, but also in conjunction and co-operation with the UNHCR. It is understandable that given the pressure on countries in Europe with the implosion of migration from North Africa, and other areas of the Middle East, that there would be little enthusiasm for such a scheme. However, this research indicates that not everyone wants to take *hijra* as an option to achieve agency for themselves. This scheme could operate in tandem with the provision of limited civic rights in Lebanon. These two schemes would provide opportunities for the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, which are denied them at present and would not only improve their circumstances but those of their families still in Lebanon, due to the practice of sending remittances home.

It is recommended that ethnographers and anthropologists re-examine the concepts of Palestinian identity and Palestinian refugee identity. The research for this thesis has established intergenerational differences in the concepts of personal and collective identity between the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* and the previous generations, as previously reported by academics. This research has also established that the concept of identity amongst Palestinian refugees cannot be described as homogenous, nor is it static. Both Clemens (2007) and Calhoun (1995) suggest that heterogeneity is a natural feature of any group of people. If we accept this fact as a basic premise, then a better understanding of groups such as the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* will inform policymakers, who rely on academics for their knowledge, to construct better solutions to the refugee problem.

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Appendix 'A'

Profile of Palestinian Refugees from Lebanon (PRLs) in Lebanon

The 12 Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs) in Lebanon hold 63.4% of the PRL population. The other 36.6% reside in unofficial 'gatherings' mainly located in urban centres; in addition to some privately-owned residences scattered throughout the country. The camps are administered by UNRWA and dwellings which lie outside the boundaries of the camps are not. Sanitation services and some dwelling rehabilitation are available to occupants of the PRCs but not to those in the gatherings. The municipal authorities do not supply services to the gatherings and consequently, some housing in these areas is very poor. Health services are available to both resident types, depending on registration status. The standard of housing in the camps is described as dire by Chaaban et al (2016 :126) mainly due to insufficient funding for rehabilitation of residences and also the overcrowding caused by the influx of Syrian and Palestinian Refugees from Syria (PRS). Houses suffer from a lack of maintenance, power supply, proper sewage systems and waste disposal is inadequate. Water ingress and dampness problems are present in 78% of homes. Due to the high density of buildings in the camps, 52% suffer from poor ventilation and 55% are affected by darkness, leading to physical health and psychological problems amongst the occupants (Chaaban et al, 2016: 11).

Population density varies in the PRCs with Ein el Hilweh being the most populous at 45,000 inhabitants and Mar Elias at 1,600 inhabitants (UNRWA estimates 2016) being the least populous. The camps are small in area, with a high density of occupation. No allowance has been made by the Government of Lebanon (GOL) for normal increases in population since 1949 and horizontal development is forbidden and there are restrictions on the access of building materials into the camps (Chaaban et al, 2016: 127). As a result, every available space has been used and residences are crowded together with sometimes poorly constructed buildings, often six or seven storeys high, intersected by narrow alleyways. Very often no daylight enters these residences, as a consequence.

Infrastructure is poor and water and sanitation insufficient to meet the needs of the inhabitants. Electricity supply is inadequate and electricity cables and water pipes run often at head height along with internet cables. Electrocution is common as people try to acquire power themselves by jury-rigging connections. Appendix 'B' provides a synopsis of conditions in Shatila PRC, which is typical of the other camps. Chaaban et al (2016) outlines the restrictions on camp improvements, living conditions and the restrictions imposed by GOL on Palestinians in Lebanon.

Classification of Palestine Refugees.

UNRWA defines Palestine refugees as "persons whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and who lost both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict." UNRWA services are available to all those living in its area of operations who meet this definition, who are registered with the Agency and who need assistance. The descendants of Palestine refugee males, including adopted children, are also eligible for registration (UNRWA, 2016). There are three classifications of PRLs, in Lebanon.

Firstly, there are 495, 985 PRLs registered with UNRWA. These are usually registered also with the Lebanese government's Directorate of Political and Refugees Affairs (DPRA), and hold an 'Identification card for Palestine Refugee', issued by that directorate (Chaaban et al, 2016: 23). However, it is estimated that between 260,000 and 280,000 of these are actually still living in Lebanon (Chaaban et al, 2016: 44). Many PRLs have emigrated to other countries, but retain their registration status. Fear of failure in their new host countries, and the maintenance of a fall-back strategy is one factor in this practice. Another factor is the desire to retain their right of return, under United Nations General Assembly Resolution (UNGAR) 194, in the event should such right be recognised by Israel and implemented.

The second classification concerns the 'Non-Registered' PRLs who are estimated to number 35,000. These are not registered with UNRWA, but

are registered with DPRA. These are PRLs who came to Lebanon after 1948, including some fleeing Palestine after the 1967 war.

The third classification are known as ‘Non -Ids’. These refugees are not registered with DRPA or UNRWA, in Lebanon. Some of these refugees may have been previously registered with UNRWA, in other fields of operation, but whose documentation has expired. Estimates of this classification ranges between 3,000 and 10,000. Chaaban et al (2016: 23) relates that this category has limited access to UNRWA services and due to their lack of valid documentation, they endure challenging socioeconomic conditions as they are unable to gain legal employment. In considering population numbers, it should be borne in mind that it is not possible to definitively quantify the true figures, since registration is voluntary and not mandatory. UNRWA officials and NGO members told this author, in 2015 and 2016, that some registration figures are unreliable.

Unemployment and Poverty.

GOL has continued to consider the Palestinians in Lebanon as ‘stateless foreigners’, depriving them of the basic rights enjoyed by Lebanese citizens (Halabi, 2004: 42; Chaaban et al, 2016: 24). Due to GOL restrictions, a large number of the professions are debarred to PRLs, due either to the precondition of holding Lebanese nationality, or having to meet the reciprocity of treatment condition, in order to access a profession (Chaaban et al, 2016: 84). The Human Rights Watch Report (2012) stated that

> ‘Palestinian refugees in Lebanon live in appalling social and economic conditions. 2011 saw no improvement in their access to the labour market, despite a labour law amendment in 2010 that was supposed to ease such access. The main reason was the government's failure to implement the amendment. Lebanese laws and decrees still bar Palestinians from working in at least 25 professions requiring syndicate membership, including law, medicine, and engineering. Palestinian refugees are still subject to a discriminatory law introduced in 2001.’

Conditions have not changed since 2012. PRLs wishing to work in any of the permitted professions must go through a convoluted process to obtain a work permit, putting a bureaucratic workload on both the prospective employee and employer. Consequently, the majority of PRLs work informally, in menial occupations, 50% of whom are paid on a daily basis. The unemployment rate for the PRLs was measured at 21% for males and 32% for females in 2016, and across the gender profile at 23.2%, compared to 8% for the Lebanese population. The highest rate of unemployment was amongst the youth at 36.4% (Chaaban et al, 2016: 86). Poverty rates were found by Chaaban et al (2016: 52) to have increased by 9% since 2010, in the Central Lebanon Area (CLA), which holds three of the camps visited for the research for this thesis. There was a slight decline of extreme poverty levels in the same area, but it still stands at 25%. The same survey found that there are 74% of adolescents living in poverty and 5% in extreme poverty. Poverty rates are higher inside the camps than without. It is estimated by Chaaban et al (2016) that conditions for PRLs are as bad if not worse than those found in Gaza. The main factors identified were low education, lack of decent work, and pressures from Syrian refugees and PRS in the job market.

Education and Health Care:

UNRWA is the main provider of education at primary, secondary and vocational levels, since access to the Lebanese education system is largely denied to the PRLs. Additionally, NGOs and non-profit organisations provide funds for access to third level education on a limited basis. UNRWA runs 67 schools and vocational education centres in Lebanon (Chaaban et al, 2016: 70). It is obligatory for the pupils at these schools to follow the Lebanese curriculum. UNRWA provides 27 healthcare centres in Lebanon (Chaaban et al, 2016: 96). Due to underfunding, UNRWA is not able to provide a comprehensive service and tertiary care in particular is only partially funded. The Palestinian Red Crescent provides additional support, on a limited basis.

Property Rights:

Jaber Suleiman (2010: 10) relates that until 2001, when GOL amended a 1969 decree, foreigners, including Palestinians were eligible to own property in Lebanon. The 2001 amendment prohibited 'any person who is not a national of a recognized state or any one whose ownership of property is contrary to the provisions of the Constitution relating to *tawteen* (naturalisation/settlement) to acquire real estate of any kind.' The result of this amendment is that Palestinians can no longer buy land or property; can no longer bequeath such land or property; and puts into question the legal legitimacy of acquisition of property or land prior to this amendment.

Freedom of Movement, Right to Travel.

PRLS are eligible for an identity card and travel documents, which are renewable, with some restrictions, depending on their classification as outlined above. Those registered with UNRWA and DPRA can renew their travel documents every three years and are allowed to return to Lebanon. However, those who are 'Non-Ids' have a 'No return' stamped on their exit visas. These regulations are subject to arbitrary and sudden changes as was the case in 1995 when the Lebanese Minister of the Interior issued Decree no.478 'regulating Entry and Exit of Palestinians into and out of Lebanon.' Palestinians outside of Lebanon had to obtain an entry visa to re-enter Lebanon, trapping thousands of PRLs outside Lebanon (Suleiman, 2010: 8). Restrictions on travel within Lebanon are also imposed. Prior authorisation from the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) and the Ministry of the Interior must be acquired to travel to PRCs in the South. In practice, this is often not complied with and there is relative freedom to travel to other camps.

Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon where Research for this Thesis was carried out:

Shatila PRC

Mar Elias PRC

Burj al Barajneh PRC

Ein el Hilweh PRC

Figure A.1. Location of Palestinian Refugee Camps in Lebanon where this research was carried out. Map Source: Google Earth 2017.

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Appendix 'B'

Case Study: Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp

Note: All information in this appendix was provided by UNRWA.

Statistics:

Area: 0.4 Sq. Km.

Population: 25,000 (estimated on 30 Jun 2016). This is an increase from 6,000 in 2000.

Palestinian refugees registered with UNRWA (on 30 Jun 2016):

PRLs: 11,647

PRS: 1,643

(Note: Not all Palestinian refugees are registered with UNRWA)



Figure B.1. Estimated Age Profile of Palestinian Refugees in Shatila. Source: UNRWA.

Places of Origin: Upper Galilee Region; Majd el Krum; Barwa; Haifa; Jaffa and Acre.

Population Density (estimated): 60,000 per sq. km.

General:

Shatila was established in 1949, in the mayoral municipality of Ghoberi in Beirut. Originally it encompassed 500 residential units and it now holds over 5,000 units. (See Figures B. 14 to B. 17) for camp expansion since 2002). The camp was almost completely destroyed during the Israeli invasion of 1982 and again during attacks by Amal (a Shia militia) between 1985 and 1987. In 1982, Phalangist forces carried out a massacre of the inhabitants, resulting in an estimated 3,000 deaths (Fisk, 1992: 3-4, 51). The areas surrounding Shatila such as Sabra also contain PRLs, but UNRWA is responsible for the area delineated by the camp's boundaries. As the GOL will not permit any further expansion to the camp area, horizontal development has stymied. Consequently, vertical development has ensued, with six or even seven storeys of poorly constructed buildings which are often unsafe. Space is at a premium and the camp is permeated with narrow alleyways, sometimes so narrow that only one person can walk through. There is one main street in the camp. The preferred method of transport within the camp is on foot or on mopeds, some of which have been modified to carry goods into shops and homes (see Figure B. 12). In addition to residential units, there are 187 businesses in the camp, ranging from one- roomed family run shops to larger enterprises.

Figure B.2. A family owned small shop in Shatila PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2015.

Family solidarity is much in evidence in Shatila. The extended family will often pool resources in areas such as food provision and preparation to ensure that all members are fed.

Figures B.3. and B.4. Householders preparing food for a Family meal, Shatila PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2016.

There are three mosques in the camp, one is affiliated to Hamas; one to Islamic Jihad and a third to al-Ahbash. Although Hamas and Islamic Jihad do not have offices in the camp, both enjoy widespread support, possibly due to the level of welfare services which they provide. During the War of the Camps, the basement of the main mosque served as a burial ground. This has been preserved as a memorial site and is visited by the occupants of Shatila and visitors to the camp.

Figure B.5. Entrance to Burial Place beneath Mosque in Shatila PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2016.

As noted above, the population of the camp was estimated at 25,000 persons. Of these some 13,200 are registered as Palestinian refugees with UNRWA. In Lebanon, registration is voluntary and somewhat haphazard, and not all Palestinian refugees are registered with UNRWA. Additionally, as Lebanon's economic situation has deteriorated many poor Lebanese have taken up occupation in the Shatila due to the high price of accommodation in Beirut. Palestinian families will often rent out rooms to non- Palestinians, increasing the problems of overcrowding. Many immigrants have also taken up accommodation in the camp, hoping to build up savings and move up the economic ladder. The influx of non-Palestinian refugees has increased as they are no longer able to afford high rents in the cities and have no other option due to the protracted troubles in Syria. UNRWA officials told this author in 2015 that many of these refugees are appalled at the conditions in the PRCs. UNRWA is to conduct a census in all camps in 2017, in an effort to quantify populations levels and to establish definitively who the occupants are.

Figures B.6 and B.7. View into Shatila PRC and standard of construction of residences, inside the PRC. Source: O'Connor, 2016. Note the seven storey buildings, which are typical of others within the camp. Note also the unfinished construction of the side view in Figure B.7.

UNRWA:

UNRWA is responsible for the running of the camp. It employs a staff of 76.

Staffing levels;

Administration (Camp Services Officer: CSO): 1.

Education: 41.

Health: 15.

Relief and Social Services: 3

Sanitation Services: 16.

Education:

UNRWA has one school in Shatila with 850 pupils. Due to space limitations and these large numbers the school operates a double shift

system with different teachers and students in morning and afternoon sessions. Additional education is provided by several NGOs for undetermined numbers, in private schools. These schools do not charge for the education provided and in the main use unqualified staff, who are students at university. Some of these NGOs are affiliated and funded by political factions, within the camp.

Health:

UNRWA operates one health centre in Shatila. Its provision of medical services, are comparable with those in a general practice in the West. Additionally, pre-conception care, antenatal care and postnatal care is provided, as well as vaccination campaigns for children. UNRWA employs one general medical doctor; a gynaecologist twice a month, and access to essential and cancer medication through a pharmacist. In 2015, the health centre saw over 43,000 patient visits. In addition to UNRWA health services, the Palestinian Red Cross provide some support for medical services, as do some of the NGOs.

Figure B.8. Health Centre Shatila PRC. Source: O'Connor 2016.

Relief and Social Services:

UNRWA employs three social workers to process Special Hardship Cases, where refugees are in severe poverty and have no means of supporting themselves. By 30 Jun 2016, they had processed 690 such cases. Assistance given is minimal, amounting to $10 a month and some small amounts of staple food. Psychosocial support is provided by one of the social workers. NGOs working in the camp also provide services including education in gender -based violence, legal assistance, school and community projects and youth programmes. The American University of Beirut assist the social workers and NGO partners with provision of nutrition for pupils at the UNRWA school, for students in grades 1 to 6. The daily meals are provided to hundreds of children for a monthly subscription of $ 3-5.

Sanitation Services:

UNRWA employs 12 sanitation workers to collect waste, clean sewage and control rodents and insects. The collected waste and garbage is usually transported to an adjacent dumpsite, using handcarts negotiating the narrow alleyways in Shatila. During visits by the author to the camp in 2015 and 2016 it was patently obvious that these collections are not always effective and a view was expressed that the number of labourers was insufficient for the task. A recycling yard adjacent to the camp is frequently under a pall of smoke, due to the practice of burning electrical wiring in order to get copper for sale. Many residences have open drains and dampness problems, and this author witnessed areas with open sewers and drains, with some flooding, beside residences in 2016.

Figure B.9. Refuse dump in Shatila PRC. Source: O'Connor 2016.

Environmental Situation:

The overcrowding situation has worsened in the past five years due to a large influx of Syrian refugees, poor Lebanese and migrant workers from Egypt and Sudan, many of whom are in Lebanon illegally. This has caused immense pressure on the infrastructure within Shatila. There has been a reported increase in health issues, including asthma, allergies, skin diseases and psychological problems.

Water:

Shatila was formerly supplied with water for six artesian wells, but as these were outside the camp boundary, they were appropriated by the municipality during the Civil war. There are now three additional wells which are commercially owned and operated and four smaller wells operated by the Popular Committee, but they are insufficient for the needs of the population and they are regarded as unfit for drinking, due to contamination and high saline levels. Residents have to buy water from shops and this water is suspect as it is not subject to health checks. A project funded by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation

implemented a scheme to provide potable water for the residents but as of 2016, this was not in operation.

Electricity:

There are two electricity sub-stations for Shatila, which is inadequate for the population. The electricity company, EDL, provides a minimal supply, which like the rest of Beirut operates on a reduced basis. There are many illegal and jerry-rigged connections within the camp and electrocutions are common, partly due to this practice and also due to the proximity of water pipes and electricity cables which are often at head height, running from building to building. In June of 2016, two persons were electrocuted during the visit of this author to the camp. A small number of residents have small generators for electricity provision, but this is inadequate for the camp as a whole.

Figures B.10 and B.11. Proliferation of Electric cables and Water pipes in Shatila PRC. Source: O'Connor 2016.

Figure B.12. Main Street Shatila PRC. Source: O'Connor 2016.

(Note the proliferation of electricity and internet cables and water pipes above the street and the adaptation of the scooter to carry supplies).

Security Matters:

GOL, does not normally enter Shatila compared with other camps and maintains minimal security on the perimeters of the camp, compared with Ein el Hilweh and Burj al Barajneh. Factions allied to members of the Popular Committee police the camp. These internal 'police' are armed with small arms and inter-factional area boundaries are delineated. However, compared with other PRCs such as Ein el Hilweh, armed confrontations are rare. Crime levels are low, but concerns about the prevalence of drugs were expressed to this author in 2015 and 2016. There is a high level of unemployment and no recreational facilities for the youth, leading to fears of involvement in the drugs trade and even some levels of radicalisation. As both of these topics are sensitive matters, interviewees were cautious about giving more than anecdotal information.

Figure B.13. Palestinian Self Defence Forces Burj al Barajneh PRC. O'Connor: 2016.

Figure B.14. Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp Showing the expansion of the Sabra area around Shatila. 2002. Source: Google Earth, 2017.

Figure B.15. Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp Showing the expansion of the Sabra area around Shatila 2004. Source: Google Earth, 2017.

Figure B.16. Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp Showing the expansion of the Sabra area around Shatila 2008. Source: Google Earth, 2017.

Figure B. 17. Shatila Palestinian Refugee Camp Showing the expansion of the Sabra area around Shatila. 2017. Source: Google Earth, 2017.

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Appendix 'C'

Methodology

Research Aims

The primary and overarching aim of this research was to ascertain the degree to which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Har*b subscribe to the traditional Palestinian refugee identity as depicted by previous researchers (Sayigh: 1977,1998,2001, 2012; Ramadan: 2009; Masalha: 2009; Khalidi: 1997; Peteet: 2005), and to identify any intergenerational dissonance in the expression of that identity.

Subsidiary Research aims

- The first subsidiary research aim was to establish the relevance which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* ascribe to events surrounding the *Nakba* (catastrophe). *Al-Nakba* forms the basis for exilic Palestinian history and has been described as the lynchpin of Palestinian identity Allan (2014: 41-45) and a 'watershed in the development of Palestinian identity' (Peteet, 2005: 3; Khalidi, 1997: 22).

- The second subsidiary research aim was to measure the relevance of the concept of *haq al 'awda* for the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* in Lebanon today. *Haq al 'awda* has been one of the central tenets of Palestinian national identity as iterated by academics through the years (Knudsen,2007; Khalidi, 1992; Sayigh, 2001; Abu-Sitta, 1999).

- The third subsidiary research aim was to evaluate whether or not this generation were willing to accept or reject *tawteen. Tawteen* (assimilation, settlement, naturalisation) is regarded as one of the pillars of Palestinian national identity (Knudsen: 2007), and has been regarded by some academics as abhorrent to all Palestinians (Sayigh,1977; Masalha, 2009; Bianchi, 2014). Within the concept,

dimensions of attachment to place, collective identity, homeland and belonging are intertwined.

- The fourth subsidiary research aim was to establish how *hijra* impacted on the concept of identity and belonging for this generation. It has been estimated by Chaaban et al. (2016: 44) that 53.5% of Palestinian refugee households, in Lebanon reported having immediate family abroad. The importance of *hijra* as an outlet for the Palestinian refugees given their precarious existence in the PRCs and how achieving that agency is deserving of investigation.

The author believed that a better understanding of the concepts which the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* hold about their identity may serve to give ethnographers and anthropologists a more realistic and grounded understanding of this generation. It may also assist policymakers and NGOs at the international, regional, national and local levels to design more appropriate strategies for the development of aid, assistance, and permit this generation to achieve some agency for themselves.

This appendix outlines the methodology for this research and is set out to include

- Research aims outline
- Rationale for qualitative research design
- Rationale for case study methodology
- Research design
- Selection of sample groups for data collection
- Data collection methods
- Data analysis methods
- Ethical considerations
- Reliability and Validation

Rationale for Qualitative Research Design

Qualitative research allows the researcher to interact with the lifeworld of the subjects of research and to understand the intricacy of how they experience that world. The aim of qualitative research is to provide a wholeness of understanding how the inhabitants encounter, understand and derive meaning from their social surroundings. Gubrium and Holstein (1997) identify four strands of qualitative research. The first is naturalism which provides thick descriptions of people in natural settings, in social reality. The second is emotionalism, where the inner reality of people is explored. The third is ethnomethodology, the exploration of the creation of social order through dialogue and social interaction. The fourth is postmodernism, in which the social world is open to interpretations, and not just that of the researcher, who may wish to give his/her definitive narrative. In the research for this thesis, elements of those four strands were utilised, in order to achieve what Geertz (1973) termed 'thick descriptions', providing a richer accumulation of data. Qualitative research allows for a spectrum of methods rather than one single method; allows for the perspectives of the participants; maintains a principle of openness; and has its goal discovery of information and deduction of theory and conclusions from that information.

In designing the research methods for this research, the author was of the opinion that purely quantitative methods were insufficient to achieve an abundant level of data, necessary to successfully progress the study. This was mainly due to the paucity of data available for the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb*, in Lebanon, and also based on his experiences in interacting with Palestinian refugees in Lebanon over thirty years. Qualitative research is exploratory and therefore apposite because the research subject is new, and has never been addressed, and existing theories may not apply with this particular group under study.

Rationale for Case Study Methodology

Creswell (2013: 97) describes case study as a qualitative research tool which 'explores a real-life contemporary bounded system…through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information… and reports a case description and case themes'. Merriam (1998: 19), although speaking about its use in education, suggests that 'a case study design is employed to gain an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for all those involved.' She goes on to state that 'insights gained from case studies can directly influence policy, practice and future research.' In the context of this research, the case study approach offered a level of flexibility, which enhanced the collection and analysis of data. The research for this thesis adopted the case study methodology in order to advance an understanding of concepts surrounding the debate on identity for the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* in Lebanon. Denzin and Lincoln (2011: 1-6) relate that the diverse nature of qualitative research allows frequent bending of parameters in methodological practices, which still remain true to the tenets of rigour, including combinations of case study design. This case study could be considered as both idiographic (concerned with unique attributes of a case) and nomothetic (producing conclusions which are not time or place specific). This hybridity was considered to fit well with Denzin and Lincoln's statement, and was formulated as the best method to provide a better understanding of the issues under research.

Research Design

The research design is laid out in the following steps

- A detailed literature review was carried out, in order to identify any relevant contributions by researchers in the issues surrounding identity in general and then specifically refugee identity. This sharpened the focus of the research and ensured that when the

research proposal was presented to the University Research Board, a concrete and directed proposal was established.

- After the proposal was accepted, a further review of the available literature was conducted, which tightened the focus of the research. The proposal was submitted to the University Ethics Board for approval and was accepted.
- A short reconnaissance visit was made in 2015, in order to identify gatekeepers, gather additional information, and detect any potential problems which might arise with the conduct of the research.
- The proposal was reviewed again and some more tightening was made of the focus of research.
- In 2016, gatekeepers were contacted and the research trip was made to Lebanon.
- Semi-structured interviews were conducted with the sixty- one of the *Jeel ma baa'd El Harb* and also with another seventeen NGOs and members of the Lebanese and Palestinian community.
- Interview data were analysed at the end of each day, in order to ascertain if any fine tweaking was required to elicit more pertinent responses.
- On return to Ireland, the data were collated and transcribed and analysed.

Selection of and Access to Sample Groups for Data Collection.

The selection of the sample group for this research used what Bryman (2008: 415) terms purposive sampling- a non-probability form of sampling. Sampling was not carried out on a random basis. The goal was to provide a body of samples which were relevant to the research aims and objectives and yet retain a diversity of opinions and views. This approach was used in order to discover correspondence or difference amongst the respondents. The criteria for selection of respondents included:

- Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon who were resident in the Palestinian Refugee Camps (PRCs). The specific PRCs were: Shatila, Burj al Barajneh, Mar Elias and Ein el Hilweh.
- Palestinian refugee youth in Lebanon who were resident in the gatherings or Urban areas located in Beirut.
- Palestinian refugee youth between the ages of 18 and 35 years. Swedenburg (2007: 1) notes that 'forces of modernity' have greatly 'extended the period of youth' amongst Middle Eastern populations. As a consequence, he says 'young men' (and young women) 'may belong to this category well into their thirties, due in great part to economic difficulties'. This situation is even more prevalent amongst Palestinian refugees in Lebanon.

Due to difficulties of access to the PRCs, identified during preparation for the research, it became obvious that gatekeepers were required as Bryman (2008: 407-409) recommends. Facilitators from within the Irish Diplomatic Service; NGOs; and across the Lebanese and Palestinian political and civil spectrum were utilised. The use of gatekeepers can be problematic, in that they can limit or deny access; or seek to influence the direction and quality of the research undertaken (Saunders, 2006: 126). In the case of this research, no obstacle was encountered and no attempt was made to influence the direction of the research or to put constraints on access or publication of outcomes. Gatekeepers were, as Crawhurst and Kennedy-Macfoy (2013: 457) suggested, 'integral to the entire process of conducting research' in the Lebanese PRCs. By 'negotiating directly with prospective research participants, they accelerated the recruitment process,' thereby, as Mc Areavy and Das (2013: 116) suggest, saving this researcher time and resources.

Data Collection Methods

The author sought to conform to a normative praxis of ethnographic research which examines humans in what Geertz (1973: 45) terms 'webs of significance with their environments', in an effort to understand the world

from the subject's point of view, 'to unfold the meaning of the subject's experiences, to uncover their lived world' as Kvale and Brinkmann (2009: 1) suggest.' Patton (1990: 278) suggests that 'the perspective of others is meaningful, knowable and able to be made explicit.'

The use of interviews has the possibility to generate 'thick descriptions' which enable persons outside of a culture to make meaning of behaviours and beliefs (Geertz, 1973). Observation is another tool in the collection of data. Chatman (1992: 3) classed the process of observation as a way which permits the researcher to gain an insider's view, which affords understanding 'in social settings that reveal reality as lived by members of those settings'.

Interviews

The interview method was deemed the best way to foreground the lived experience of the respondents and uncover their lived world by recording their understanding of that world, in their own language. A number of factors guided this decision including ensuring that the perspective of those being studied was enabled to provide the point of orientation; the ability to gauge the connections of the participants to their social settings more accurately; the ability to investigate the respondents in natural environments; and qualitative research enabled this researcher to attempt to genuinely understand their lives through their eyes (Bryman, 2008: 393-394). The questionnaire used as the basis for the interviews (Appendix 'D') was compiled, after consulting the extant literature on the subject of identity and the formulation of the research aims.

Semi-structured interviews were utilised because as Bryman (2008: 436-439) notes they allowed the researcher to be flexible and to 'adjust the emphasis in responding to the direction in which interviewees gave answers.' This method was deemed to provide a richer and more detailed dataset and enabled the researcher to follow up replies and to alter the order of, and wording of questions. The researcher was conscious of the limitations associated with the interview process, especially when language barriers are present. It should be noted that not all respondents had a high

standard of English and interpreters were employed to assist in the interviews. Munroe and Munroe (1986: 120) highlight the difference between ‘equivalent meaning’ and ‘direct translation’ and the researcher is confident that this did not alter the veracity of translations to responses to the questions asked, during the interviews, as the advice of Berman and Tyyska (2011: 187) was heeded and interpreters were ‘reconceptualised as partners in the research process’.

A secondary limitation is that of researcher bias. This research has adopted what Druckman (2005: 10) calls the *etic* approach, in that the researcher is observing the subject from an ‘outsider vantage point’ and is ‘focussing on the social consequences of actions’. All research is a pursuit for knowledge and this research has striven to be as objective as possible, in order to comply with normative standards. It would be pragmatic to accept that ‘true’ objectivity is nearly impossible to achieve and as Stanley and Wise (1983: 174) state:

> ‘Truth is a social construct, in the same way that objectivity is; and both are constructed out of experiences which are, for all practical purposes, the same as lies and subjectivity’

Furthermore, Fee (1983: 75-88) writes that objectivity does not necessarily involve the distancing of the researcher from the subject and accepts the impossibility of separating research from its socio-political background. Schuyens, Schuyens and Murray (2003: 192) make the same point and add that ‘the axes of our identity leave an imprint on the construction, organisation and execution of the academic process of research’.

Observation

Gorman and Clayton (2005: 40) suggest that observation is: ‘the systematic recording of observable phenomena or behaviour in a natural setting’. The purpose of observation in this research was to study and understand the Palestinian refugees in their natural environment. Acting as a participant – observer, this researcher was afforded the opportunity to discern meanings

which are not readily apparent to casual observers. Geertz (1973: 4-5) further states that

> 'the ability of researcher to take what they say seriously has less to do with… a factual look…. than it has with their capacity to convince us that what they say is as a result of their having penetrated another way of life… of having been there.'

It is acknowledged that it was difficult to maintain observer detachment in PRC settings and "not cross into the friendship domain and remain strongly research oriented" as cautioned by Adler & Adler (1994: 380); however, as this danger was identified in a reflexive process and corrective measures were taken, when deemed necessary. Massey (1991: 24-29) states that places are little more than fragments of time, in a continued process of social relations, which stretch across space. It is in these places that Allan (2014: 27) states that *'felt immediacies'* are most evident. As all aspects of landscape are representational, interpretation of cultural landscape did reveal social attitudes and led to a greater understanding of Palestinian identity. A limitation imposed due to time constraints involved in the research meant that observation methods were restricted, but were nevertheless possible.

Data Analysis Methods

The analysis of the data gathered was a continuous process from the first interview following the path suggested by Strauss and Corbin (1998: 12), in order to develop theory from data collection and analysis. Codes were assigned to data from interviews in order to highlight any data which might form the basis for theory development. These codes were revised on a continual basis, in the field and further revisions were made as the analysis of data ensued upon return from the field of research. Using large sheets of paper, the codes were assigned headings and grouped together to form patterns. Transcripts were read and re-read and notes on the readings were made, especially where additional views on the data were identified. Variables were identified and noted. The researcher employed a system of segmenting the data into groups, and themes which spoke to the subject of

the research. Patterns were identified and grouped together, in separate classifications. The classifications were examined for commonalities of patterns and compared and contrasted with previous research in the broader area of identity. This enabled the researcher to develop theory and to make affirmative conclusions. The findings as a result of the analysis of the data collected is presented as Appendix 'G'.

Ethical Considerations

Bryman (2008: 118) identifies four areas where ethical principles are paramount in research:

- Harm to participants
- Lack of Informed Consent
- Invasion of Privacy
- Use of Deception

Harm to participants

Every care was taken in carrying out the research in Lebanon. Goodhand (2000: 12) warns that 'researchers like aid agencies may affect incentive schemes, and impact upon the coping strategies and safety of communities'. He goes on to make clear that 'researchers have a moral responsibility for their interventions and that they may inadvertently do harm by infringing the security, privacy and well-being of the subjects'. Every effort was made to conduct this research taking into account the cultural, security, privacy and gender issues involved. Furthermore, the researcher was conscious that as Goodhand (2000: 13) states:

> 'researchers have to be constantly aware that while they are present for only a short time, their questions and the discussions which they provoke may reverberate for a long time afterwards'

All interviews were anonymised and pseudonyms assigned to the participants. A master index of real identities was kept in the possession of the researcher at all times. Computers were secured in a safe when not in

use, as was the Dictaphone used as back-up in the interviews. The interviews were conducted in so far as possible in locations out of the public eye, in order to ensure confidentiality for the participants.

Informed Consent

No interview was conducted without the informed consent of the respondent. An explanatory letter was given to each interviewee (Appendix 'E'). Additionally, two copies of a consent to interview form were completed, one copy for the interviewee and one retained by the researcher (Appendix 'F'). Where language problems became apparent, interpreters were used to translate the document and ensure that the respondent understood fully what each form contained; that they were not obliged to answer any or all of the questions asked of them; and that they were free to withdraw from the interview at any time.

Invasion of Privacy

All interviews were conducted in an overt manner. No covert methods were employed. One concern which the researcher had was about the dangers of re-igniting trauma. However, it has been previously found that Palestinians generally have no reticence in recounting the past and are accustomed to researcher's questions. Many of the respondents reported as Newman and Kaloupek (2004: 383-394) suggest that they even found it beneficial. In addition, Hutchinson, Wilson and Wilson (1994: 161-164) have suggested that 'victims find it helpful to talk about their victimisation and to be heard and validated'.

Deception

No deception was involved in this research.

Reliability and Validation

Lincoln and Guba (1985) and Guba and Lincoln (1994) suggest that there are four main measures for the testing the reliability and validation of qualitative research, which they group together under the heading of trustworthiness. These measures are credibility, transferability,

dependability and conformability. It should be noted that it is virtually impossible to replicate a body of research exactly, in other words to produce external reliability. Bryman (2008: 391) suggests that 'it is difficult- not to say impossible to replicate qualitative findings.' The personalities of the respondents; the personalities of the researchers; the location of the research; and the temporal conditions in which it is carried out are unique to that time and place.

Credibility

The credibility or internal validity of the research depends on complying with the norms of good practice, in carrying out the research and presenting the research findings to the subjects of the research in order to assure the accuracy and confirmation of those findings. This ensures that the researcher has a strong link between the observations of the researcher and the conclusions which he evolves. There was limited opportunity for providing feedback to the subjects of this research, due to time constraints and the geographical dispersion of the respondents. However, explication of the data was provided in most cases, and in particular where the researcher wished to clarify that the information and meanings of responses was correctly understood. The research sought at all times to test the validity of the conclusions reached and not just to verify the conclusions. It should be borne in mind that in most cases of the interviews conducted, it would be difficult for the respondents to authenticate the evaluation of the researcher, due to the language used, which is for a scientific audience. Nevertheless, in all cases where attempts were made to validate the data and analysis, simple terminology was used. No differences were recorded between the conclusions which the researcher arrived at and the inputs from respondents which were recorded.

Transferability

The transferability or external validity of the research is concerned with the concept of whether or not the phenomenon under research and the resultant findings 'can hold true in some other context, at some other time' (Lincoln and Guba 1985: 316). Geertz (1973) suggests that researchers produce

‘thick descriptions’ -thick, rich descriptions of the respondents and the context in which they are made- in order to ensure the transferability of findings to other contexts.

Dependability

The dependability or reliability of qualitative research relies on the keeping of complete records of all stages of the research process from research aim formulation, through selection of respondents and compilation of interview transcripts to analysis and conclusions. This research sought at all times to conform to the rigour of normative practices in this area. Extensive notes were kept at all stages of the development of the research aims and objectives; the conduct of the fieldwork in Lebanon; and at the analysis and conclusions reached stages.

Conformability

Conformability in qualitative research is concerned with the objectivity of the researcher. It is almost impossible to achieve complete objectivity in ethnographic research, especially where interview techniques are employed. The researcher for this study used a reflexive methodology to eliminate bias, subjectivity, personal values and theoretical leanings which might have influenced the design of the research and its findings.

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Appendix 'D'

Aide Memoire for Interviews in Lebanon

1. Interview Number:
2. Date:
3. Gender:
4. Age:
5. Married/Engaged/Single:
6. Religion: Muslim, Sunni
7. Camp: Area/Street:
8. Original Village/Town Palestine:
9. Mother:
10. Father:
11. Brothers:
12. Sisters:
13. Position in the Family:
14. Relatives from *al-Nakba* still living:
15. Education:
16. Employment:
17. Earnings:
18. Access to Internet:
19. How often do you leave the Camp?
20. Where do you go outside the Camp?
21. Is there anywhere you don't go?
22. What do you know about the *Nakba*?

23. How did you learn about the *Nakba*?
24. How many rooms in your House/Apartment?
25. Do You Own Your House/Apartment?
26. How much Rent do you pay?
27. Is anyone in your family sick often and if so how often?
28. How much does it cost for Medical treatment and where do you get it?
29. What do want for the future for yourself and your family?
30. What do you think about *tawteen*?
31. What do you understand by *haq al-awda*?
32. What do you think about *hijra*? *
33. How are your aspirations different from those of your parents and grandparents?
34. What should the countries of the world do to help your situation?
35. Is there anything that you want me to know, that I have not asked you?

*The question on *hijra* was added to the questionnaire in Lebanon, as a result of preliminary interviews with NGOs and UNRWA officials and analysis of the data collected from them.

Appendix 'E'

Information Sheet

Researcher: Dermot O'Connor

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T: +44 2870123456

e-mail: oconnor-d5@ulster.ac.uk

Research Title: "A Study of Identity and Belonging amongst the *Jeel al-harb* Generation of Palestinians in Lebanon."

Information Sheet

This research is being carried out to ascertain if the concepts of personal and group identity are the same as the concepts of identity and belonging as previously understood by academics, relief agencies, politicians and laypeople.

The importance for this research lies in its ability to throw light on any changes which might be uncovered and which could ultimately lead to a better understanding of the situation of the Jeel al-harb generation.

A better understanding by the world in general, but specifically by Relief Agencies, NGO's and Peacemakers will ultimately lead to formulation of better policies and an improvement in service provision for the Palestinian Refugee population as a whole.

This research is entirely voluntary and you are free at any time to discontinue participating in it.

All interview records are confidential and are encrypted.

All records will be kept securely and remain in the possession of the Researcher and Ulster University.

All records will be anonymised, so the individuals will not be identifiable.

Dermot O'Connor

Researcher

Appendix 'F'

Consent Form

Researcher: Dermot O'Connor

e-mail: oconnor-d5@ulster.ac.uk

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T: +44 2870123456

Research Title: "A Study of Identity and Belonging amongst the *Jeel al-harb* Generation of Palestinians in Lebanon."

CONSENT FORM

I confirm that I have been given and have read and understood the Information Sheet for the above study and I have asked and received answers to any questions raised. [ ]

I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to Withdraw at any time without giving a reason and without my rights being affected in any way. [ ]

I understand that the researchers will hold all information and data collected securely and in confidence and that all efforts will be made to ensure that I cannot be identified as a participant in the study (except as might be required by law) and I give permission for the researchers to hold relevant personal data. [ ]

I agree to take part in the above study. [ ]

_____
_____

Name of Subject Signature

Date

_____
_____

Name of person taking consent Signature

Date

_____
_____

Name of researcher Signature

Date

One Copy each to Researcher and Subject

Appendix 'G'

Summary of Findings

Total Interviewed: 61

Religion

Muslim, Sunni: 60 – 98.4%

Christian, Catholic: 1 – 1.6%

Gender Distribution

Males: 32 – 53%

Females: 29 – 47%

Homes of Interviewees

Shatila: 29 - 47%

Burj al Barajneh: 16 – 26%

Ein el Hilweh: 2 – 3%

Mar Elias: 3 – 5%

Gatherings: 5 – 9%

City: 6 - 10%

Total: 61 – 100%

Interviewee Age Spread (in years)

18 – 25: 32 – 53%

26 – 30: 16 – 26%

30 -35: 13 - 21%

Marital Status

Married: 17 – 27%

Single: 38 – 63%

Engaged: 4 – 6%

Divorced: 1 – 2%

Widowed: 1 – 2%

Employment Status:

Employed: 41 -67%

Unemployed: 20 – 33%

White Collar: 25 – 61%

Blue Collar: 16 – 39%

Employment by Gender

Employed Males: 22 – 69%

White Collar: 9 – 36%

Blue Collar: 13 – 64%

Employed Females: 19 – 66%

White Collar: 16 – 81%

Blue Collar: 3 – 19%

Unemployed Males: 10 – 31%

Unemployed Females: 10 – 34%

Earnings ($ per Month, includes nil)

0 – 400: 21 – 51% of those Employed

400– 1,000: 12 – 20% of those Employed

1,050 – 1,500: 5 – 12% of those Employed

>1,500: 3 – 8% of those Employed

Earnings ($ per Month, includes nil), by Gender

Males:

0– 400: 7 – 32% of those Employed

400– 1,000: 8 – 36% of those Employed

1,050 – 1,500: 4 – 18% of those Employed

>1,500: 3 – 14% of those Employed

Females:

0– 400: 14 – 74% of those Employed

400– 1,000: 4 – 21% of those Employed

1,050 – 1,500: 1 – 5% of those Employed

>1,500: 0 – 0% of those Employed

Education

Brevet (includes not completed): 16 – 26%

Baccalaureate (includes not completed): 20 – 33%

University (includes not completed): 25 – 41%

Education by Gender:

Males - Brevet (includes not completed): 12 – 37%

- Baccalaureate (includes not completed): 9 -28%
- University (includes not completed): 11 -35%

Females – Brevet (includes not completed): 4 – 14%

- Baccalaureate (includes not completed) 11 – 38%
- University (includes not completed) 14 – 48%

Education and Employment

Employed Males **22** (69%)

up to, and including Brevet: - 8 -36%

up to and including Baccalaureate: - 6 - 27%

up to and including University: - 8 -36%

Unemployed Males **10** (31%)

up to, and including Brevet: - 4 -40%

up to and including Baccalaureate: - 3 - 30%

up to and including University: - 3 - 30%

Employed Females **19** (65.5%)

up to, and including Brevet: - 1 -5%

up to and including Baccalaureate: - 5 - 26%

up to and including University: - 13 -69%

Unemployed Females **10** (34.5%)

up to, and including Brevet: - 3 -30%

up to and including Baccalaureate: - 6 - 60%

up to and including University: - 1 -10%

Total Both Genders Employed **41**

up to, and including Brevet: - 9 -22%

up to and including Baccalaureate: - 11 - 27%

up to and including University: - 21 - 51%

Total Both Genders Unemployed **20**

up to, and including Brevet: - 7 -35%

up to and including Baccalaureate: - 9 - 45%

up to and including University: - 4 – 20%

Access to Mobile Phone, Laptop & Wi-Fi/ Internet

Mobile Phone Males 32, (100%) Females 29 (100%) – Total -100%

Laptop/Computer Males 12 (37.5%), Females 12 (41.4%) - Total – 39%

Wi-Fi, Internet Males 24 (75%), Females 21 (72,4%) -Total – 77%

Those who said that they had no Computer/Laptop said that they couldn't afford it. (61%)

Those who said that they had no Wi-Fi/Internet said that they couldn't afford it. (23%)

Differences in aspirations from Parents/Grandparents

Yes

Males	16 – 50%
Females	17 – 59%
Total Yes	33 – 54%

No. the same

Males	12 – 37%
Females	11 – 38%
Total No the same	23 – 38%

Didn't know/no opinion

Males	4 - 13%
Females	1 - 3%

Total didn't know/no opinion – 5 - 8%

Tawteen

For:	27 -44%
Against	26 – 43%

Unsure	5– 8%
Don't Care	3 – 5%

***Tawteen* Males:**

For:	15 -47%
Against	11 – 35%
Unsure	3– 9%
Don't Care	3 – 9%

***Tawteen* Females**;

For:	12 -41%
Against	15 –52%
Unsure	2– 7%
Don't Care	0

***Hijra*:**

Yes:	36 – 59%
No:	6 -10%
Unsure**:	19 -31%

Males:

Yes:	20- 63%
No:	3 -9%
Unsure**:	9 -28%

Females:

Yes:	16 – 55%
No:	3 -10%
Unsure**:	10- 35%

** This figure includes those who didn't know whether they would or not emigrate or did not express an opinion on the matter.

Haq al Awda

Aware of ROR:	56 – 91.8%
Don't Know about:	4 – 6.6%
Aware but don't want:	1 – 1.6%
Will happen in lifetime:	30 – 49%
Not happen in Near/Med Future:	27 – 44%

***Haq al Awda* Males**

Aware of ROR:	29 – 91%
Don't Know about:	2– 6%
Aware but don't want:	1 – 1.6%
Will happen in lifetime:	16 – 50%
Not happen in Near/Med Future:	16 – 50%

***Haq al Awda* Females**

Aware of ROR:	27 – 93%
Don't Know about:	2– 7%
Aware but don't want:	0 – 0%
Will happen in lifetime:	14 – 48.4%
Not happen in Near/Med Future:	11 – 38%

Identity

Retain Palestinian Identity: 35 – 57.4%

Lose Palestinian Identity: 6 – 10%

Don't Care: 1 – 1.6%

Happy to have a Double Identity**: 38 – 62%

Ambivalent/Not Sure: 19 – 31%

** The respondents said that they wouldn't necessarily include a Palestinian identity here.

Identity Males

Retain Palestinian Identity: 20 – 62%

Lose Palestinian Identity: 4 – 13%

Don't Care: 1 – 3%

Happy to have a Double Identity**: 16 – 50%

Ambivalent/Not Sure: 7 – 22%

** The respondents said that they wouldn't necessarily include a Palestinian identity here.

Identity Females

Retain Palestinian Identity: 15 – 52%

Lose Palestinian Identity: 2 – 7%

Don't Care: 0

Happy to have a Double Identity**: 22 – 76%

Ambivalent/Not Sure: 12 – 41%

** The respondents said that they wouldn't necessarily include a Palestinian identity here.

Nakba

Don't know about:	8 – 13%
Poor Knowledge:	17 – 28%
Fair Knowledge:	23 – 38%
Good/Very Good Knowledge:	13 – 21%
Blame British for:	34 – 56%
Blame US for:	4 – 7%

Appendix 'H'

Research Interviews *Jeel ma Baa'd El Harb* Lebanon 2016

Number	Date	Location	Gender	Age	Religion
01	20.06.16	Beirut Gathering	F	21	Sunni
02	20.06.16	Beirut	F	21	Sunni
03	20.06.16	Beirut Gathering	M	23	Sunni
04	20.06.16	Beirut Gathering	M	21	Sunni
05	20.06.16	Mar Elias	M	26	Sunni
06	20.06.16	Mar Elias	M	23	Sunni
07	20.06.16	Shatila	M	26	Sunni
08	21.06.16	Beirut	M	29	Sunni
09	21.06.16	Beirut Gathering	M	31	Sunni
10	21.06.16	Beirut	M	31	Christian
11	21.06.16	Burj al Barajneh	M	31	Sunni
12	21.06.16	Shatila	M	21	Sunni
13	21.06.16	Shatila	F	20	Sunni
14	21.06.16	Shatila	F	20	Sunni
15	22.06.16	Ein el Hilweh	M	35	Sunni
16	22.06.16	Ein el Hilweh	F	27	Sunni
17	22.06.16	Shatila	M	27	Sunni

18	27.06.16	Shatila	M	27	Sunni
19	27.06.16	Shatila	M	35	Sunni
20	27.06.16	Shatila	F	20	Sunni
21	27.06.16	Shatila	M	25	Sunni
22	27.06.16	Shatila	M	33	Sunni
23	27.06.16	Shatila	F	34	Sunni
24	27.06.16	Beirut Gathering	M	25	Sunni
25	28.06.16	Mar Elias	F	35	Sunni
26	28.06.16	Shatila	M	24	Sunni
27	28.06.16	Shatila	F	20	Sunni
28	28.06.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	19	Sunni
29	28.06.16	Beirut Gathering	M	29	Sunni
30	29.06.16	Shatila	F	19	Sunni
31	29.06.16	Shatila	F	28	Sunni
32	29.06.16	Shatila	F	20	Sunni
33	29.06.16	Shatila	M	35	Sunni
34	30.06.16	Beirut Gathering	F	30	Sunni
35	30.06.16	Shatila	M	21	Sunni
36	30.06.16	Shatila	M	35	Sunni
37	30.06.16	Shatila	F	25	Sunni

38	30.06.16	Shatila	F	20	Sunni
39	30.06.16	Shatila	F	30	Sunni
40	30.06.16	Shatila	M	28	Sunni
41	01.07.16	Shatila	M	27	Sunni
42	01.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	25	Sunni
43	01.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	28	Sunni
44	01.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	21	Sunni
45	01.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	23	Sunni
46	01.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	23	Sunni
47	01.07.16	Beirut Gathering	F	22	Sunni
48	01.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	19	Sunni
49	01.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	21	Sunni
50	01.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	M	24	Sunni
51	02.07.16	Beirut Gathering	M	35	Sunni
52	04.07.16	Mar Elias	F	22	Sunni
53	04.07.16	Mar Elias	M	35	Sunni

54	05.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	34	Sunni
55	05.07.16	Beirut Gathering	M	27	Sunni
56	05.07.16	Beirut Gathering	F	23	Sunni
57	05.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	M	21	Sunni
58	05.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	26	Sunni
59	05.07.16	Beirut Gathering	M	25	Sunni
60	05.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	F	22	Sunni
61	05.07.16	Burj al Barajneh	M	24	Sunni